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Recently, standard is an increasingly important non-tariff barrier in the world trade system.  
However, the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which has been 
adopted to deal with issues of trade-restrictive standards, is yet to be adequately utilized and 
effectively applied to discipline such a problem.  This thesis observes that one of the major 
regulatory limitations of the current TBT regime is the Agreement’s ambiguity in the concept 
of ‘standards’ and its regulatory scope.  Therefore, this thesis attempts to clarify the meaning, 
regulatory scope and legal status of ‘standards’ in the TBT Agreement.  In particular, this 
thesis finds it fundamentally essential to compare the concept of ‘standards’ with the concept 
of ‘technical regulations’ and to examine the legal element of “mandatory/voluntary 
compliance”, which serves as a determinative legal criterion to distinguish ‘standards’ from 
‘technical regulations’, with a view to suggest a proper meaning and boundary of ‘standards’ 
for the purpose of the Agreement.  This thesis basically relies on two sources of evidence 
that are considered to be most relevant and useful.  One is the conceptual development of 
‘standards’ over the past GATT/WTO negotiations and the other is the legal development of 
the terms ‘standards’ and “mandatory/voluntary compliance” interpreted and applied in recent 
TBT disputes.  
The result of the analysis on the conceptual development primarily shows that there have 
been notable changes in the concept of ‘standards’ adopted by major draft and final TBT 
codes and agreements in the GATT/WTO history.  For instance, the analysis finds that the 
legal status of ‘standards’ in the past TBT draft and final codes was actually equivalent to that 
of ‘technical regulations’.  However, the equivalent legal status has been significantly 
revised during the Uruguay Round negotiations and, as a result, in the current TBT 
Agreement, ‘standards’ are indirectly and less strictly regulated, when compared to ‘technical 
regulations’.  Another finding shows that, in the past, the concept of ‘standards’ was largely 
comprised with characteristics of the standards bodies and these characteristics of the bodies 
were main features that distinguished the concept of ‘standards’ from the concept of 
ii 
‘technical regulations’.  However, these components have evolved to be almost meaningless 
in the current TBT regime since the scope of standards bodies have broadened to incorporate 
virtually all bodies and the scope of the bodies that enact and enforce standards is actually 
identical with the scope of the bodies that implement ‘technical regulations’.  Moreover, the 
requirement of “mandatory/voluntary compliance” was strictly dependent on some legal 
criteria in the early draft and final codes, but these legal elements have been gradually 
removed from the legal texts throughout the negotiations, making the distinction between 
‘standards’ and ‘technical regulations’ substantially blurred and obscure in the current TBT 
Agreement.   
These findings altogether imply that there has been increasing ambiguity in the concept of 
‘standards’ and its regulatory scope under the TBT Agreement.  This is a serious limitation 
of the TBT regime, since such a vague concept can cause confusion and uncertainty in the 
implementation and operation of the TBT Agreement.  Consequently, it can also make the 
TBT regime less useful and ineffective.  Accordingly, this thesis suggests that such a 
loophole should be addressed with a more careful interpretation of the terms ‘standards’ and 
“mandatory/voluntary compliance” and, thus, the second part of the thesis is devoted to 
examining various approaches to the interpretation of these concepts in order to find out an 
appropriate context for interpreting the concept.  
Therefore, this thesis moves on to examine the recent discussions surrounding the concepts 
of ‘standards’ and “mandatory/voluntary compliance”.  The analysis largely concludes that 
the term ‘standard’ is usually interpreted in the context of determining a “relevant 
international standard” as provided in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement but the review 
processes have not been consistent.  In addition, it finds that the definition of ‘standard’ is 
only limitedly considered when the legal characterization of a measure at issue is reviewed. 
Furthermore, the concept of “mandatory/voluntary compliance” is still left unclear, if not 
obscured even further, by the interpretations in US-Tuna II.  
In line with these implications and partial conclusions of the analyses summarized above, 
the thesis finally revisits the concept of ‘standards’ and attempts to suggest an appropriate 
way of understanding and applying the concept.  This thesis argues that it may be desirable 
to carry out the legal characterization of a measure in accordance with a suggested two-stage 
review process, rather than with the one-stage-three-criteria review process introduced, but 
iii 
not consistently applied, in the actual dispute settlements up to the present.  It further argues 
that the recent approach to interpreting “mandatory/voluntary compliance” concept in US-
Tuna II cannot be a generally applicable set of criteria for other disputes.  In addition, it 
criticizes that some of the interpretative approaches were overly relied on textualism.  
Finally, it emphasizes that the concept of “mandatory/voluntary compliance” should be 
extensively applied so that part of the legally voluntary but virtually mandatory ‘standards’ 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Nature of the Issue 
Product standards are developed for various purposes, and widely used in numerous 
contexts.  In general, they have been crucial for modern industrial development, encouraging 
technological spillovers and enabling product compatibilities.  In the meantime, the 
governments have actively utilized the beneficial function of standards when they implement 
public policies for protecting the consumers and the environment.  Through standardization 
activities, for example, they have set minimum product qualities, maximum levels of health 
risks and desirable thresholds for the environment.   
The demand for standards is continuously rising as the modern society becomes more 
aware of market failures such as consumption risks or information asymmetry, and as the 
global competition in terms of technology and production efficiency intensifies among 
producers all over the world.  As a result, standards are increasing in number and in variety, 
posing serious problems in international trade environment.  
The trade effect of domestic standards is not straightforward.  However, the trading 
partners’ dissimilar domestic standards often create trade barriers, and some domestic 
standards are actually introduced for protectionist intents.  These trade-restrictive aspects of 
standards had been well noted by the early negotiators of the GATT/WTO system and, 
consequently, the plurilateral GATT Standards Code was adopted after the Tokyo Round to 
address trade-related standards issues, and this Code was eventually replaced by the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) after the Uruguay Round.    
The WTO TBT Agreement, therefore, establishes the currently effective multilateral 
system for preventing trade-restrictive standards and regulating other standards issues.  The 
Agreement defines technical barriers in terms of three sources: ‘technical regulations’, 
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‘standards’ and ‘conformity assessment procedures’.  These three categories are separately 
defined in the legal provisions.  However, the distinction between ‘standards’ and ‘technical 
regulations’ in particular is not sufficiently clear for practical uses because the concept of 
“mandatory/voluntary compliance”, a critical legal element for the division, is found to be 
ambiguous and confusing in actual interpretation.  In fact, the logics and approaches 
suggested during the interpretation of the terms ‘technical regulations’ and ‘standards’ in US-
Tuna II have evidently showed that the WTO members, panels and the Appellate Body were 
all having diverging views and perspectives as regards to the concepts of these terms.   
In addition, it is noted that the treatment of ‘standards’ and the treatment of ‘technical 
regulations’ in the Agreement are fundamentally different.  The legal consequence of being 
‘standards’ results in relatively indirect application of more general disciplines, when 
compared with the legal consequence of being ‘technical regulations’.  This is because the 
Agreement’s obligations for ‘standards’ are provided in Annex 4, which is only conditionally 
applied upon prior acceptance by the standards bodies.  Thus, despite the rising importance 
of standards as non-tariff trade barriers, standards issues are not adequately captured by the 
current regulatory scope of the Agreement and not yet to be effectively addressed by the 
disciplines.  
Based on this background, the thesis addresses the inherent vagueness in the concept of 
‘standards’ in the WTO TBT Agreement and ultimately attempts to clarify the meaning, scope 
and legal status of them for the purpose of the Agreement.  This thesis considers that there 
are three major distinctive features in the nature of the problem it intends to deal with.   
First, the concept of ‘standards’ cannot be examined independently and separately from the 
concept of ‘technical regulations’ since they share the common dividing line between 
themselves.  In other words, the “mandatory/voluntary compliance” concept is one of the 
major legal components for both ‘technical regulations’ and ‘standards’, and the interpretation 
and application of the concept simultaneously affects the meanings and regulatory scopes of 
the both concepts.  Therefore, it is inevitable, in this study, to discuss the concept of 
‘technical regulations’ and the interpretation of “mandatory/voluntary compliance” in the 
context of ‘technical regulations’ along with the delineation of the concept ‘standards’.  
Second, this thesis observes that the conceptual evolution of ‘standards’ within the 
developmental history of the GATT/WTO TBT Agreements over the past decades provides 
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one of the most relevant reference and a valuable perspective in understanding the concept of 
‘standards’ used in the current TBT Agreement.  The reasons are twofold.  On the one hand, 
the current concept of ‘standards’ established by the WTO TBT Agreement is fundamentally 
a result of the past negotiations and, therefore, should be understood in line with the previous 
concepts introduced in the early draft and final legal texts.  This does not necessarily mean 
that the current state of the concept or the past state of the concept is one of the most desirable 
or the most improved.  On the other hand, a preliminary conclusion of the conceptual 
developments supports that major changes in the concept of ‘standards’ over the 
developmental process have been consistent and that there are probably certain evolutionary 
directions for such changes.  This thesis reasons that such evolutionary directions, regardless 
of their desirability, may provide some relevant and useful contexts for interpreting the legal 
concept of ‘standards’.  
Third, this thesis considers that not only final rulings of the panels and the Appellate body 
in disputes but all of the arguments and interpretative approaches taken by the disputants and 
participants to the disputes also provide valuable foundations and references for the 
interpretation.  This is because the legal development in the concepts of ‘standards’ and 
“mandatory/voluntary compliance” is still at a very early stage and solid jurisprudence for 
them has not established yet.  Therefore, it may be more appropriate for an academic study 
like this thesis to take into account all relevant ideas and approaches discussed so far and to 
carefully use them as a basis of finding a desirable perspective for the concepts.  
In pursuit of the above-mentioned objectives, Chapter II of this thesis begins with the 
discussions over various meanings of ‘standards’ found in different contexts and different 
WTO agreements.  Then, Chapter III proceeds to explore the meaning, regulatory scope and 
legal status of ‘standards’ in the WTO TBT Agreement.  Chapter IV thoroughly studies the 
conceptual development of ‘standards’ traced back in the negotiation process, from the prior 
period to the Tokyo Round to the Tokyo Round negotiations to the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  Chapter V carries out rigorous legal analyses on the interpretative approaches 
to the concept of ‘standards’ shown in disputes and compares them with the corresponding 
approaches to the interpretations of the concept ‘technical regulations’. Based on the 
implications from the major analyses on the conceptual developments and legal 
interpretations, Chapter VI revisits the concepts of ‘standards’ and “mandatory/voluntary 
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1.2 Scope of the Study 
 
The scope of the study in this thesis covers only the legal concepts of ‘standards’, 
‘technical regulations’ and other relevant terms such as “mandatory/voluntary compliance” 
and does not encompass the concept of “conformity assessment procedures” and other 
procedural standards.  In addition, although it examines and compares the common and 
different disciplines for ‘technical regulations’ and ‘standards’, the comparative analysis is 
strictly limited to their common and different terminologies, expressions, and languages 
provided in provisions, and is not extended to more rigorous legal analysis for their 
interpretations and applications.  
In addition, the analysis of the conceptual development of the concept ‘standards’ is 
largely based on its legal definitions, regulatory scopes, and legal status apparently found in 
major drafts and final codes, which are carefully selected based upon their significance in 
conceptual changes and rule developments.  The analysis does not attempt to figure out 
unrevealed intentions by the early negotiators or unexpressed reasons for the revisions unless 
the relevant official documents provide clear backgrounds and overt reasons regarding certain 
arguments and revisions.  
Furthermore, the following analytic tool is used to examine and compare changes in the 
concept of ‘standards’ in different draft and final legal texts.  The TBT Agreement divides 
the entire scope of product standards into mandatory ‘technical regulations’ and voluntary 
‘standards’ and each category is subject to different rules and disciplines.  Article 2 and 3 of 
the TBT Agreement are applied to ‘technical regulations’ and Article 4 and the Code to 
standards are applied to ‘standard’.  These separate rules and procedures are generally 
identical to each other.  The common principles for both ‘technical regulations’ and 
‘standards’ include non-discriminatory treatment between domestic and import products as 
well as among imported products, prohibition of unnecessary barriers to trade, requirement to 
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use international standards as a basis, encouragement to participate in international 
standardizations, and requirement of certain transparency procedures when the members are 
preparing, adopting, and applying the three categories of technical barriers.  
The rules and procedures for ‘technical regulations’ or ‘standards’ are also divided into 
three levels of standards bodies, which are central government bodies, local government 
bodies and non-government bodies.  This categorization is inherently related to the 
implementation obligations.  The Agreement applies its obligations directly to central 
government bodies but indirectly imposes disciplines on local and non-government bodies. 
Also, the Agreement contains the expression “shall ensure” and applies the highest degree of 
implementation obligations to central government bodies; however, it contains the so-called 
“best efforts” approach and only demands a relatively lower degree of compliance obligation 
from local and non-government bodies.  In this way, the Agreement further differentiates its 
treatment to central government standardizing bodies from its treatment to local and non-
government standardization bodies’.  
 
Figure 1. An analytic framework applied in this thesis 
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Accordingly, the overall regulatory framework of the TBT Agreement is constructed not 
only based on different categories of technical barriers, namely, technical regulations, 
standards, and conformity assessment procedures, but also based on the different levels of 
standardizing bodies, that is, central government bodies, local government bodies, and non-
government bodies.  This regulatory framework of the TBT Agreement can be presented in a 
three-by-three matrix box as drawn in <Figure 1>.  
< Figure 1> shows that the regulatory framework of the TBT Agreement is based on the 
three types of technical barriers - ‘technical regulation’, ‘standard’, and ‘conformity 
assessment procedure’ - as horizontally represented in each column and three different levels 
of standards bodies - central government bodies, local government bodies, and non-
government bodies- as vertically represented in each row.  The bold lines represent the 
actual regulatory scope and dotted lines represent conceptually the most expansive regulatory 
scope of the TBT Agreement.   
The three-by-three matrix drawn in <Figure 1> represents an entire picture of the 
Agreement’s regulatory structure.  However, this thesis addresses legal and regulatory issues 
of the concept of ‘standards’ and its distinction from the concept of ‘technical regulation’.  
Therefore, the three-by-three matrix table will be modified to a two-by-three matrix form by 
excluding the last column in the right side, which represents the regulatory scope of 
‘conformity assessment procedures’.  The modified two-by-three matrix tool will be applied 





The thesis introduces and addresses various meanings of the term standards and diverse 
contexts in which they are used.  The term sometimes indicates a set of standards used in 
everyday life and in general contexts.  The term may also stand for a specific legal 
terminology used in certain legal documents.  In other contexts, the term probably refers to 
one of the subject matters provided by the WTO TBT Agreement.   
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Due to the complexity and multiplicity of the meanings of the term standard, this thesis 
finds it necessary and useful to distinguish all these three types of standards represented in 
different contexts, and to identify each of them with a different form of writing.  
Accordingly, this thesis writes standard in the three respective forms as shown in the 
following: standards, “standards” and ‘standards’.   
In order to minimize confusions on the part of the readers, each of them is illustrated.  
First, the expression standards refers to standards used in general and broad meanings.  The 
expression “standards” indicates concepts and subject matters provided in any legal or official 
texts such as the draft proposals and final versions of the GATT/WTO TBT Agreements or 
the definitions provided by the ISO/ECE Guides.  Finally, the term ‘standards’ is 
consistently used to represent the category of standards which is defined as one of the three 
main sources of the technical barriers to trade by the current TBT Agreement and which is the 
fundamental object of this thesis.  In other words, this thesis studies the concept of 
‘standards’ in comparison with standards or “standards”, and its ultimate goal is to clarify the 
concept of ‘standards’.  
In addition, the expression “mandatory/voluntary compliance” represents both the binding 
character of compliance for ‘technical regulations’ and the non-binding character of 
compliance for ‘standards’.  The expression is generally used to indicate any type of the 
compliance for the sake of simplicity.  Therefore, the readers should understand that the 
phrase “mandatory/voluntary compliance” just refers to the legal element or component itself, 
not to any of the compliance types.  When a specific indication is needed, such expressions 
as “mandatoriness” or “voluntariness” of the compliance will be used.   
 
 
1.4 Overview of Principal Conclusions 
 
In general, standards cover a variety of fields, functions and forms.  The term standard, 
therefore, can be hardly defined in specific terms.  Since the word standard itself implies 
multiple contexts and situations, its concept can hardly be clearly delineated, which causes a 
fundamental problem for understanding and applying the term ‘standard’ for the purpose of 
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operating the WTO TBT Agreement.  
Thus, Chapter 2 examines unstandardized meanings of standard in general contexts.  It 
emphasizes diversity of its meanings by showing examples of different definitions and 
concepts represented in dictionaries, in economics, and in language of major international, 
regional and national standards bodies.  In addition, this Chapter particularly sheds lights on 
apparently inconsistent and incoherent use of the term standard across different Agreements 
under the auspice of the WTO regime. 
In the GATT/WTO regime, the word standard is mainly used to refer to voluntary 
‘standards’, one source of technical barriers under the auspice of the TBT Agreement.  
However, other Agreements also use the term standard, but without clearly indicating 
whether it has the same meaning as the term ‘standards’ used in the TBT Agreement or not.  
The analysis of this Chapter finds that all the terms “standards” have different meanings and 
scopes from an Agreement to another, and the explicitly defined meaning of ‘standards’ in the 
TBT Agreement is not consistently or coherently used in other WTO Agreements.  For 
example, when the word “standards” is used in the GATS and GPA, it generally encompasses 
very broad meanings and scopes.  It probably includes both substantive and procedural 
standards.  Also, the “standards” may refer to products standards or service standards or both 
depending on the context the term is used.   
In addition, it is clear from the analysis of this chapter that none of the contexts in other 
WTO Agreements, the concept of “standards” is identified as ‘standards’ on the basis of 
voluntary compliance.  Therefore, it seems to be very typical to the case of the TBT 
Agreement that the term ‘standards’ is defined in terms of voluntary compliance.  
The fundamental purpose of the TBT Agreement is to reduce and prevent technical barriers 
to trade.  In order words, the Agreement establishes a regime which prevents and deals with 
trade-restrictive effect of standards rather than directly controlling standards and 
standardization activities.  Chapter 3, therefore, is devoted to reviewing the current TBT 
regime that defines ‘standard’ as one of its subject matters and regulates it through disciplines 
set out in provisions of Article 3 and the Code of Good Practice in Annex 4.  In particular, it 
examines major legal elements that comprise the concept of ‘standards’ for the purpose of the 
TBT Agreement and adopts a comparative analysis with a view to highlight both common and 
different features in the Agreement’s treatments toward ‘standards’ and ‘technical 
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regulations’. 
The major findings of the analysis on the meaning of ‘standards’ in the current TBT 
Agreement include that products must be identifiable in documents of ‘standards’, that it is 
not still clear as to whether the scope of ‘standards’ covers non-product related PPMs or not, 
but voluntary labelling, for example, may cover both product-related and non-product related 
PPMs, and that approval by a recognized ‘standards’ bodies can be perceived from broad 
perspectives.  The concept of ‘standards’ shares many commonalities with the concept of 
‘technical regulations’ except for its legal element of “voluntary” compliance.  
The comparison of the disciplines concludes that the Agreement’s obligations for 
‘standards’ and ‘technical regulations’ are largely identical.  Nevertheless, in addition to 
transparency procedures, there are a few critical differences in disciplines for ‘standard’ such 
as the Agreement’s no explicit requirement for “legitimate objectives”, expressive 
requirement for national harmonization and pursuit of national consensus, and requirement for 
Member’s implementation effort based on a negative approach.  Above all, the disciplines 
for ‘standards’ provided in Annex 4 Code are applied, in principle, only conditionally upon 
the acceptance by standards bodies.  
The GATT/WTO system has long attempted to establish an effective regime to reduce and 
prevent technical barriers and, after a series of negotiations and revisions, it finally adopted 
the definitions, regulatory structures and disciplines currently provided in the TBT Agreement. 
Multilateral negotiations to regulate trade-restrictive standards began right after the Kennedy 
Round as the negotiators felt a need to discipline non-tariff barriers.  The negotiation for 
standards was generally successful and proceeded with little difficulties compared to other 
non-tariff barrier issues during the Tokyo Round negotiation.   
Nevertheless, there have been substantial changes with respect to definitions, regulatory 
structures, and disciplines from the initial design to the GATT TBT Agreement and to the 
WTO TBT Agreement, and the concept of “standards” has experienced several revisions.  In 
consequence, the concept of “standards” defined and regulated by the WTO TBT Agreement 
now is a result of the long process of previous negotiations and revisions and, therefore, it 
should be understood and interpreted in line with this developmental context.  
Therefore, Chapter 4 concentrates on the conceptual development of ‘standard’ during the 
past negotiation history of the GATT/WTO system.  It first reviews the very early 
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discussions over the concept and the coverage of ‘standard’ during the drafting period of the 
Standards Code right after the Kennedy Round.  Then, it moves on to examine the rigorous 
conceptualization process during the Tokyo Round, including discussion over applicability of 
the Agreement to various subject matters like SPS measures, health and sanitary regulations, 
labeling, packaging and marks of origin.  It traces how the overall coverage of 
“standard”(the entire subject matter) was finally determined, and how the concept of 
‘standard’ (one of the subject matters) was developed and harmonized with the ISO/ECE 
normative definitions.  Then, the chapter analyzes the concept of ‘standard’ – its definition, 
regulatory scope and disciplines in major draft Standards Codes.  Finally, it reviewed the 
negotiation for inserting the Code of Good Practice annexed to the TBT Agreement during the 
Uruguay Round.   
The analysis of this chapter primarily shows that the concept of “standards” went through 
substantial changes over the past several decades of negotiation and revision.  In particular, 
the concept of “standard” has long developed in line with the concept of “technical 
regulations” and the former’s relation with the latter experienced significant alterations until 
the WTO TBT Agreement was adopted.  
One of the major findings of this chapter’s analysis shows that the requirement of voluntary 
compliance which strictly depended on legal criteria, such as existence of legal basis and 
evidence of legal enactment and legal enforcement in the past drafts, has evolved to be 
defined in more general terms and, thus, became ambiguous in its legal criteria.  In addition, 
the concept of ‘standards’ which could be largely confirmed by its non-governmental 
standards body in previous drafts has now been changed in such a way that it can be adopted 
or applied by both governmental and non-governmental standards bodies and, thus, the factor 
of standards body has no longer a critical implication for its concept.  Moreover, the analysis 
finds that the treatment of ‘standards’ was almost equivalent to that of ‘technical regulations’ 
in the earlier drafts and the final version of the GATT Standards Code; but revisions during 
the Uruguay Round have led to a result in which the current TBT Agreement establishes 
relatively indirect and less strict disciplines for ‘standards’.   
The ambiguous distinction between ‘standards’ and ‘technical regulations’, in itself, creates 
a serious loophole in the operation of the TBT Agreement.  Unlike the GATT Standards 
Code which treated “standards” almost equivalently as “technical regulations” except for a 
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few transparency obligations, the current TBT regime’s treatment of ‘standards’ is apparently 
more different from its treatment of ‘technical regulations’.  This legal consequence makes 
the loophole even more serious.   These findings altogether imply that the multilateral 
trading system’s treatment of ‘standards’ has become more general and less direct, which 
potentially causes increasing uncertainty in the interpretation of the definition.  
In fact, the vague concept of “voluntary/mandatory” compliance was one of the most 
critical legal issues in recent US-Tuna II dispute.  Views and arguments were sharply 
divided regarding its interpretation.  Therefore, Chapter 5 analyzes the current interpretation 
and application of the definitions of ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’.   
First, it finds that the definition of ‘standard’ is quite limitedly applied in disputes to date, 
being interpreted only in the context of “a relevant international standard” as provided in 
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.  There has been no dispute in which ‘standard’ was 
interpreted solely for the sake of determining a ‘standard’ itself. Also, interpretations of 
“international standard” were found to be inconsistent in disputes.  Sometimes, ‘standard’ 
was reviewed as a legal element of “international standard” based on the definition of the 
TBT Agreement but, in other times, the phrase “international standard” was examined 
exclusively based on the definition in the ISO/ECE Guide.  
The second part of the chapter examines the legal interpretations and the consequent 
determination of a ‘technical regulation’, which is basically composed of reviews on three 
legal elements, “identifiable product or group of products”, “lays down product characteristics” 
and “mandatory compliance”.  In particular, the concept of “mandatory compliance” as 
interpreted in this context is very important since the criterion also affects the concept and 
regulatory scope of ‘standard’.  The concept has rarely been a core legal issue in disputes.  
However, the disputants in a recent case had substantially different views from each other 
surrounding the meaning of “mandatory/voluntary compliance” and even the adjudicating 
bodies like panels and the AB submitted significantly diverging opinions.  The analysis 
shows that the AB considered the “exclusivity” criterion most important for determining the 
“mandatory/voluntary compliance” concept.  The chapter additionally analyzes the major 
approaches found in disputes, i.e. “market sales condition” approach, “de jure/de facto” 
approach and “exclusivity” approach, and finds that the adjudicating bodies have overly relied 
on a strict textualist approach in interpreting the concept “mandatory compliance”.  
12 
  Finally, Chapter 6 revisits the concept of ‘standards’ based on implications driven from the 
examinations and analyses in the previous chapters.  Major findings of the chapter include 
that the legal characterization of ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’ should be based on a 
two-stage review process and that recently adopted criteria in US-Tuna II dispute fall short of 
providing generally applicable criteria for reviewing and interpreting the term ‘standards’.  
In addition, the chapter suggests introducing a concept like “specificity” as a criterion for 
considering the nature of matter addressed in dispute.  It also emphasizes that the practically 
effective domain of the TBT Agreement can be expanded if the concept of “mandatory” 










2.1 Standards in Various Contexts 
 
In general, product standards can hardly be defined in a definite term.  The term standard 
represents a variety of technical specifications that describe or require characteristics of 
product or production and process methods.1  There are a number of ways to classify 
standards and division criteria most commonly used include their subject matters, ownership, 
functions or purposes.   
The subject matters of product standards vary.  They can be primarily product 
characteristics or certain production or process methods.  They can also address certain 
characteristics of products’ marketing, packing, consumption, or even post-consumption such 
as waste treatment or recycling policy.   
In terms of ownership, standards can be generally divided into three categories.2  Some 
standards are established long time ago and so commonly used in modern society that who 
has established them is sometimes unknown.  Some standards are intentionally established 
by a certain body such as a governmental standardizing body or a non-governmental civic 
group and provided for public use.  These two categories are examples of non-existence of 
any ownership.  However, a third category of some standards include company’s internal 
production know-hows or secretes and producers often claim their ownership toward these 
standards and demand intellectual property rights over them.   
                                           
1 Standards may refer to technical specifications for products or services. In this thesis, however, only 
product standards are considered and, therefore, the term standard is limitedly referred to product standard 
only.  
2 This classification in accordance with standards’ ownership is a broad categorization.  See generally, 
Blind (2000). 
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The study of standards’ functions and effects is largely carried out in the field of economics.  
Some industrial standards are closely related to technological development and facilitate 
spreads or spillovers of certain technology so that compatibility between products or among 
systems is enhanced and positive externalities are created within an industry.  In this 
category, standards are perceived as one way of increasing compatibility and production 
networks, thereby inducing more production efficiency.  In the other category, the 
government usually takes strong initiatives to provide protection for consumers and 
environment and implement public policies that are generally enacted and enforced based on 
standards.  These days, labeling is considered a useful policy instrument for provision of 
consumer information since it generally improves consumer welfare by redressing 
information asymmetry but presumably at a minimum cost.  
Standards may pursue a number of different goals.  One most common purpose is 
probably reduction of production cost through easier product compatibility and broader 
production networks.  Another frequently pursued policy is protection of human, animal 
plant life or health from consumption of products.  Recently, a rising objective of production 
standards is environmental protection and prevention of climate change through various eco-
labels and carbon emission labels.  Standards are increasingly used to achieve certain goals 
in a relative passive manner and, in some cases, the ultimate objective may be just 
information provisions.  
As shown above, standards cover a variety of fields, functions and forms.  The term 
standard, therefore, cannot be defined in a specific term.  Since the word standard itself 
implies a multiple context and situation, its concept can hardly be clearly delineated, which 
causes a fundamental problem for understanding and interpreting the term ‘standard’ in the 
WTO TBT Agreement.  
This Chapter examines unstandardized meanings of standard in general contexts.  It 
emphasizes diversity of its meanings by showing examples of different definitions and 
concepts represented in dictionaries, in economics, in language of major international, 
regional and national standards bodies.  In addition, this Chapter particularly shed lights on 
apparently inconsistent and incoherent use of the term standard across different Agreements 
under the auspice of the WTO regime. 
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2.1.1 General meanings of standard 
 
  The term standard is used in a variety of contexts.  The general meaning of a standard is 
“any norm, convention, or requirement” and a technical standard is “a formal document that 
establishes uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices.”3  
Despite its various contextual meanings, the primary meaning of standard is “a level of 
quality or attainment” or “something used as a measure, norm, or model in comparative 
evaluations.”4  
According to the definition by the International Organization for Standards (ISO), a 
standard is “a document that provides, requirements, specifications, guidelines or 
characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that materials, products, processes and 
services are fit for their purpose.”5  It is followed by a note stating, “[s]tandards should be 
based on the consolidated results of science, technology and experience, and aimed at the 
promotion of optimum community benefits”.6  On the contrary, technical regulation is 
defined as “regulation that provides technical requirements, either directly or by referring to 
or incorporating the content of a standard, technical specification or code of practice”, which 
is followed by a note, “[a] technical regulation may be supplemented by technical guidance 
that outlines some means of compliance with the requirements of the regulation, i.e. deemed-
to-satisfy provision.”7 
  International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), another international standardization 
organizations particularly devoted to electrical, electronic and related technology standards, 
defines a standard as “a document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized 
body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given 
                                           
3 Searched on “standard” and “technical standard” in Wikipedia. < www.wikipedia.org > 
4 Definition of “standard” in Oxford Dictionaries of English.  < oxforddictionaries.com > 
5 ISO (2004), para 3.2.  The ISO (International Organization for Standardization) was founded in 1947 and 
is now the world’s largest organization for developing international standards covering all aspects of 
technology and business. It has developed almost 20,000 international standards in respect of a variety of 
aspects ranging from food safety to various products and technologies to business practices and services. < 
www.iso.org/iso/home/standards.htm > 
6 ISO (2004), para 3.2.  
7 ISO (2004), para 3.6.1. 
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context.”8  European Standards (EN) similarly defines a standard as “a publication that 
provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their related results, for common 
and repeated use.”9  
  A more concrete explanation on a standard is found in a background paper for the sub-
committee on Standards and Conformance of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC), which 
states that “standards, that is written or documentary … include specifications, regulations 
and procedural requirements. Adherence to standards can be either to voluntary documents or 
to mandatory regulations and laws.  Documentary standards are written by international 
organizations, national standards bodies, regulatory authorities, and trade and industry 
associations with the active participation of stakeholders including technical experts from 
industry, government, consumer groups and other affected parties.”10 
  Descriptions on the activities of certain domestic standardization entities or information on 
standards statistics may provide indirect references to what a standard means in reality and in 
practice. American National Standards Institute (ANSI), for instance, announces its goals in 
two-fold: to strengthen the US competitiveness in the global economy and to assure the safety 
and health of consumers and the protection of the environment.11  It describes its major role 
as in the following: “[t]he Institute oversees the creation, promulgation and use of thousands 
of norms and guidelines that directly impact businesses in nearly every sector: from acoustical 
devices to construction equipment, from dairy and livestock production to energy distribution, 
and many more.”12  
                                           
8 The IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) was founded in 1906, and is now the world’s leading 
organization for the preparation and publication of International Standards for all electrical, electronic and 
related technologies. < www.iec.ch/standardsdev/publications/is.htm > 
9 The European Standards (EN) is a standard that has been adopted by one of the three recognized European 
Standardization Organization (ESOs), - namely, European Committee for Standardization (CEN), European 
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) or European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI). < www.cen.eu/cen/products/en/pages/default.aspx > 
10 APEC (2009), p.1. 
11 ANSI, a non-governmental standardization body in the US, states that its mission is “to enhance both the 
global competitiveness of the US business and the US quality of life by promoting and facilitating voluntary 
consensus standards and conformity assessment systems, and safeguarding their integrity.”  < 
www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1 > 
12 ANSI has a dozen of specific standardization panels in respect of such state of the art areas as energy 
efficiency, homeland defense and security, identity theft prevention and identity management, 
nanotechnology standards, nuclear energy standards, electric vehicle standards, chemical regulation, biofuel 
standards, and healthcare information technology standards. 
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Another example also shows that standards include not only standards of private bodies but 
also standards referred in the government regulations.  A US publication often states that, in 
the US alone, there are more than 93,000 standards produced and almost 700 domestic 
standardization organizations as of 1996, among which the federal government produced the 
largest number of standards as a single body, that is, more than 44,000 and other private 
bodies together about 49,000 standards.13 This implies that the term standard sometimes 
includes not only mandatory government regulations and specifications but also voluntary 
standards developed by private entities.  
 
2.1.2 Meanings of standard in economics 
In economics, a standard is generally defined in terms of its economic effects. In a very 
broad sense, the fundamental purpose of standard is to reduce variety to enhance efficiency. 
Therefore, anything that basically reduces diversity and, in turn, provides an agreed model for 
a wide use may be considered a standard.  
In this field, standards are generally classified into four broad categories: “unsponsored 
standards”, “sponsored standards”, “standards from voluntary standardization development 
organizations” or sometimes referred to as “formal standards” or “committee standards” and 
“mandatory standards” or “regulations” of government regulatory authorities.14  In a glance, 
this classification is largely based on the question of who is the standardizing entity, a private 
producer, a public body such as committee or industrial association, or the government. 
The category of “unsponsored standards” contains very general and commonly followed 
norms of the society, whose creators are not known and which has a long evolutionary history.  
The “sponsored standards” category includes standards which are developed by individuals 
and, at the same time, protected by proprietary rights.  Standards in this category usually 
refer to those standardized technologies and know-hows invested and developed by firms and 
legally protected as intellectual properties of them.  Examples like patents, copyrights, 
trademarks are the standards belonging to this group.  
Then, the distinction between “formal standards” and “mandatory standards” is somewhat 
                                           
13 Toth (1996), p. 2. Browneller (1984), p. 44. 
14 See Blind (2004), Chapter 6.  
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similar to the one between voluntary ‘standards’ and mandatory ‘technical regulations’ in the 
TBT Agreement.  In economics, the category of “formal standards” refers to the group of 
standards which are established by a committee or industrial association for the purpose of 
network externality and economies of scale.  These standards are probably “legally” 
voluntary, but “in reality” mandatory, participants in the relevant industry will have to adopt 
them if they are to stay within the system and enjoy the advantage of the system they chose.  
The cost of having such a standardized system may be an increasing cost of transferring to 
another competing systems and the choice of which standard to follow is usually left to the 
decision of the relevant industry or group of actors, which is thus terms as economics of 
“club”.15  
The group of “mandatory standards” includes “regulations” enacted and implemented by 
the government with a view to fulfill its own policy objectives.  This category of standards 
are termed as “mandatory standards” and relevant academic issues and theories are mostly 
related to such discussions as to when government should intervene and lead the market in 
developing certain industrial standards.  The discussion is related to the degree of positive 
externalities that a prospective standard would produce and the cost of lock-in.  However, it 
does not directly deal with “technical regulations”; general discussions for “regulation” as 
whole may be relevant to the theories of “technical regulations”.  
 
 




The term standard is mentioned in a number of contexts under the GATT/WTO system but 
their use and meanings are not consistent with each other and by no means based on any 
explicit or even implicit consensus.  The word standard is most frequently and importantly 
used in the TBT Agreement as one type of the Agreement’s subject matters.  In specific, the 
TBT Agreement covers three sources of technical barriers, namely, ‘technical regulations’, 
                                           
15 See David (1990), pp. 3-41.  
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‘standards’, and ‘conformity assessment procedures’.  Here, the term ‘standard’ is used to 
refer to a specific category of voluntary substantive standard for the purpose of the 
Agreement.  Thus, ‘standard’ is defined as a “[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, 
that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products 
or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.”  
Unlike the meaning of “standard” defined by ISO/IEC Guide 2, which covers both mandatory 
and voluntary standards, ‘standard’ used in context of the TBT Agreement indicates 
“voluntary” documents only.  
Although the term standard is primarily and directly addressed by the TBT Agreement, the 
concept also appears in other Agreements.  For example, the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA) also contains the phrase “technical regulations and standards” in its several 
articles.16  The term standard in this context must be identical to the meanings of ‘standard’ 
in the TBT Agreement because the definition of “standard” for government procurement as 
laid out in the footnote to Article VI of the GPA is exactly the same as the definition of 
‘standard’ in the TBT Agreement.  
Interestingly, the word standard in the GATS is used in a slightly different context.  For 
instance, Article VI.4 of the GATS providing disciplines for service related domestic 
regulation mentions that “[w]ith a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in Services shall, through 
appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines…”.17  It is noted that 
the phrase “technical standard” appears rather than “technical regulation” or “standard”.  
Here, it is ambiguous whether the GATS “technical standard” includes ‘technical regulation’ 
or ‘standard’ or both or even something totally different from the TBT Agreement concepts.  
A close examination shows that the word standard sometimes appears alone, i.e., without 
the adjective “technical”, but always accompanies the similarly phrased context, i.e., in a 
indicative list of domestic regulations such as authorization criteria, licensing or certification.  
Therefore, in this sense, GATS “technical standards” and “standards” are probably different 
from the concept of TBT Agreement ‘standards’.  Rather, it may be more appropriate to 
                                           
16 Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), Article V, VI, XV, and XIX.  
17 General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS), Article VI.4.  
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understand the GATS terminologies in the context of the provisions for “domestic regulations” 
and with more weight on the reference to the concept of TBT Agreement ‘technical 
regulation’.   
However, even within the GATS, the word standard does not appear to be used 
consistently.  In some other contexts, the term standard appears in a phrase “international 
standard”.  The expression “international standard” in the context of GATS is probably 
indicating something very similar to the TBT Agreement “international standards” and, 
therefore, the meaning of “standard” in GATS and that of the TBT ‘standard’ are probably the 
same in this context.  
In other contexts of the GATT/WTO Agreements, the word standard seems to have more 
general meanings and the meaning of it contains little substantive concept in its specific 
context.  In one context, the term standard is used as a noun, generally expressing a 
“requirement, specification, or criteria”.  For instance, the footnote to Article 3.1 of the 
Subsidy Agreement states which states ‘[t]his standard is met when the facts demonstrate that 
…’ is referring to the main text “(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact” and the word 
“standard” in this context probably means “criteria or requirement” in general.   
A little awkward use of the term standard appears in the TRIPS.  The word standard 
appears in the title of Part II, which reads, “Standards concerning the availability, scope and 
use of intellectual property rights”.  Since the chapter provides specific obligations for each 
intellectual property such as copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
standards, patent, layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, protection of 
undisclosed information, and control for anti-competitive practices in contractual licenses, it 
is appropriate to understand “standard” in TRIPS as meaning requirement, specification, or 
criteria in general sense.  
Sometimes, the word standard is used as an adjective followed by some nouns.  In such 
case, it should be understood as meaning something “of a basis, agreed form or practice, or a 
model”.  Such examples may include the phrase “an agreed standard form” in Article 16.4 
and “standard practice” in Annex 1.3 and 1.7 of the Antidumping Agreement, and “an agreed 
standard form” in Article 25.11 and ‘standard practice’ in Annex VI of the Subsidy 
Agreement.  
In addition, there are some other cases where standard means a certain approach or 
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methodology. In the Agreement on Rules of Origin, such expressions as ‘positive standard’ 
and ‘negative standard’ are used.  Although terminated in 1997, the plurilateral Agreement 
on International Dairy had the word ‘standard’, representing a type of measurement or unit. 
In short, the word standard is used in a variety of contexts within the GATT/WTO legal 
text and in different meanings.  It primarily indicates one category of technical barriers in the 
context of the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement.  However, it is sometimes used 
interchangeably with a “regulation” as shown in some contexts of the GATS.  Also, in other 
times, it is used as a noun or an adjective based on general dictionary meanings.   
Despite that fact that the term standard is not consistently used within the legal text, its 
primary usage is found in the TBT Agreement and it is explicitly defined in the Annex to the 
Agreement.  ‘Standard’ in the TBT Agreement is one category of the Agreement’s subject 
matters and it constitutes an important concept, delineating the coverage of the Agreement 
along with the other two categories of technical barriers, ‘technical regulation’ and 
‘conformity assessment procedures’.  
 
2.2.2 Boundaries of the TBT standards 
 
No provision in the TBT Agreement or in any other WTO Agreements disciplining barriers 
to trade in goods defines what ‘technical barrier’ is.  The concept of ‘technical barrier’ is 
only inferred from three subject matters addressed by the Agreement which are technical 
regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures.  The coverage of the TBT 
Agreement is affirmed by the explanatory note to the Annex 1.2 when it distinguishes the 
different legal elements of standard in the Agreement from those in the reference ISO/IEC 
Guide 2, stating that “[t]his Agreement deals only with technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures related to products or processes and production methods.   
In a general sense, technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures 
all take a form of standard since they constrain excessive diversity and limit product 
characteristics or product methods to a certain specified scope.  From this perspective, 
technical regulations and standards can be simply considered as some substantive standards 
while conformity assessment procedures as some procedural standards.  Then, technical 
regulations and standards are divided based on their compliance character; if the compliance 
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is mandatory, that standard is ‘technical regulation’ within the meaning of the TBT 
Agreement; and if the compliance is voluntary, that standard is ‘standard’.  Therefore, 
‘standard’ defined in the TBT Agreement is not identical to generally used meaning of 
standard, the former being a more specific and narrower category.  
The TBT Agreement’s ‘technical regulations’, ‘standards’ and ‘conformity assessment 
procedures’ should be related to product, or to be more specific, “[a]ll products, including 
industrial and agricultural products.”18  Therefore, standards related to services and trade in 
services are excluded from the regulatory scope of the TBT Agreement but are subject to 
disciplines of the GATS.  The exclusion of services and trade in services is reaffirmed by the 
introductory clause to the Annex 1, which states the Agreement’s coverage and explicitly 
mentions that it will gives the meaning of terms and definitions “taking into account that 
services are excluded from the coverage of this Agreement.”19   
Another category of the scope specifically excluded by the TBT Agreement is purchasing 
specifications by the government for the purpose of government consumption or production 
procurement.  The Agreement clearly states that these government consumption or 
production specifications should be “addressed in the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, according to its coverage.”20  Furthermore, the TBT Agreement explicitly rules 
out application of its disciplines to “measures necessary for the protection of [the Members’] 
essential security interest.21  Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are particularly ruled by 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, when conformed 
to its definitions of subject measures.  
 
2.2.3 Service standards in the GATS 
 
The TBT ‘standards’ incorporate only product standards.  The TBT Agreement expressly 
limits its scope to products, stating this in Article 1.3 that “[a]ll products, including industrial 
and agricultural products, shall be subject to the provisions of this Agreement.”  Therefore, 
                                           
18 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), Article 1.3. 
19 TBT Agreement, Annex 1, introductory clause. 
20 TBT Agreement, Article 1.4. 
21 TBT Agreement, the preamble, 7th recital.  
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the TBT ‘standard’ encompasses all kinds of product standards from manufactures, chemicals, 
other intermediary parts and components and industrial supplies to agricultural and fishery to 
food and drink products, both fresh and processed.  Moreover, the preamble of the 
Agreement states its desire to “further the objective of the GATT”, but not of the GATS.  
This may imply that the TBT Agreement ‘standard’ disciplines are to enhance multilateral 
trade in goods only, but not multilateral trade in services. 
  The boundary for the operation of the TBT Agreement against the subject matters related to 
service standards is more overtly pronounced in the Annex 1 to the Agreement, where the 
meaning of the terms are generally given for the purpose of the Agreement in accordance with 
Article 1.2.  The introductory clause to the Annex 1 adopts the sixth edition of “the ISO/IEC 
Guide 2: 1991, General Terms and Their Definitions Concerning Standardization and Related 
Activities” as a primary reference for the meanings of the terms in the TBT Agreement.  
According to the clause, the terms presented in the Guide shall have the same meaning when 
used in the TBT Agreement.  Then, the clause explicitly excludes service standards from the 
scope of the TBT Agreement based on a phrase, “taking into account that services are 
excluded from the coverage of” the Agreement.  
  In addition, the definitions of technical regulation and standard in Annex 1.1 and 1.2, 
respectively, implies that the Agreement is applied to products and product characteristics, 
implying that service standards are excluded.  For instance, Annex 1.1 defines technical 
regulation as a document which lays down “product characteristics or their related processes 
and production methods….(emphasis added)”  Another clear evidence for the exclusion lies 
in the explanatory note to Annex 1.2, the first two sentences of which read, “ [t]he terms as 
defined in ISO/IEC Guide 2 cover products, processes and services.  This Agreement deals 
only with technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures related to 
product or process and production methods.”  
 
2.2.3.1 The GATS scope of service standards 
 
  The task of defining services and trade in services is very daunting and difficult.22  So is 
                                           
22 There have long been attempts to define “service” and “trade in services” as well as their difference from 
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the task of defining service standards.  Since service standards are certain requirements and 
criteria for services, it is inevitable to first deal with what services are and what constitutes 
them.  
  In the GATS, the ‘services’ are not expressly defined but only their four modes of supplies 
are laid out.  There is general understanding from economic perspective that ‘services’ are, 
in nature, intangible or invisible, non-durable or transitory, and/or produced and consumed 
simultaneously.  However, these characteristics are not exclusive and any consensus has not 
been reached.  Therefore, there was an issue during the Uruguay Round negotiations and in 
several GATS disputes like Canada-Periodicals, Canada-Autos and China-Audiovisual, over 
the question of whether to extend the scope of the GATS final service products to service 
factors used for any production.23  Furthermore, there is a complex issue of how to consider 
services that are embodied in goods as a medium for the delivery of the service.  The AB in 
China-Audiovisual addressed this issue and concluded that services embodied and delivered 
in goods are considered goods and governed by GATT rather than by GATS. 
  Neither does the GATS provide any explicit provisions for defining service standards. 
However, a few provisions contain some rules and obligations for quality requirements and 
technical standards.  For example, Article VI of the Agreement stipulates certain procedural 
and built-in obligations concerning certain types of service standards. Specifically, Article 
VI.4 ensures that domestic regulations relating to “qualification requirements and procedures, 
technical standards and licensing requirements” should not constitute unnecessary barriers to 
trade in service and, with a view to prevent unnecessary ‘technical’ barriers, the Article 
allows future development of any necessary disciplines by the Council for Trade in Service, 
through appropriate bodies it may establish.  
  Based these provisions, service standards may be defined and distinguished from product 
standards for the purpose of this study.  From the provision, it may be inferred that service 
standards appeared in the GATS include only domestic regulation-type standards or 
mandatory government-made standards.  First of all, the scope of the GATS does not include 
any standards adopted by non-government body. Also, since it would be impossible for a 
                                                                                                                   
“goods” and “trade in goods”.  For this discussion, generally see: Bhagwati (1991), Chapter 14; Daniels 
(1993), pp. 1-23; Feketekuty (1988).  
23 Marconini (1990), pp. 20-21 
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domestic regulation to be voluntary in terms of its compliance, it may be appropriate to view 
that the scope does not include government voluntary standards, either.  
 
2.2.3.2 The GATS disciplines for service standards 
 
  Article VI.4 requires qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, and 
licensing requirements to be transparent, not more burdensome than necessary, and, in case of 
licensing procedures, not, in themselves, restrictive on the supply of the service. Article VI.5 
also requires that Members shall not apply licensing and qualification requirements and 
technical standards that nullify or impair such specific commitments they have undertaken for 
sectors. Specifically, the Article further states that those service standards should not nullify 
or impair those specific commitments in a manner which does not comply with provisions of 
Article VI.5 and could not reasonably have been expected at the time the specific 
commitments in those sectors were made. However, international standards of relevant 
international organizations shall be taken into account when determining whether a Member 
is nullifying or impairing the specific commitments.  
  Similarly with the provisions of the TBT Agreement, or Article 6 in particular, the GATS 
also encourages Members to recognize the quality of certain services to be equivalent to their 
own.  For instance, Article VII.1 states that a Member may recognize “the education or 
experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certifications granted in a particular 
country” in their procedures to fulfill, in whole or in part, of its standards or criteria for the 
authorization, licensing or certification of services suppliers. However, in recognizing service 
standards of another Member, a Member shall not discriminate between countries or impose a 
disguised restriction on trade in services based on Article VII.3. Furthermore, Article VII.5 
encourages Members to work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations towards the establishment and adoption of international standards 
and criteria for recognition as well as international service standards.  
  In GATS Annex on Telecommunications, Article 4 imposes transparency obligations as 
regards to relevant information on conditions affecting access to and use of public 
telecommunications transport networks and services. In specific, the Article requires each 
Member to make publicly available such information as tariffs and other terms and conditions 
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of services, specifications of technical interfaces with such network and services, information 
on bodies responsible for the preparation and adoption of standards affecting such access and 
use, conditions applying to attachment of terminal or other equipment, and notifications, 
registration or licensing requirements, if any.  
Like in any other Agreements concerning technical barriers, the Annex also emphasizes the 
importance of international standards for global compatibility in Article 7. It specifically 
stipulates that Members recognize such importance and undertake to promote such standards 
through the work of relevant international bodies, including the International 
Telecommunication Union and the International Organization for Standardization. 
  
2.2.4 Government procurement standards in the Agreement on 
Government Procurement 
 
  The TBT Agreement explicitly excludes standard issues for government procurement from 
its scope of application.  Article 1.4 stipulates, “[p]urchasing specifications prepared by 
governmental bodies for production or consumption requirements of governmental bodies are 
not subject to [the TBT] Agreement but are addressed in the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, according to its coverage.”  Therefore, any technical standards quality 
requirements for government purchase have to comply with obligations of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement(GPA).  
  Nevertheless, standards for the government procurement have large influence on the supply 
side of a market.  The government procurement plays an important role in markets not only 
in terms of the size of transaction, but also through the ‘secondary’ function or effect of the 
government choice for the counterpart.24  The purpose of government procurement may 
range widely from direct need of certain public facilities and equipment to indirect intent to 
promote and disseminate certain social, political or economic values.  For example, the 
government sometimes uses the procurement policy instrument to promote environmental 
protection, labor rights protection, human rights consideration, social responsible corporates 
as well as to protect a dwindling industry or to restrict security issues. In reality, many 
                                           
24 Kunzlink (1999), Chapter 11. 
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advanced countries such as the US adopt certain government procurement criteria in order to 
show their concerns over political, social or economic issues in other countries.  
  Therefore, government procurement standards are separately addressed by the GPA.  
There is important legal loophole regarding the coverage of non-GPA members.  In other 
words, the TBT Agreement clearly excludes government procurement standards from its 
scope while the GPA is applied only to the WTO members which have accepted it.  
Consequently, government procurement standards adopted and implemented by non-GPA 
member countries are excluded and left unregulated by any of the regime.25  
 
2.2.4.1 The GPA scope of government procurement standards 
 
 Article VI of the GPA rules for technical specifications.  The first provision of the article 
implies that procurement standards mean technical specifications which lay down 
“characteristics of the product or services to be procured, such as quality, performance, safety 
and dimensions, symbols, terminology, packaging, marking and labelling, or the processes 
and methods for their production and requirements relating to conformity assessment 
procedures prescribed by procuring entities…”  Thus, standards for government 
procurements under the GPA basically incorporate both product and service standards, both 
final product (service) and process and production method standards, and both substantive 
requirement and procedural assessment requirement by procuring entities.  Similarly with 
the scope of TBT Agreement, GPA’s temporal scope incorporates the preparation, adoption or 
application of the procurement standards as a whole.  
Therefore, the concept of “standard” in the GPA is much broader than the concept of 
‘standard’ in the TBT Agreement since the former extends its scope to cover service standards 
as well as conformity assessment procedures.  Also, for the government procurement 
“standards”, it is almost meaningless to distinguish mandatory standards and voluntary 
standards since standards applied as terms of government procurement will always have 
compulsory power for the suppliers.   
 
                                           
25 Wolfrum (2007), p.185.  
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2.2.4.2 The GPA disciplines for government procurement standards 
 
  The Article stipulates very similar rules and obligations for procurement standards as those 
of the TBT Agreement.  Most importantly, it provides the least-trade-restrictive principle. 
According to the phrase, “shall not be prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the 
effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade”, procuring entities should take 
into consideration de jure and de facto trade-restrictive effect of their procurement standards 
and be responsible for any unnecessary trade barriers resulting from their procurement 
standards.  
  In Article VI.2, the GPA aims to minimize the trade barriers arising from the government 
procurement standards through the obligations to base procurement standards on their 
performance rather than their design or descriptive characteristics, to harmonize them with 
international standards if possible or otherwise with their national standards, either technical 
regulations or standards, or building codes.  
  Article VI.3 refrains procuring entities from using a particular trademark or trade name, 
patent, design or type, specific origin, producer or suppliers as their requirement or reference 
except in the case where “there is no sufficiently precise or intelligible way of describing” 
their procurement standards and, in such case, word such as “or equivalent” should be 
included in their tender documentation.  Thus, the GPA tries to minimize arbitrary or 
discriminatory procurement standards.  Furthermore, Article VI.4 stipulates that procuring 
entities shall not seek or accept, in a manner that have the effect of precluding competition, 
advice for procurement standard from a firm that may have a commercial interest in the 
procurement.  
 
2.2.5 Sanitary and phytosanitary standards in the SPS Agreement 
 
  The TBT Agreement clearly excludes Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures from its 
scope by explicitly stipulating in Article 1.5 that “[t]he provisions of [TBT Agreement] do not 
apply to sanitary and phytosanitary measures as defined in Annex of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.”  In conjunction with the provision, 
Article 1.4 of the SPS Agreement states, “[n]othing in [the SPS] Agreement shall affect the 
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rights of Members under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with respect to 
measures not within the scope of the SPS Agreement.”  Therefore, it can be inferred that the 
TBT Agreement governs all technical barriers, substantive technical regulations and standards 
or procedural conformity assessment standards, except for sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures as defined in the SPS Agreement.  
  In disputes, the DSB first examines whether a certain measure is SPS measure or not, and, 
if it is so, the SPS agreement applies first. If no violation is found under the SPS Agreement, 
the dispute is further reviewed under the TBT Agreement and subsequently under the GATT. 
In EC-Hormones (US) dispute case, the Panel found that the SPS Agreement was applicable, 
but not the TBT Agreement, to the dispute since the measures in dispute were sanitary 
measures. Also, a product-related SPS measure is subject to the related GATT provisions. In 
EC-Biotech Products case, complaining parties claimed under both the provisions of the SPS 
Agreement and those of the TBT Agreement and the Panel decided to first review under the 
SPS Agreement and then review under the TBT Agreement ‘to the extent it is necessary to do 
so.’26 In general, a SPS measure is ‘a special tool for the regulation of a very narrow but 
special category of technical barriers to trade’ and is lex specialis to the TBT Agreement.27 
  In their legal text, both the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement clearly state their 
relations with each other and these provisions are generally interpreted that, in case where a 
product-related SPS measure is concerned and both Agreements are applicable, the SPS 
Agreement overrides the other. The SPS Agreement deals with a special category or subset of 
the measures which are subject to the TBT Agreement in a broad sense and the definitions of 
a SPS measure determines the boundary of the SPS subgroup of the TBT measures, which are 
excluded from the operation of the TBT Agreement but primarily governed by the SPS 
Agreement.  
 
2.2.5.1 The SPS Agreement scope of sanitary and phytosanitary standards  
 
According to Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement, the scope of the SPS Agreement is all 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect international 
                                           
26 Panel Report, EC- Biotech Product, para. 7.1671-7.1679.  
27 Wolfrum (2007), p. 185.  
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trade. Annex A.1 of the SPS Agreement defines sanitary or phytosanitary measures as any 
measure of the following: (a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease-causing organism; (b) to protect human or animal life or health 
within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or 
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; (c) to protect human life or 
health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, 
plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or (d) to 
prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests. Accordingly, SPS measures are measures to protect life or 
health of animal, plant or human from risks arising from diseases, poisons or other life or 
health damage.  
  Annex A.1 further stipulates regulatory formalities, providing that SPS measures include 
“all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end 
product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification and 
approval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant requirements associated with 
the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during 
transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk 
assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety.” 
  The approaches to defining subject matters differ between the TBT Agreement and the SPS 
Agreement. The SPS Agreement defines SPS measures based on their four different 
regulatory goals, rather than what kind of policy instrument they incorporate. In other words, 
SPS measures can be such policy instruments as a quarantine procedure at the boarder or 
import ban or domestic quality, safety, or content requirements or even information 
requirements such as labelling. In other words, no matter what policy form it takes, a SPS 
measures is a measure whose regulatory goal is to protect human, plant or animal life or 
health from risks arising from various sources stated in the relevant SPS provisions.28  
  The TBT Agreement also covers measures to protect human, plant or animal life or health 
or to protect environment. What is critical factor for distinguishing the TBT measure and the 
                                           
28 Roberts (1998), p. 382. 
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SPS measure is the ‘risk’ that a specific measure tries to counter. The TBT Agreement 
governs standards for ‘product characteristics’ whereas the SPS Agreement addresses 
standards for ‘risk’ prevention or ‘risk’ management.  
  “Due to this structure of the definition of SPS measures, further difficulties arise when one 
and the same government regulation serves an SPS purpose and a non-SPS purpose, or 
addresses an SPS-risk and a non-SPS risk simultaneously. In such instances, the measure 
should be broken down into its individual component parts and each provision judged 
according to its regulatory purpose under the TBT or SPS Agreement. In the rare instances in 
which a government measure cannot be divided into different instances in which a 
government measure cannot be divided into different parts with respective regulatory 
purposes, TBT Agreement may applies cumulatively to the extent that the requirements for 
the application of the SPS Agreement are not fulfilled.”29 
 
2.2.5.2 The SPS Agreement disciplines for SPS standards 
 
  The distinction between TBT measures and SPS measures is particularly important since 
the level of WTO regulatory approach is generally higher in the latter. Several different and 
more specific legal requirements are found in the SPS Agreement. They are, for instance, 
Article 5 for risk assessment and appropriate level of SPS protection, Article 3 for 
harmonization obligation and specific international standards explicitly mentioned in the 
Article, and Article 6 for adaptation to regional conditions, including pest- or disease-free 
areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence.  
  Under the SPS Agreement, the WTO members have ‘right’ to take SPS measures and the 
level of SPS measures should be only to the extent ‘necessary for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health.’30 Also, SPS measures should not be applied in a manner which 
would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. 
  Although WTO members are given right to implement SPS measures on their necessity, 
those measures should be based on scientific principles and is not maintained without 
                                           
29 Wolfrum (2007), p.186.  
30 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Article 2.1 and 2.2,.  
32 
sufficient scientific evidence.31 The Agreement states that SPS measures should be based on 
risk assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances. 32  It further provides that, when 
assessing risks, Members should take into account risk assessment techniques developed by 
the relevant international organizations33 as well as available scientific evidence, relevant 
process and production methods, relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods, 
prevalence of specific diseases or pests, existence of pest- or disease-free areas, relevant 
ecological and environmental conditions, and quarantine or other treatment. 34  When 
assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and determining the measure to be applied 
for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, they also have to 
consider economic factors, including the potential damage in terms of loss of production or 
sales in the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease, costs or control or 
eradication in the territory of the importing Member and the relative cost-effectiveness of 
alternative approaches to limiting risks.35 
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally 
adopt SPS measures “on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the 
relevant international organization as well as from SPS measures applied by other 
Members.” 36  In such circumstances, Members have to seek to obtain the additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the SPS measure 
accordingly within a reasonable period of time.37  
  Like in the TBT Agreement, non-discrimination obligation applies to SPS measures. The 
WTO members must ensure that their SPS measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail.38 The non-
discrimination obligation extends to between a Member’s own territory and that of other 
Members. 39  In applying the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, 
Members should avoid  applying arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it 
                                           
31 SPS Agreement, Article 2.2.  
32 SPS Agreement, Article 5.1, first sentence.   
33 SPS Agreement, Article 5.1, second sentence. 
34 SPS Agreement, Article 5.2.  
35 SPS Agreement, Article 5.3. 
36 SPS Agreement, Article 5.7.  
37 SPS Agreement, Article 5.7.  
38 SPS Agreement, Article 2.3.  
39 SPS Agreement, Article 2.3.  
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considers appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.40 
  This non-discrimination disciplines are somewhat different from the GATT principles for 
MFN and NT, which fundamentally deals with different treatment between like products of 
different origins.41 The non-discrimination disciplines in SPS Agreement essentially have 
taken into consideration different assessment of the like ‘risks’ and discriminatory 
circumstances based on different biological and toxicological risks assessments. Therefore, 
risks of different origins incorporates risks of different regions, sub-national units. In line with 
this, the Agreements allows particularities, in terms of risks, of different regions of a nation, 
ensuring that Members’ SPS measures are adapted to SPS measures of the area of exporting 
or importing countries when assessing sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of a region, 
and that Members recognize the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas or areas of low pest or 
disease prevalence.  
  Like in the TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreement also recognizes the important contribution 
of international standards, guidelines and recommendations in minimizing the negative trade 
effects of the SPS measures.42 Accordingly, it requires Members’ SPS measures to be 
harmonized on as wide a basis as possible to international standards, where they exist.43 
When a SPS measure conforms to international standards, it is deemed to be necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health and presumed to be consistent with the relevant 
provisions of the SPS Agreement and GATT 1994.44 Members may introduce or maintain 
SPS measures whose resulting health, life or environment protection level is higher than that 
of international standards, if there is a scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level 
a Member determines to be appropriate, and if they are not inconsistent with any other 
provisions of the SPS Agreement.45  
  The Agreement requires the WTO members to play a full part, within the limits of their 
resources, in the relevant international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in particular 
                                           
40 SPS Agreement, Article 5.5. 
41 Roberts (1998), p. 384.  
42 SPS Agreement, the preamble, 5th recital.  
43 SPS Agreement, Article 3.1. 
44 SPS Agreement, Article 3.2.  
45 SPS Agreement, Article 3.3. 
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the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the 
International Plant Protection Convention to promote the development and periodic review of 
international standards.46  
The Agreement requires the WTO Members to accept SPS measures of other Members as 
equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or from those used by others, if the 
exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its measures 
achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.47 
For this purpose, the exporting members should provide reasonable access, upon request, to 
the importing member of inspection, testing and other relevant procedures.48 Upon request, 
members should, enter into consultations to achieve a bilateral or multilateral arrangement for 
recognition of the equivalence of specified SPS measures.49  
 
 
2.3 Chapter Summary and Partial Conclusion 
 
Standards cover a variety of fields, functions and forms.  The term standard, therefore, 
can be hardly defined in specific terms.  Since the word standard itself implies multiple 
contexts and situations, its concept can hardly be clearly delineated, which causes a 
fundamental problem for understanding and applying the term ‘standard’ for the purpose of 
operating the WTO TBT Agreement.  
Thus, Chapter 2 examines unstandardized meanings of standard in general contexts.  It 
emphasizes diversity of its meanings by showing examples of different definitions and 
concepts represented in dictionaries, in economics, and in language of major international, 
regional and national standards bodies.  In addition, this Chapter particularly sheds lights on 
apparently inconsistent and incoherent use of the term standard across different Agreements 
under the auspice of the WTO regime. 
In the GATT/WTO regime, the word standard is mainly used to refer to voluntary 
                                           
46 SPS Agreement, Article 3.4. 
47 SPS Agreement, Article 4.1, first sentence. 
48 SPS Agreement, Article 4.1, second sentence. 
49 SPS Agreement, Article 4.2. 
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‘standards’, one source of technical barriers under the auspice of the TBT Agreement.  
However, other Agreements also use the term standard, but without clearly indicating 
whether it has the same meaning as the term ‘standards’ used in the TBT Agreement or not.  
The analysis of this Chapter finds that all the terms “standards” have different meanings and 
scopes from an Agreement to another, and the explicitly defined meaning of ‘standards’ in the 
TBT Agreement is not consistently or coherently used in other WTO Agreements.  For 
example, when the word “standards” is used in the GATS and GPA, it generally encompasses 
very broad meanings and scopes.  It probably includes both substantive and procedural 
standards.  Also, the “standards” may refer to products standards or service standards or both 
depending on the context the term is used.   
In addition, it is clear from the analysis of this chapter that none of the contexts in other 
WTO Agreements, the concept of “standards” is identified as ‘standards’ on the basis of 
voluntary compliance.  Therefore, it seems to be very typical to the case of the TBT 











3.1 Product Standards in the TBT Regime 
3.1.1 Standards and Trade 
Standards have their own legitimate objectives and functions.  In general, they facilitate 
compatibility between products or between product systems and promote production 
efficiency.  In some cases, they provide consumers with necessary product information and 
help them make appropriate consumption choice.  Standards also play important roles in 
protecting consumers and environment since they are increasingly perceived as efficient 
regulatory instruments by government.  Thus, standards in themselves do not primarily 
prevent international trade unless they are adopted under specific protectionist intent.  
However, standards do have trade effects.  Despite the fact that the trade effects of 
standards are externalities, standards do create barriers to international trade on the one hand.  
For example, importing country’s standards often require foreign exporters to bear additional 
administrative procedures and cost.  This is because, frequently, standards in importing 
countries are different from those in exporting countries and this discrepancy causes 
additional market entry cost.50  The technical trade barriers arising from such heterogeneity 
                                           
50 Several studies have attempted to measure the impact of technical barriers as a whole and generally 
suggest that there exist negative impact on international trade when technical regulations and standards 
increase. Most of them are World Bank or OECD working papers such as Maskus (2000) and Beghin (2001) 
and examples of published journal articles include Gandal (2000), Li and Beghin (2011), and Gebrehiwet 
(2007).  There are a number of studies which suggest negative trade effect of standards on international trade 
and some general examples include Deardoff and Stern (1998), Calvin and Krissoff (1988), Yue (2006), 
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particularly incur additional trade costs since they accompany stringent, redundant, 
overlapping conformity assessment procedures.51  On the other hand, it is also true that some 
standards provide foreign exporters with market demand or preference information and thus 
have positive impact on trade.  Or, in some cases, the adoption of a standard promotes 
domestic export by helping domestic products acquire a certain level of product quality 
recognized by foreign consumers, thereby creating more global trade.  However, more often 
than they have negative trade impacts. Particularly, importing country’s standards constitute 
trade barriers to foreign exporters due to several reasons.  
 
3.1.2 Standards and the TBT Agreement  
Despite the fact that trade effects of standard are inherently unintended and considered 
externalities in general, some standards and standardization in reality are based on 
protectionist intent and serve as useful circumvention instruments.  Therefore, the 
GATT/WTO regime establishes the TBT regime based on two fundamental approaches.  
One is to prevent such protectionist abusive use of technical regulations and standards and the 
other is to internalize the resulting externalities to trade.  
In consequence, the focus of the TBT Agreement is primarily on trade, not on standards per 
se.  The Agreement’s preamble expresses such desire as to “further the objectives of GATT 
1994”.52  Also, like in other parts of the GATT/WTO regime, the TBT Agreement takes the 
approach to this delicate issue of adopting the concept of necessary/unnecessary obstacles to 
trade, recognizing, on the one hand, that “no country should be prevented from taking 
measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal 
or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices…” and 
desiring, on the other hand, that technical barriers “do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade”.53   
                                                                                                                   
Essaji (2008), Disdier (2008), and many others.  Another category of previous studies try to show that 
international standards help reduce technical barriers and facilitate international trade.  Some of these works 
are Swann (1996) and Moenius (2000).    
51 Sykes (1999), p. 475-480. Sykes (1995), 40-51.  
52 TBT Agreement, preamble, 2nd recital.  
53 Respectively, TBT Agreement, preamble, 6th recital and 5th recital. 
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The TBT Agreement does not define “technical barriers to trade” even though it expressly 
indicates the subject matter in its title.  Instead, the TBT Agreement identifies the problem of 
technical barriers based on three sources: ‘technical regulations’, ‘standards’, and ‘conformity 
assessment procedures’.  Again, nowhere in the Agreement the term “technical barriers to 
trade” has been identified explicitly with these three causes but these three terms as they are 
repeatedly appearing throughout the TBT Agreement no doubt describes the subject matters 
of the TBT Agreement and constitutes basic framework of the TBT Agreement.  The 
preamble, for example, mentions that “technical regulations and standards, including 
packaging, marking and labeling requirements, and procedures for assessment of conformity 
with technical regulations and standards” do not cause unnecessary barriers.54  Furthermore, 
the entire articles of the TBT Agreement are structured based on these three categories; thus, 
Articles 2 and 3 are applied to ‘technical regulations’, Article 4 rules ‘standard’ and Article 5 
through 9 govern ‘conformity with technical regulations and standards’.  Moreover, Article 
10 is entitled “Information About Technical Regulations, Standards and Conformity 
Assessment Procedures” and these three terms are repeated continuously in articles.  In 
addition, Paragraphs 1 through 3 of the Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement define terms of these 
three categories one by one.  
In sum, ‘standard’ in the TBT Agreement is one of the three main causes of technical 
barriers to trade and is a subject matter of the Agreement’s disciplines.  In principle, the 
Agreement captures ‘standard’ in its scope in order to address its trade-restrictive effect, not 
directly to regulate ‘standards’ and standardization activities.  Therefore, the TBT 
Agreement’s fundamental approach toward ‘standard’ treatment is two-fold: one is to prevent 
any protectionist intent hidden behind ‘standards’ and the other is to internalize externalities 
which are unintentionally resulted from standards and standardizations and consequently 
hindering international trade.  The next section discusses Agreement’s such ‘standard’ 
treatments in more detail.  
 
                                           
54 TBT Agreement, preamble, 5th recital. 
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3.2 ‘Standards’ of the WTO TBT Agreement 
3.2.1 The definition of ‘standard’    
For the purpose of the TBT Agreement, the meaning of terms used in the Agreement is 
given in the Annex 1.  Annex 1.1 through 1.8 respectively give definitions to such terms as 
‘technical regulation’, ‘standard’, ‘conformity assessment procedures’, ‘international body or 
system’, ‘regional body or system’, ‘central government body’, ‘local government body’ and 
‘non-government body’ in the TBT Agreement.55   
The meanings and definitions of these terms are basically applied with the same meanings 
and definitions of the ISO/IEC Guide to the extent that the definitions in Annex provide 
different legal elements.  To this end, Annex 1 begins with an introductory clause, which 
affirms that terms presented in the TBT Agreement have the same meaning and definitions as 
those presented in the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991, if not otherwise defined in 
the Annex.56  Also, it clearly states that general terms for standardization and conformity 
assessment procedures will normally have the meaning given by the United Nations system 
and by international standardizing bodies, taken into account their context and in light of the 
object and purpose of the TBT Agreement.57  
The TBT Agreement covers three sources of technical barriers: ‘technical regulation’, 
‘standard’ and ‘conformity assessment procedure’.  Each of them is defined in Annex 1 to 
the TBT Agreement.  
Technical regulation is defined in Annex 1.1 as,  
 
“[d]ocument which lays down characteristics or their related processes 
and production methods, including the applicable administrative 
provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It May also include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging marking or 
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production 
                                           
55 TBT Agreement, Annex 1. 
56 TBT Agreement, Annex 1, introductory clause. 




The explanatory note to the definition stipulates, “[t]he definition in ISO/IEC Guide 2 is 
not self-contained, but based on the so-called “building block” system”. 
The definition of ‘standard’ follows as,  
 
“[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common 
and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or 
related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not 
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to 
a product, process or production method”.59  
 
The definition of ‘standard’ given in the Annex 1.2 is subsequently compared, in the 
explanatory note, with the definition of standard in the ISO/IEC Guide 2.  Although the 
ISO/IEC Guide 2 defines a “standard” to cover products, processes and services, the TBT 
Agreement deals only with technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures that are relevant to products or processes and production methods.60  In addition, 
“standards” defined in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 encompass both mandatory and voluntary 
standards while ‘standards’ defined for the purpose of the TBT Agreement incorporate only 
voluntary standards.61  
The first two categories, i.e. ‘technical regulations’ and ‘standards’, are substantive 
requirements while the third source of technical barriers, i.e. ‘conformity assessment 
procedures’ is procedural requirement to prove that the above-mentioned substantive 
requirements are fulfilled and complied.  Thus, the definition of ‘conformity assessment 
procedures’ as provided for in Annex 1.3 states,  
 
                                           
58 TBT Agreement, Annex 1.1. 
59 TBT Agreement, Annex 1.2.  
60 TBT Agreement, Annex 1.2, first and second sentences of the explanatory note.  
61 TBT Agreement, Annex 1.2, third and fourth sentences of the explanatory note.  
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“[a]ny procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant 
requirements in technical regulations or standards are fulfilled.”   
 
This definition is followed by an explanatory note which gives more concrete ideas about 
what may constitutes conformity assessment procedures. The note provides,  
 
“[c]onformity assessment procedures include, inter alia procedures for 
sampling, testing and inspection; evaluation, verification and assurance 
of conformity; registration, accreditation and approval as well as their 
combinations.” 
 
  Thus, it is limited to tests and inspections in general during the process of evaluation 
whether a certain product has fulfilled substantive requirements set out in a technical 
regulation or standard.  
The definition of ‘standard’ as provided for in Annex 1.2 resembles with ‘technical 
regulation’ in several aspects.  Both ‘standards’ and ‘technical regulations’ mean “document” 
that provide for some product characteristics or their process or production methods.  Also, 
both definitions cover a wide range of subject matters including terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labeling requirements.  In US-Tuna II, the AB confirms this by 
stating,  
 
“…the subject matter of a particular measures is … not dispositive of 
whether a measure constitute a technical regulation or a standard. Instead, 
“terminology”, “symbols”, “packaging”, “marking”, and “labeling 
requirements” may be the subject-matter of either technical regulations or 
standards.”62   
 
However, the respective definitions of ‘standards’ and ‘technical regulations’ are different 
from each other in respect of the legal element “compliance” type.  The compliance with 
                                           
62 Appellate Body(AB) report, US-Tuna II, para. 187,  
42 
‘standard’ is required to be “not mandatory” or, this is to say, voluntary whereas the 
compliance with ‘technical regulation’ is required to be mandatory.  
 
Table 1. Legal Elements of Technical Regulations and Standards 
 Technical Regulation Standard 
Subject 
Person 
§ Central government body 
§ Local government body 
§ Non-Government body 





§ Lays down product characteristics 
or their related process and 
production methods,  
§ Including applicable administrative 
provisions 
§ It may also include or deal 
exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirement. 
§ Document 
§ Provides…rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for products or their 
related process and production 
methods 
§ For common and frequent use 
§ It may also include or deal 
exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirement. 
Compliance § Mandatory § Not mandatory 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
 
 Overall, as shown in <Table 1>, the coverage and legal elements of ‘standard’ are 
basically identical with those of ‘technical regulation’ except for the compliance requirement. 
This legal element of compliance is the most critical element which distinguishes ‘standard’ 
from ‘technical regulation’ for the purpose of the TBT Agreement.   
In the following section, each of the legal elements that are found in the definition of 
‘standard’ is discussed.  These legal elements include “product characteristics”, “production 
and process methods”, “for common and frequent use”, and “approval by a recognized body”. 
The discussion will also consider some features that are common with or different from 
‘technical regulation’.  The meaning and actual interpretation of the concept “compliance” 
will be rigorously discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.2.  
 
3.2.2 A legal requirement of “product characteristics”  
  
  The concept of ‘standard’ covers standards for product or process and production method.  
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It also covers, on the whole or in part, some terminology requirements, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labelling requirements.  The same coverage is found in the definition of 
‘technical regulation’ and, therefore, these subject matters of ‘standard’ are generally 
identically interpreted and applied with those of ‘technical regulation’.  
In EC-Asbestos, the panel had to determine whether the TBT Agreement could be applied 
to the French ban on the use of asbestos at dispute.  In its analysis, the panel noted that the 
word “product” in the definition in Annex 1.1 of the Agreement should be interpreted based 
on the principle of effectiveness.63  The panel briefly considered a possibility that the word 
‘product’ had been used to indicate that the definitions were related to products rather than 
services.  However, the Panel noted that the TBT Agreement’s coverage over “trade in 
goods” has been already mentioned in Article 1and, therefore, concluded that the term 
“product” would probably meant to pursue another objective.64  The Panel went on to say 
that the purpose of using the word “product” was ‘to create a link between the technical 
characteristics and one or more given products’.  The Panel emphasized that the word 
“product” is related to the characteristics provided in the document and, therefore, concluded 
that “the product(s) to which the characteristics refer must be clearly identifiable in the 
document in question”. 
 
3.2.3 An issue of PPM ‘standard’ 
   
  The issue of production and process method (PPM) has long been debated under the 
GATT/WTO system.  Since the GATT 1947 mentions only “product”, not PPM, a past 
debate has been devoted to the question of whether the scope of “product” in GATT could be 
interpreted in an extensive way to include PPMs of product.  
The PPM issue now under the TBT regime has a different focus.  Unlike the issue of PPM 
under the GATT 1947 in which only the word “product”, not “production and process 
method”, was explicitly mentioned in the legal text, the TBT Agreement contains both words, 
                                           
63 Panel report, EC-Asbestos, para. 8.36.  
64 Panel report, EC-Asbestos, para. 8.37.  
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“product” and “production and process methods” and, therefore, the TBT Agreement’s 
coverage over PPM is certain.  
The essential question now is how far the PPM is covered.  The term PPM can be defined 
as “the ways in which and techniques by which a product is manufactured or produced, or a 
natural product is extracted or captured”.65  Also, PPM measures are generally divided into 
two categories, i.e. product-related PPMs and non-product-related PPMs, and it is debated 
over whether the TBT Agreement covers only product-related PPMs or both product-related 
and non-product related PPMs.66  The question becomes more complicated because although 
both definitions of ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’ cover not only “product” 
characteristics but also “processes and production methods”, the phrases used with respect to 
these two subject matters differ in ‘standard’ definition from ‘technical regulation’ definition.  
The result of the determination will lead to significant consequence in practice since, 
recently, the increasing number of standards is dealing with non-product related PPMs such as 
requirements for workers’ human rights and environment protection and pollution reduction 
during the process and production stage.  The consequence of the determination also 
involves north-south debate since a majority of non-product-related PPM standards are 
adopted and applied by the developed countries in their market and developing countries 
which are usually the exporters who must comply with the developed countries’ non-product-
related PPM standards face challenges and difficulties, even asserting that the developed 
countries support the TBT Agreement’s coverage over non-product-related PPM in order to 
pursue protectionist intents.   
To date, there has been no definite conclusion as to this new PPM issue – whether the TBT 
Agreement covers non-product-related PPMs or not.  However, the WTO Committee on 
Trade and Environment has once reached a kind of consensus that the TBT Agreement does 
not cover non-product-related PPMs.67 
As mentioned above, although both definitions of ‘standards’ and ‘technical regulations’ 
covers PPM measures, their phrases are slightly different.  According to their respective 
definitions, a document of ‘technical regulation’ lays down “product characteristics or their 
                                           
65 Wolfrum (2007), p. 195.  
66 Wolfrum (2007), pp. 195-6.  
67 See Joshi (2004) and Chang (1997).  
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related processes and production methods” whereas a document of ‘standard’ provides 
“characteristics for products or related processes and production methods”.  Therefore, one 
argues that the PPMs for ‘technical regulation’ are related to “product characteristics” 
whereas, the PPMs for ‘standard’ are relevant to “products”.  These elements may lead to a 
conclusion that a ‘technical regulation’ covers characteristics-related PPMs regardless of 
whether they are product-related or non-product-related whereas a ‘standard’ covers only 
product-related PPMs.  Based on this interpretation, the scope of a ‘standard’ does not 
incorporate non-product-related PPMs standard and, in this sense, is narrower than the scope 
of a ‘technical regulation’.   
Another aspect of the PPM issue in the TBT Agreement is also highlighted when the 
second sentence in the respective definitions is considered.  The both second sentences 
identically read, “[i]t may also include or deal exclusively with… labeling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method”.  Interpreting this second sentence as 
an additional description of the TBT Agreement subject matter, one group argues that 
“labeling requirements… to… process or production method” possibly incorporates both 
product-related and non-product related PPMs.68  In contrast, the other group of scholars 
considers that the first sentence in respective definitions of ‘standard’ and ‘technical 
regulation’ generally describes the subject matter and the second sentence suggests a list of 
examples, thereby concluding that the general scope is limited to products or product-related 
PPMs and, therefore, any one of the listed subject matters, including labeling extends only to 
the limit of products or product-related PPMs.69  These two aspects of TBT Agreement’s 
PPM issues are summarized and illustrated in <Figure 2>.  
In US-Tuna II dispute, the measure at issue was a US tuna labeling scheme which had been 
adopted to protect dolphins in the process of fishing, i.e. producing, tuna.  Therefore, the 
measure was a kind of PPM eco-labeling scheme, particularly, non-product-related PPM eco-
labeling scheme.  In the Panel proceeding, the second element of the three-tier test in 
determination of a ‘technical regulation’ was relevant to this PPM related question but this 
issue was not actually disputed in that case.  The question actually disputed between parties 
was whether the measure at dispute addressed “product characteristics” or not and the Panel 
                                           
68 Bartenhagen (1997), p.74. 
69 Staffin (1996), p. 238.  
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described this question for its analysis as “whether the matter addressed in the US dolphin-
safe labeling provisions falls within the scope of the subject matters of a technical 
regulation”.70 
 
Figure 2. A summary of the issues regarding the scope of PPM standards 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
 
Then, in its analysis, the Panel first clarified the relationship between the first sentence and 
the second sentence.  It noted that both sentences in Annex 1.1 provide “indications as to the 
subject matter, or contents, of technical regulations”, the first sentence establishes that a 
                                           
70 Panel report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.71.  
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technical regulation “may lay down ‘product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods’”(emphasis in original text), and the second sentence “further elaborates 
on the subject-matter of technical regulations, and enumerates some specific items that 
technical regulations may also ‘include or deal exclusively with’”.71  From these elements, 
and as well as the disputants’ agreement that the US measure at dispute establishes “labeling 
requirements” for “dolphin-safe” applied to both a product – tuna product– and a production 
method, the Panel concluded that the subject-matter fell within the scope of the second 
sentence of Annex 1.1.  Having found this, the Panel considered it unnecessary to examine 
further whether the US dolphin-safe labeling provisions also fell within the scope of the first 
sentence as “product characteristics or related production or processing methods”.72 
  Although it did not explicitly endorse the interpretation of the Panel, the AB seems to have 
taken a similar approach with the Panel.  Regarding the subject matter of a technical 
regulation, it noted that the second sentence “further states” what a technical regulation may 
include or deal exclusively with.  By this, it is implied that the second sentence provides a 
separate set of subject matters in addition to “product or their related process and production 
methods” in the first sentence.  Moreover, the AB did not question whether the US labeling 
scheme addressed “product characteristics” and thus fell within the scope of a technical 
regulation when it was examining for legal characterization of the measure at issue.  
                                           
71 Panel report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.72. For this analysis, the Panel noted a Appellate Body’s statement in EC-
Asbestos as relevant, which states,  
 
“[i]n addition, according to the definition in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, a ‘technical 
regulation’ may set forth the ‘applicable administrative provisions’ for products which 
have certain ‘characteristics’. Further, we note that the definition of a ‘technical regulation 
provides that such a regulation ‘may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements’… The use here of the word 
‘exclusively’ and the disjunctive word ‘or’ indicates that a ‘technical regulation’ may be 
confined to laying down only one or a few ‘product characteristics’.”(emphasis in original 
text).” (AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 67) 
 
The Panel was assured by the AB’s statement above, which has observed that “the terms of the second 
sentence make it clear that the subject-matter of a technical regulation may be confined to one of the items 
enumerated in the second sentence”. (Panel report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.79) The Panel noted that the AB has 
also determined that “labeling requirements”, as well as other items described in the second sentence of Annex 
1.1, constitute “product characteristics” within the meaning of the first sentence. (Panel report, US-Tuna II, 
footnote 251) 
72 Panel report, US-Tuna II, footnote 251. The Panel noted that the AB has also determined that “labeling 
requirements”, as well as other items described in the second sentence of Annex 1.1, constitute “product 
characteristics” within the meaning of the first sentence.  
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The determination of the dispute implies, therefore, that the scope of a mandatory “labeling 
requirements” is not just limited to product-related PPMs but also extends to cover non-
product-related PPMs.  In this dispute, the disputing parties did not fight over legal 
characterization of a technical regulation in terms of the element “product characteristics”.  
However, it still remains unresolved that how far the meaning of “product characteristics” 
can be stretched out.  A relevant consideration would be whether the extent of non-product-
related PPMs can incorporate labels for certain human rights claims, for instance.   
Again, the dispute ruling confirms the coverage of a mandatory labeling requirement over 
some non-product-related requirements but provides little, if not any, clues to the scope of 
voluntary labeling requirement.  Nevertheless, the AB’s interpretation for the relationship 
between the first sentence and the second sentence may have a valuable implication.  Since 
the definition of a ‘standard’ contains similarly expressed sentences, it can be inferred 
likewise that the second sentence in the ‘standard’ definition provides additional subject 
matters to the subject matters provided by the first sentence.  This means that voluntary 
labeling requirements just like mandatory labeling requirements are not subject to the scope 
established by the first sentence, which, in turn, means labeling requirements can be either 
product related or non-product related.  Therefore, as long as the subject matters in the 
second sentence such as labeling requirements for example are concerned, the scope of 
mandatory labeling requirements and that of voluntary labeling requirements may be identical.  
In conclusion, it is still uncertain whether the scope of ‘standards’ covers non-product 
related PPMs or not.  However, interpretation in a recent dispute implies that all those 
voluntary standards exemplified in the second sentence of its definition, namely, 
terminologies, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements may cover both 
product-related and non-product related PPMs.   
 
3.2.4 A legal element of “for common and frequent use” 
 
The legal element of “for common and frequent use” requires a standard to acquire the 
characteristic of general applicability of the rules, guidelines or characteristics of products or 
related PPM.  Thus, in US-Tuna II, the Panel stated that “[t]his in turn has a bearing on the 
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frequency of the use of such rules, guidelines or characteristics”.73  Nevertheless, it remains 
ambiguous what degree of frequency or generality would satisfy this element.  
This legal element is probably useful for distinguishing, for the purpose of the Agreement, 
‘standards’ and non-‘standards’ from the perspective of their use.  If a certain technical 
specification is normally used for some occasions but not sufficiently “for common and 
frequent use” within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, then the specification cannot be 
considered a ‘standard’ in this regime.  This threshold criterion can be a dispute issue if a 
voluntary technical specification is widely used, but probably not widely and frequently 
enough in order to be perceived as a ‘standard’ from an eye of a Member. 
 
3.2.5 A legal element of “approval by a recognized body” 
 
The definition of ‘standard’ requires that a ‘standard’ be a document “approved by a 
recognized body”.74  The legal element is composed of two parts: a recognized body and 
approval by the body.  The TBT Agreement does not expressly explain the meanings of 
these two parts.  In disputes, they are examined during the analysis in respect of Article 2.4 
of the TBT Agreement, which basically requires a ‘technical regulation’ to be based on “a 
relevant international standard”.  
In EC-Sardines, the issue related to this legal element was surrounding the term “approval”.  
The disputants disagreed whether approval should take place by consensus or by other 
methods.  The Panel and the AB noted the last two sentences of the explanatory note to the 
definition of ‘standard’ in Annex 1.2, which states, “Standards prepared by the international 
standardization community are based on consensus.  This Agreement covers also documents 
that are not based on consensus”.  The Panel interpreted these sentences as in the following, 
which the AB endorsed,  
 
“The first sentence reiterates the norm of the international standardization 
community that standards are prepared on the basis of consensus.  The 
                                           
73 Panel report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.674.  
74 TBT Agreement, Annex 1.2. 
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following sentence, however, acknowledges that consensus may not always 
be achieved and that international standards that were not adopted by 
consensus are within the scope of the TBT Agreement.[footnote 86 omitted]  
This provision therefore confirms that even if not adopted by consensus, an 
international standard can constitute a relevant international standard.” 
 
Therefore, the approval by a recognized body is interpreted to mean not only consensus 
but also some other means.   
The term “a recognized body” in the context of the analysis under Article 2.4 was 
interpreted in US-Tuna II based on the ISO/IEC 2 Guide which defines “body” as a “legal or 
administrative entity that has specific tasks and composition”.75  Regarding the term, the AB 
noted that the definition refers to a “body”, not an “organization” and, likewise, Annex 1.4 
defines an “international body or system”, not an “international organization”.  Based on the 
term “body”, the AB clarified that, for the purpose of the TBT Agreement, “international” 
standards are adopted by “bodies”, which may be, but not always have to be, 
“organizations”.76    
Then, the AB takes a textual approach in interpreting the term “activities”.  It stated,   
 
“… the ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 defines a “body” as a “legal or administrative 
entity that has specific tasks and composition”. With respect to the specific tasks, 
the definition specifies that an international standardizing body must have 
“activities in standardization”. “Activity” is defined in the dictionary as the “state 
of being active”. The term “activity” thus may refer to an instance of action, as 
well as a state. As a result, the use of the plural “activities” does not necessarily 
imply that a body is, or has been, involved in the development of more than one 
standard. As we see it, a body simply has to be “active” in standardization in 
order to have “activities in standardization”.77  
 
                                           
75 Panel report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.679.  
76 AB report, US-Tuna II, para. 355.  
77 AB report, US-Tuna II, para. 360.  
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Thus, according to the AB, a body must have specific tasks such as standardization, but the 
activity can involve just one standard or many and a body should be active in standardization.  
Regarding the term “recognized”, the Panel in US-Tuna II considered it as referring to the 
body’s activities in standards development, and inferred such recognition from the 
participation of the countries that are parties to the AIDCP, a relevant international agreement, 
in those activities and from the resulting standard.78  The AB, finding that the definition of 
“standardizing body” in the ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 does not conflict with the definition of the 
TBT Agreement, confirmed that the definition of the former “adds to and complement” the 
latter, specifying that “a body must be “recognized” with respect to its “activities in 
standardization”.   
The AB explained that the term recognition should be considered not only in factual 
dimension but in normative dimension as well.  It found, “[t]he term “recognize” is defined 
as “[a]cknowlege the existence, legality, or validity of, [especially] by formal approval or 
sanction; accord notice or attention to; treat as worthy of consideration””.79  Then, it 
explained that “these definitions fall along a spectrum that ranges from a factual end 
(acknowledgement of the existence of something) to a normative end (acknowledgement of 
the validity or legality of something).  In interpreting “recognized activities in 
standardization”, we will therefore bear in mind both the factual and the normative dimension 
of the concept of “recognition”.”80  
Accordingly, the AB summarized that a “standardizing body” means a body with 
“recognized activities in standardization” but it does not need to have standardization as “its 
principal function, or even a one of its principal function” and, at the same time, requires, at a 
minimum, that WTO Members must be aware, or have reason to expect, that the international 
body in question is engaged in standardization activities.  
By implication, how far in the extent the AB’s interpretation and analysis can be applied to 
a general concept of ‘standards’, rather than ‘international standard’ within the meaning of 
Article 2.4 is not certain yet.  Nevertheless, the examination method for other levels of 
standards such as regional standards, central or local government standards, or private 
                                           
78 Panel report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.686.  
79 AB report, US-Tuna II, para. 361.  
80 AB report, US-Tuna II, para. 361.  
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standards will be very similar to the summarized analysis for international standards 
elaborately described above.  
Last, the TBT Agreement’s ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’ are based on slightly 
different concept of standards bodies.  In general, the concept of “a recognized body” in the 
definition of ‘standard’ seems to be encompassing a broad range of bodies since the element 
covers all different levels of bodies – international, regional, central government, local 
government or private.  In contrast, standards bodies for ‘technical regulation’ are not 
explicitly mentioned in its definition but they are implied in the regulatory structure of the 
TBT Agreement and limited to central, local or non-government bodies within the boundary 
of a state’s territory.  
  
3.2.6 A legal element of “voluntary compliance” 
 
The legal element of “voluntary compliance” is a determinative factor for distinguishing 
‘standard’ from ‘technical regulation’ within the meanings of the TBT Agreement and for the 
purpose of the TBT Agreement.  The exact expression in the definition of ‘standard’ is 
“document…with which compliance is not mandatory” which largely corresponds but 
contracts with the phrase “document with which compliance is mandatory” in the definition 
of ‘technical regulation’.  Therefore, the meaning of “mandatory” compliance is a critical 
legal element for delineating the scope of ‘standard’ as opposed to the scope of ‘technical 
regulation’.   
This legal element has been the most important feature for drawing a dividing line between 
‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’.  This approach, i.e. an approach to divide the two 
categories based on the compliance character, is typical to the TBT Agreement.  Few  
standards bodies define “standard” in terms of its voluntary compliance.   
For the purpose of this study, the analysis in Chapter 5 is devoted to closely reviewing and 
examining panels’ and the AB’s interpretation and application of the concept “mandatory” 
compliance represented in disputes to date.  Therefore, the content of this section will further 




3.3 ‘Standards’ Disciplines of the WTO TBT Agreement 
 
3.2.1 Regulatory structure of the TBT Agreement  
 
The scope of this study is limited to ‘technical regulations’ and ‘standards’ since the 
ultimate purpose is to delineate the regulatory boundaries and scope of ‘standards’ in relation 
with those of ‘technical regulations’.  The subsequent analyses in this thesis will be based on 
a two-by-three matrix box as shown in <Figure 3>, in which two subject matters, i.e. technical 
regulations and standards will be put horizontally while three entities, i.e. central, local and 
non-governmental bodies will be laid out vertically.  This analytic box is a part of the 
original matrix shown in <Figure 1> and only the first two columns are carved out from the 
original matrix in order to show regulatory scopes for ‘standards’ and their relations with 
‘technical regulations’.  
 
Figure 3. Regulatory scope of the WTO TBT Agreement 
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<Figure 3> shows that different Articles are applied to ‘technical regulation’ and to 
‘standard’.  Article 2 and 3 are applied to ‘technical regulations’ and Article 4 is applied to 
‘standard’.  However, this regulatory scope is further divided in accordance with different 
levels of standards bodies.  Therefore, Article 2 governs matters related to technical 
regulations of central government bodies while Article 3 regulates matters related to technical 
regulations of local and non-government bodies.  However, this division is only what is 
apparent from the legal text.  If we consider the provisions and contents of each Article, the 
regulatory scope can be even further divided by different degrees of the implementation 
obligations. 
To begin with, TBT Agreement’s regulatory structure shows that the Agreement imposes 
different levels of implementation obligation to different levels of standards bodies.  
Regardless of the legal characterization of a measure, the Agreement imposes the highest 
level or the strongest implementation obligation on central government standards bodies.  In 
specific, Article 2 which disciplines ‘technical regulation’ of central government bodies 
requires that the Members “shall ensure” those bodies to comply with the rules and 
procedures set out in the provision.  Also, Article 4 which governs ‘standard’ of central 
government bodies demands the Members “shall ensure” such bodies to accept and comply 
with the Code of Good Practice.  Thus, the expression “shall” appears in provisions applied 
to central government bodies, and thus the obligations imposed on Members with respect to 
central government bodies’ activities are very strong.  
Then, the implementation obligation for central government bodies is compared with 
corresponding obligations for standards bodies of other levels.  An analysis shows that, for 
local government bodies and non-government bodies, the obligation is only ‘best effort’ 
requirement.  In specific, Article 3 requires that the Members “shall take such reasonable 
measures as may be available to … ensure” local government bodies’ compliance with the 
provisions of Article 2.  Also, Article 4 demands that the Members “shall take such 
reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure” that non-government bodies 
accept and comply with the Code of Good Practice.  Thus, for local and non-governmental 
standards bodies, implementation obligation is expressed in ambiguous phrases as “shall take 
such reasonable measures as may be available to ensure” and it can be inferred that, due to 
this ambiguity, the actual reach of the Agreement’s discipline will be very limited.   
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Therefore, in practice, it turns out that Article 2 is devoted to regulate technical regulations 
of central government bodies, and Article 4 and Code of Good Practice can only effectively 
govern standards by central government bodies.  The summary of discussion is illustrated in 
<Figure 4> which clearly shows that central government bodies’ technical regulations and 
standards are practically and effectively subject to implementation of the Agreement.  In 
contrast, local government bodies’ and non-governmental bodies’ technical regulations and 
standards are subject to only “best effort” requirements for implementation, which means that 
the operation of the Agreement is not practically effective on them.  
 
Figure 4. Different degrees of obligation in the WTO TBT Agreement 
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The adoption of a regulatory structure based on different levels of standards bodies was 
inevitable since different countries have different standards systems.  In some countries, the 
domestic standardization and standards system is centralized so that central government 
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bodies play leading, if not dominant, roles in standard-setting.  In other countries, however, 
the domestic political system is based on a fragmented structure in which local-government or 
state-government bodies can independently enact technical regulations and establish standards.  
In these two cases, the government, regardless of central or local, is at the center of 
standardization activity but the actual reach and effectiveness of the WTO Agreements 
including the TBT Agreement will be limited to activities of central government bodies; the 
operation of the WTO Agreements will only indirectly affect local government bodies 
through the influence by central government bodies.    
There is a more challenging situation in which standardization primarily belongs to the 
domain of private work and non-government bodies are the major actors in supplying 
standards.  In such a case, government only adopts useful private standards as basis for its 
government technical regulations and standards.  Although the TBT Agreement contains this 
category, i.e. technical regulations and standards by non-governmental bodies, as part of its 
subject matters and entities, if the Agreement imposes the same obligations under the 
equivalent degree of implementation pressure on non-government bodies through central 
government bodies, it would be highly questionable whether such obligations can effectively 
implemented and whether a Member with this type of domestic standardization structure is 
under substantially heavier implementation burden than a Member with a centralized system. 
In fact, different situations in different countries were virtually one of the most challenging 
and important issues throughout the negotiation history of the TBT Agreement.  Particularly, 
the early drafters have perceived the Agreement’s critical regulatory problem surrounding 
imbalance in burdens of the TBT Agreement implementation.  At first, they considered that 
the early GATT system was primarily a legal regime for governments, so Agreements would 
be applied only to the Members or central governments in principle.  The essential problem 
was that unless obligations for local government bodies and non-government bodies were 
explicitly addressed, de-centralized countries would enjoy less implementation burden while 
only centralized countries would be practically subject to the draft TBT regime.   
On this background, the early TBT Agreement drafters decided to include specific rules 
and procedures for local and non-government standards bodies in the legal text. To address 
the imbalance and regulatory fragility problem, the drafting negotiators decided to incorporate 
obligations for local and non-government bodies on the one hand and to apply a different 
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degree of implementation obligation to each level of standards bodies on the other hand.  In 
addition, the TBT Agreement requires the Members to be responsible for and allows other 
Member’s dispute challenges regarding any matters accruing to the operation of the TBT 
Agreement 
Even so, practical difficulties still remained.  Even if legally and conceptually equal 
weight of burden was put on Members through provisions of Articles 3 and 4 and even if both 
decentralized standards systems and centralized standards systems were, in principle, subject 
to the same disciplines of the TBT Agreement, the experience under the GATT Standards 
Code proved that it was very difficult to bring activities of non-government bodies into the 
realm of the TBT regime.  An attempt to improve this regulatory deficiency was the 
adoption of the Code of Good Practice.  However, it is still doubtful that the current TBT 
Agreement can ever virtually and effectively reach standards activities carried out by non-
government bodies.  
 
3.2.2 Common disciplines for ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’  
 
General principles and rules governing central government bodies’ technical regulations 
and standards are almost identical.  When the two sets of provisions, i.e., those in Article 2, 
which governs matters related to central government bodies’ preparation, adoption and 
application of technical regulations and those in the Code of Good Practice, which is applied 
to regulate central government standardizing bodies’ preparation, adoption and application of 
standards, are compared in terms of their disciplines, they basically stipulate the same general 
principles and rules.  As shown in <Table 2>, the two sets of provisions not only commonly 
provide the GATT’s fundamental principles such as non-discrimination, removal of 
unnecessary obstacles, and some transparency procedures, but they also identically require 
central government bodies to use international standards, participate in international 
standardization, and prefer performance-based standards.  
To elaborate, Paragraph D of the Code provides standardizing body’s obligations of most-
favored-nation treatment and national treatment in respect of standards while the same non-
discrimination rule is applied to central government body’s technical regulations in 
accordance with Article 2.1.  Paragraph E requires standardizing body to ensure that 
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standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade, the same obligation in exactly identical language 
of which is also found in the first sentence in Article 2.2.  
   
Table 2. Common disciplines for technical regulations and standards in the WTO 
TBT Agreement 
Disciplines 
(Rules and obligations) 
Disciplines for Technical 
Regulations provided in 
the comparable 
provisions of Article 2 
Disciplines for 
Standards provided in 
the comparable 
provisions of the Code 
of Good Practice 
Non-discrimination  2.1 D 
Not with a view to or with effect of 
creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade 
2.2 E 
Use of International standards as a basis  2.4 F 
Participation in international 
standardization 2.6 G 
Based on performance rather than design 
or descriptive characteristics 2.8 I 
Transparency Rules (prompt publication,  
provision of copies upon request, 
reasonable intervals for comments, 
comment-and-reply rules ) 
2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
 
In addition, Paragraph F requires standardizing body to use international standards as a 
basis for the standards it develops, except where such international standards would be 
ineffective or inappropriate, for instance, because of an insufficient level of protection or 
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.  This 
obligation to use international standards as a basis is also provided in Article 2.4 in respect of 
central government body’s technical regulations.  
  In line with its recognition of important contribution by international standards and its 
encouragement for the development of international standards in preamble, the TBT 
Agreement obligates Members to participate as fully as possible in the preparation of 
international standards.  Thus, paragraph G provides that, with a view to harmonizing 
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standards on as wide a basis as possible, the standardizing body shall, in an appropriate way, 
play a full party, within the limits of its resources, in the preparation by relevant international 
standardizing bodies of international standards regarding subject matter for which it either has 
adopted, or expects to adopt, standards.  Likewise, Article 2.6 stipulates that Members shall 
play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the preparation by appropriate 
international standardizing bodies of international standards for products which they either 
have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations.  
  Whenever appropriate, both standards and technical regulations should be based on product 
requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics, 
according to paragraph I of the Code and Article 2.8 of the Agreement, respectively. 
Despite some differences in detail, transparency rules for standards and technical regulations 
generally resemble to each other.  Once standards or technical regulations are adopted, they 
should be promptly published in accordance with paragraph O and Article 2.11, respectively.  
Central government bodies shall, upon request, promptly and without discrimination provide 
or arrange to provide copies of their standards or technical regulations as paragraph P and 
Article 2.9.2.   
  Both the Code and Article 2 adopt a comment-and-reply mechanism to enhance the 
transparency and international harmonization during standardization process.  Paragraphs L 
through N stipulates that the standardizing body should allow a period of at least 60 days for 
the submission of comments on draft standards, provide a copy of a draft standard for such 
comments, reply as promptly as possible to comments submitted and take them into account 
in the further procession of the standard.  All these procedures are also found in Article 2.9 
and applied to preparation and adoption of technical regulations whenever a relevant 
international standard does not exist or the technical content of a proposed technical 
regulation is not in accordance with that of relevant international standards and if the 
technical regulation may have a significant effect on trade.  
 
3.2.3 Different disciplines for ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’  
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  Although general principles and rules governing central government bodies’ technical 
regulations and standards are significantly similar, factors that are considered important and, 
thus, stipulated in more detail in each of the Code of Good Practice and Article 2 are different 
and noteworthy.  Throughout the provisions in the TBT Agreement, disciplines for technical 
regulations adopted and applied by central government bodies have fundamental goals of 
preventing protectionist measures in disguise and, therefore, they elaborate on criteria for 
legitimate objectives and justifications of technical regulations proposed or already adopted.  
On the contrary, no such qualifications are imposed by the Code on preparation, adoption and 
application of standards.   
  Another different discipline is related to harmonization rules: with respect to technical 
regulations, Article 2 encourages central government bodies to recognize equivalence whereas, 
the Code asks standardizing bodies to harmonize domestically as well as regionally and 
internationally and expects them to avoid duplications and overlaps.  
  In addition, technical regulations are to be notified to the WTO Secretariat while standards 
are notified to the ISO/IEC Information Centre, which may represent different fora and, thus, 
different purposes for information dissemination. 
 
3.2.3.1 No explicit requirement of “legitimate objectives” for standards 
 
  The fifth and sixth recitals in the preamble of the TBT Agreement attempts to balance 
Member’s regulatory autonomy on one hand and trade liberalization on the other.  
According to the fifth recital, all types of technical barriers, namely, technical regulations and 
standards, including packaging, marking and labeling requirements and procedures for 
assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards, should not create 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  The sixth recital basically recognizes countries’ 
taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, 
at the levels it considers appropriate.  In principle, therefore, Member countries’ preparation, 
adoption and application of technical regulations or standards are allowed and unregulated.  
However, it pursues coordination and a kind of balance between objectives of measures and 
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trade-restrictive effects of them, conditioning that Members’ measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.  
  In line with the objectives stated in the preamble, paragraph E of the Code provides that the 
standardizing body shall ensure that standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a 
view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  However, 
the paragraph does not specify the stated general rule nor explains what it means or how to 
review it when a dispute arises with respect to this least-trade-restrictive principle.   
  On the contrary, disciplines for technical regulations adopted and applied by central 
government bodies are more specific and clearer.  The second sentence in Article 2.2 further 
stipulates that necessity is judged by the legitimacy of the technical regulation under concern 
and lays out indicative list of what constitutes ‘legitimate purposes.’  It reads, “[f]or this 
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate 
objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; 
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In 
assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and 
technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products.”  
  Thus, disciplines for technical regulations require sound grounds and justification for their 
adoption in the first place and demand for continued justification for technical regulations.  
In specific, Article 2.3 explicitly provides that technical regulations shall not be maintained if 
the circumstances or objectives giving rise to their adoption no longer exist or if the changed 
circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner.  Furthermore, 
Article 2.5 stipulates, “[a] Member preparing, adopting or applying a technical regulation 
which may have a significant effect on trade of other Members shall, upon request of another 
Member, explain the justification for that technical regulation in terms of the provisions of 
paragraph 2 to 4. Whenever a technical regulation is prepared, adopted or applied for one of 
the legitimate objectives explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2, and is in accordance with 
relevant international standards, it shall be refutably presumed not to create unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade.” 
  The TBT Agreement suggests an indicative, not exclusive, list of legitimate purposes of 
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technical regulations.  In the sixth recital of its preamble, the Agreement recognizes 
regulatory autonomy of the Members, in an attempt to balance between Members’ sovereign 
rights to pursue ‘legitimate’ social goals and the multilateral systems’ trade liberalization goal 
with the critical phrase of ‘measures necessary’.81  Then, it further suggestively lists such 
standardization purposes as assurance of the product quality, protection of human, animal or 
plant life or health, protection of environment or prevention of deceptive practices.  In 
jurisprudence, any additional standardization purposes explicitly stated in the provisions of 
other GATT/WTO Agreements can also be directly based on by technical regulations. 
 
3.2.3.2 Requirements of participation in the preparation of international standards 
 
  The third recital of the preamble of the TBT Agreement recognizes the importance of 
international standards and conformity assessment systems in improving production 
efficiency and facilitating international trade.  Accordingly, paragraph F of the Code and 
Article 2.4 respectively provides harmonization of standards and technical regulations with 
relevant international standards when effective and appropriate relevant international 
standards exist or their completion is imminent.  In addition, paragraph G and Article 2.6 
promote as wide harmonization of respective standards and technical regulations as possible 
through encouraging active participation by respective standardizing bodies and the central 
government bodies in international standardization process.  
  With respect to technical regulation, Article 2.6 requires Members to play a full part, within 
the limits of their resources, in the preparation by appropriate international standardizing 
bodies in international standards for products for which they either have adopted, or expect to 
adopt, technical regulations.   
  For standards, in contrast, the Code additionally requires such participation to be carried 
out ‘in an appropriate way’.  The second sentence in paragraph G provides that, for 
standardizing bodies within the territory of a Member, participation in a particular 
international standardization activity should, whenever possible, take place through one 
                                           
81 TBT Agreement, preamble, recital 6. 
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delegation representing all standardizing bodies in the territory that have adopted, or expect to 
adopt, standards for the subject matter to which the international standardization activity 
relates.  
 
3.2.3.3 Requirements of national harmonization and national consensus for 
standards  
 
Paragraph H of the Code provides that standardizing body within the territory of a Member 
should make effort to avoid duplication of or overlap with the work of other standardizing 
bodies in the national territory or with the work of relevant international or regional 
standardizing bodies. The second sentence of the paragraph goes on to stipulates that 
standardizing body should also make effort to achieve a national consensus on the standards 
they develop.  Read together, it seems that the Code strongly pursue domestic standards 
harmonization as well as regional or international standards harmonization.   
The Code does not contain rules of recognition of equivalence as an explicit instrument 
with respect of standards harmonization, which is unlike from disciplines for technical 
regulations in Article 2.6.  The article provides that Members give positive consideration to 
accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other Members, even if these regulations 
differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfill the 
objectives of their own regulations.  
 
3.2.3.4 Publication of standards in preparation and notification to ISO/IEC 
Information Center  
 
  According to paragraph J, standardizing body should publish a work program at least once 
every six months.  It defines standard preparation a period from the moment of decision to 
develop a standard until that standard has been adopted.  Then, it further stipulates a series of 
procedural requirements for national publication and notification to ISO/IEC Information 
Center, as in the following:  
  “The titles of specific draft standards shall, upon request, be provided in English, French or 
Spanish.  A notice of the existence of the work program shall be published in a national or, 
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as the case may be, regional publication of standardization activities.   
The work program shall for each standard indicate, in accordance with any ISONET rules, the 
classification relevant to the subject matter, the stage attained in the standard’s development, 
and the references of any international standards taken as a basis.  No later than at the time 
of publication of its work program, the standardizing body shall notify the existence thereof to 
the ISO/IEC Information Center in Geneva.  
  The notification shall contain the name and address of the standardizing body, the name 
and issue of the publication in which the work program is published, the period to which the 
work program applies, its price (if any), and how and where it can be obtained. The 
notification may be sent directly to the ISO/IEC Information Center, or, preferably, through 
the relevant national member or international affiliate of ISONET, as appropriate.”  
  With respect to technical regulation, there is no explicit requirement for national 
publication and it seems to be left to the discretion of Members’ central government bodies.  
Article 2 only requires Members to ensure prompt publication to other Members or to 
interested parties in other Members.  Also, central government bodies are obliged to notify 
to the WTO Secretariat of not all but some of technical regulations in proposal or immediately 
after adoption in case of urgency, whenever technical regulations deviate from relevant 
international standards and they may have a significant effect on trade of other Members.   
  Therefore, the purpose of notification and publication requirements with respect to 
technical regulations would be to make those trade-restrictive technical regulations 
transparent to other Members or interested parties in other Members and let them be 
acquainted with them, before they are officially adopted or immediately after they adopted in 
case of urgency.  In contrast, the notification and publication requirements with respect to 
standards emphasize domestic publication and purpose of domestic harmonization along with 
regional or international transparency.  Also, information sharing is taken charge of by 
ISO/IEC Information Center, not by any WTO body and the notification requirement is not 
conditioned with any deviation from relevant international standards and possibility of 
significant trade restriction.  
 




  With respect to preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations, Members 
shall not take measures which require or encourage local government bodies or non-
governmental bodies within their territories to act in a manner inconsistent with the provisions 
of Article 2 (Article 3.4).  In addition, Members are fully responsible for the observance of 
all provisions of Article 2 and Members shall formulate and implement positive measures and 
mechanisms in support of the observance of the provisions of Article 2 by other than central 
government bodies (Article 3.5).  
  With respect to preparation, adoption and application of standards, Members are similarly 
required to take a full responsibility.  According to the third sentence of Article 4.1, 
Members are prohibited take measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, 
requiring or encouraging such standardizing bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with the 
Code of Good Practice.  Furthermore, the last sentence of Article 4.1 stipulates that the 
obligations of Members with respect to compliance of standardizing bodies with the 
provisions of the Code of Good Practice shall apply irrespective of whether or not a 
standardizing body has accepted the Code of Good Practice.   
  Therefore, it is noted that for Members’ obligation to ensure local and non-governmental 
bodies’ compliance with Article 2 with respect to technical regulations is based on a positive 
approach, meaning that Members are required to take some actions in support of the 
implementation of Article 2. On the contrary, Members’ obligation to ensure compliance of 
standardizing bodies within their territory with the provisions of the Code takes a negative 
approach, requiring Members not to take any measures that have the direct or indirect effect 
of making their standardizing bodies to act inconsistently with the Code.  
 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary and Partial Conclusion  
 
The fundamental purpose of the TBT Agreement is to reduce and prevent technical barriers 
to trade.  In order words, the Agreement establishes a regime which prevents and deals with 
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trade-restrictive effect of standards rather than directly controlling standards and 
standardization activities.  Chapter 3, therefore, is devoted to reviewing the current TBT 
regime that defines ‘standard’ as one of its subject matters and regulates it through disciplines 
set out in provisions of Article 3 and the Code of Good Practice in Annex 4.  In particular, it 
examines major legal elements that comprise the concept of ‘standards’ for the purpose of the 
TBT Agreement and adopts a comparative analysis with a view to highlight both common and 
different features in the Agreement’s treatments toward ‘standards’ and ‘technical 
regulations’. 
The major findings of the analysis on the meaning of ‘standards’ in the current TBT 
Agreement include that products must be identifiable in documents of ‘standards’, that it is 
not still clear as to whether the scope of ‘standards’ covers non-product related PPMs or not, 
but voluntary labelling, for example, may cover both product-related and non-product related 
PPMs, and that approval by a recognized ‘standards’ bodies can be perceived from broad 
perspectives.  The concept of ‘standards’ shares many commonalities with the concept of 
‘technical regulations’ except for its legal element of “voluntary” compliance.  
The comparison of the disciplines concludes that the Agreement’s obligations for 
‘standards’ and ‘technical regulations’ are largely identical.  Nevertheless, in addition to 
transparency procedures, there are a few critical differences in disciplines for ‘standard’ such 
as the Agreement’s no explicit requirement for “legitimate objectives”, expressive 
requirement for national harmonization and pursuit of national consensus, and requirement for 
Member’s implementation effort based on a negative approach.  Above all, the disciplines 
for ‘standards’ provided in Annex 4 Code are applied, in principle, only conditionally upon 
the acceptance by standards bodies.  
In sum, there is dominant evidence showing that the concept of ‘standards’ largely 
resembles the concept of ‘technical regulations’ particularly in terms of its definition and its 
disciplines in the TBT Agreement.  However, a few legal elements critically differentiate the 
two concepts.  In particular, it is noted that the legal element of “mandatory/voluntary 
compliance” is a key factor for the distinction, and voluntary ‘standards’ are subject to a 










Disciplines for  
Technical Regulations  
provided in the comparable 
provisions of Article 2 
Disciplines for  
Standards provided in the 
comparable provisions of the Code 











2. Members shall ensure that 
technical regulations are not prepared 
adopted or applied with a view to or 
with the effect of creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade. For the purpose, technical 
regulations shall not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a 
legitimated objective, raking account 
of the risks non-fulfillment would 
create. Such legitimate objectives are, 
inter alia: national security 
requirements; the prevention of 
deceptive practices; protection of 
human health or safety, animal or 
plant life or health, of the 
environment. In assessing such risks, 
relevant elements of consideration 
are, inter alia: available scientific and 
technical information, related 
processing technology or intended 
end-uses of products.  
D. The standardizing body shall 
ensure that standards are not prepared, 
adopted or applied with a view to, or 
with the effect of, creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade. 





6. With a view to harmonizing 
technical regulations on as wide a 
basis as possible, Members shall paly 
a full part, within the limits of their 
resources, in the preparation by 
appropriate international 
standardizing bodies of international 
standards for products for which they 
either have adopted, or expect to 
adopt, technical regulations.  
G. With a view to harmonizing 
standards on as wide a basis as 
possible, the standardizing body shall, 
in an appropriate way, play a full part, 
within the limits of its resources, in the 
preparation by relevant  international 
standardizing bodies of international 
standards regarding subject matter for 
which it either has adopted, or expect 
to adopt, standards. For standardizing 
bodies within the territory of a 
Member, participation in a particular 
international standardization activity 
shall, whenever possible, take place 
through one delegation representing 
all standardizing bodies in the territory 
that have adopted, or expect to adopt, 
standards for the subject matter to 
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which the international standardization 
activity relates.  
Equivalence 
recognition  
7. Members shall give positive 
consideration to accepting as 
equivalent technical regulations of 
other Members, even if these 
regulations differ from their own, 
provided they are satisfied that these 
regulations adequately fulfil the 
objectives of their own regulations.  






(No comparable provision) H. The standardizing body within the 
territory of a Member shall make 
every effort to avoid duplication of, or 
overlap with, the work of other 
standardizing bodies in the national 
territory or with the work of relevant 
international or regional standardizing 
bodies. They shall also make every 
effort to achieve a national consensus 
on the standards they develop. 
Likewise the regional standardizing 
body shall make every effort to avoid 
duplication of, or overlap with, the 




9. Whenever a relevant international 
standard does not exist or the 
technical content of a proposed 
technical regulation is not in 
accordance with the technical content 
of relevant international standards, 
and if the technical regulation may 
have a significant effect on trade of 
other Members, Members shall: 
 
 
9.1 publish a notice in a publication at 
an early appropriate stage, in such a 
manner as to enable interested parties 
in other Members to become 
acquainted with it, that they propose 




9.2  notify other Members through 
the Secretariat of the products to be 
covered by the proposed technical 
J. At least once every six months, the 
standardizing body shall publish a 
work programme containing its name 
and address, the standards it is 
currently preparing and the standards 
which it has adopted in the preceding 
period…. A notice of the existence of 
the work programme shall be 
published in a national or, as the case 
may be, regional publication of 
standardization activities……The 
notification may be sent directly to the 
ISO/IEC Information Centre, or 
preferably through the relevant 
national member or international 
affiliate of ISONET, as appropriate. 
 
L. Before adopting a standard, the 
standardizing body shall allow a 
period of at least 60 days for the 
submission of comments on the draft 
standard by interested parties within 
the territory of a Member of the WTO. 
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regulation, together with a brief 
indication of its objective and 
rationale. Such notifications shall 
take place at an early appropriate 
stage, when amendments can still be 
introduced and comments taken into 
account; 
 
This period may, however, be 
shortened in cases where urgent 
problems of safety, health or 
environment arise or threaten to arise. 
No later than at the start of the 
comment period, the standardizing 
body shall publish a notice 
announcing the period for commenting 
in the publication referred to in 
paragraph J. Such notification shall 
include, as far as practicable, whether 
the draft standard deviates from 
relevant international standards.  
 
9.3 upon request, provide to other 
Members particulars or copies of the 
proposed technical regulation and, 
whenever possible, identify the parts 
which in substance deviate from 
relevant international standards; 
 
M. On the request of any interested 
party within the territory of a Member 
of the WTO, the standardizing body 
shall promptly provide, or arrange to 
provide, a copy of a draft standard 
which it has submitted for comments. 
Any fees charged for this service shall, 
apart from the real cost of delivery, be 
the same for foreign and domestic 
parties.  
 
9.4 without discrimination, allow 
reasonable time for other Members to 
make comments in writing, discuss 
these comments upon request, and 
take these written comments and the 




N. The standardizing body shall take 
into account, in the further processing 
of the standard, the comments 
received during the period for 
commenting.  Comments received 
through standardizing bodies that have 
accepted this Code of Good Practice 
shall, if so requested, be replied to as 
promptly as possible. The reply shall 
include an explanation why a 
deviation from relevant international 
standards is necessary. 
 








4. Members shall not take measures 
which require or encourage local 
government bodies or non-
governmental bodies within their 
territories to act in a manner 
inconsistent with the provisions of 
Article 2.  
 
 
1. Members shall ensure that their 
central government standardizing 
bodies accept and comply… They 
shall take such reasonable measures as 
may be available to them to ensure 
that… In addition, Members shall not 
take measures which have the effect 
of, directly or indirectly, requiring or 
encouraging such standardizing bodies 
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5. Members are fully responsible 
under this Agreement for the 
observance of all provisions of 
Article 2. Members shall formulate 
and implement positive measures and 
mechanisms in support of the 
observance of the provisions of 
Article 2 by other than central 
government bodies. 
to act in a manner inconsistent with 
the Code of Good Practice… The 
obligations of members with respect to 
compliance of standardizing bodies 
with the provisions of the Code of 
Good Practice shall apply irrespective 
of whether or not a standardizing body 
has accepted the Code of Good 
Practice.  
 








Chapter 4. Conceptual Development of “Standard” in the 




4.1 Chapter Overview 
 
The GATT/WTO system has long attempted to establish an effective regime to reduce and 
prevent technical barriers and, after a series of negotiations and revisions, it finally adopted 
the definitions, regulatory structures and disciplines currently provided in the TBT Agreement. 
Multilateral negotiations to regulate trade-restrictive standards began right after the Kennedy 
Round as the negotiators felt a need to discipline non-tariff barriers.  The negotiation for 
standards was generally successful and proceeded with little difficulties compared to other 
non-tariff barrier issues during the Tokyo Round negotiation.   
Nevertheless, there have been substantial changes with respect to definitions, regulatory 
structures, and disciplines from the initial design to the GATT TBT Agreement and to the 
WTO TBT Agreement and the concept of “standard” has experienced several revisions.  In 
consequence, the concept of “standards” defined and regulated by the WTO TBT Agreement 
now is a result of the long process of negotiations and revisions and, therefore, it should be 
understood and interpreted based on this developmental context.  
On the reasoning, this thesis considers it appropriate and essential to examine the concept 
of “standard” designed by early negotiators, negotiated during the Tokyo Round, and revised 
during the Uruguay Round in order to grasp a full meaning of ‘standard’.  Accordingly, this 
chapter focuses on the conceptual development of “standard” throughout the negotiations of 
the GATT/WTO system and analyses the concepts of “standard” appearing in draft and final 
texts of the TBT Agreement.   
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This chapter begins with a review on initial discussions on non-tariff barriers and efforts to 
identify the problems of “standards” right after the Kennedy Round and in the preparatory 
stage of the Tokyo Round.  Then, it continues to study major standards issues during the 
Tokyo Round, highlighting the harmonization process of the GATT TBT draft codes with the 
ISO/ECE definitions.  This chapter also compares terminologies, definitions, and regulatory 
scopes of “standards” found in the earliest available draft text with those in the 1978 draft and 
with those in the final Standards Code in order to show a general direction of the negotiations 
and revisions regarding the concept of “standard”.  Finally, this chapter addresses issues 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round and elaborates on major issues of the Agreement’s 
coverage, particularly over PPMs, and the issue of inserting the Code of Good Practice in 
Annex 4 to the WTO TBT Agreement.  
 
 
4.2 “Standard” after the Kennedy Round Negotiations 
 
4.2.1 Rising issues of nontariff barriers after the Kennedy Round 
negotiations 
 
  Over the first two decades of the GATT negotiating history, the Contracting Parties 
witnessed a series of successful tariff reductions.  The past achievements and positive 
experience had helped negotiators gain confidence in the sustainability and operability of the 
GATT system and the Contracting Parties agreed to significant tariff concessions by taking a 
linear approach to tariff negotiations during the Kennedy Round.  The comprehensive results 
of tariff negotiation were generally understood to mean a period of some years for full 
implementation and were perceived to bring about massive trade impact and industrial 
adjustments in the following several years.  Therefore, although a need to negotiate non-
tariff barriers was affirmed, the general sentiment at the conclusion of the Kennedy Round, 
was that there would be little chance for any major initiatives for subsequent negotiations 
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dealing with whole range of tariffs and non-tariff issues in any near future.82 
  Nevertheless, the Contracting Parties recognized increasingly serious problems of non-
tariff trade barriers and rising need to address them in order to fully realize benefits of the 
tariff eliminations.  Thus, it was almost inevitable for the Contracting Parties to begin 
preparation and discussion for non-tariff barrier negotiations right after the conclusion of the 
Kennedy Round Negotiation.  In the twenty-fourth session of the GATT in November 1967, 
which was the first meeting after the Kennedy Round, the Director-General stated that there 
should continue discussion on what the non-tariff barriers are and how to deal with them.  In 
specific, the Director-General called for building up inventories of non-tariff measures which 
the Contracting Parties considered to constitute non-tariff barriers to trade in industrial 
products.83  
However, the problem of non-tariff barriers was, in their nature, diverse, complex and 
technical.  Each Contracting Party seemed to understand non-tariff barriers differently, and 
there was need to study their characteristics, ways to handle them and alternatives in decision-
makings.84  As a result, during the preparatory stage prior to the Tokyo Round negotiation, 
                                           
82 L/2943, paras. 4-9. After the conclusion of the Kennedy Round, the Contracting Parties had the twenty-
fourth session in 9-24 November 1967, reviewing their work of the previous twenty years and reaching 
certain conclusions on their future work programme.  In assessing the past achievement, the Contracting 
parties particularly stressed the progress to attain the objectives of the GATT in expanding world trade and 
promoting international cooperation in the trade field generally, noted the significant progress made in the 
field of agricultural trade despite substantial remaining issues, and recognized the pioneering work in the field 
of the trade problems of the developing countries. In reminding the future works, they agreed that an essential 
first task was to secure the full implementation of all the results of the Kennedy Round. In addition, although 
they reaffirmed that ‘no new major initiatives for a multilateral and comprehensive move forward could 
reasonably be expected in the near future,’ they recognized that ‘it was important to proceed to prepare for 
further advances.’ 
83 L/2893, para. 6. The Contracting Party evaluated the past achievement and suggested a future plan, stating, 
“[t]he results obtained in the trade negotiations on non-tariff barriers to trade in industrial products were 
relatively modest when compared with the results obtained in the tariff field. This is, however, an area of 
great concerned to both governments and to exporters and an area which may grow in importance as the tariff 
reductions agreed in the Kennedy Round are implemented. An examination of non-tariff barriers would 
certainly form part of the work of the working parties just proposed for individual sectors. [The Director-
General] suggest[s] also that a decision should now be taken inviting governments to submit lists of non-tariff 
barriers which, after consultation with their exporters, they believe have an adverse effect on their export 
trade. This should enable [the Contracting Parties], as a first step, to draw up a complete inventory of non-
tariff measures which are considered to constitute barriers to trade in industrial products. An assessment 
should then be made as to which of these barriers might be susceptible to international negotiation.” 
84 Winham (1986), p.88. Negotiating nontariff measures was very difficult from the beginning since they 
were “largely undefinable, numerous, often concealed, and incomparable, and that their effects were unknown 
precisely but generally thought to be pernicious.  Negotiators had to achieve an intellectual understanding of 
these measures before they could negotiate their removal.” 
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enormous efforts and works were followed, particularly for building inventories in order to 
grasp an entire picture of non-tariff barriers.85  
 
4.2.2 Efforts to identify the problems of standards  
 
4.2.2.1 Identifying the problems of nontariff barriers  
 
The Committee on Trade in Industrial Products was created based on some initial thirty 
three members to work within the terms of reference “to explore the opportunities for making 
progress toward further liberalization of trade taking into account the discussion on the 
subject at the twenty-fourth session.”86  The Committee had also been given two specific 
tasks by the Contracting Parties.  The first was to carry out an objective analysis of the tariff 
situation, whether all Kennedy Round concessions have been fully implemented.87   The 
second task was to draw up and analyze an inventory of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers.88  
At the first meeting of Committee on 17 and 18 October 1968, the Contracting Parties 
instructed to draw up a report to the Council “to establish appropriate machinery to deal with 
the problems identified in the inventory”.89  Most members agreed to the importance of 
thorough and careful preparation in the complex field and extensive nature of non-tariff 
barriers.90  However, they recognized difficulties in addressing non-tariff barriers due to 
their diversity, working uncertainty, and, in some occasions, basis of administrative 
                                           
85 L/2943, para. 10. The Contracting Parties agreed to undertake Programme for Expansion of International 
Trade under the three main headings: ‘industrial products’, ‘agriculture’ and ‘conclusions relating to the trade 
of developing countries’.  Specifically, under the Programme for Industrial Products, they decided to 
institute a Committee on Trade in Industrial Products with a view to explore the opportunities for making 
progress toward further liberalization of trade, to make an objective analysis on the tariff situation to 
accession implementation of the Kennedy Round concessions and to draw up an inventory of non-tariff and 
para-tariff barriers affecting international trade.  For the inventory, Contracting Parties were asked for to 
notify the Committee of the non-tariff barriers, both governmental and non-governmental, which they wish to 
be included in the inventory, which would later be transmitted to the Council for analysis and identification of 
the problems. 
86 COM.IND/1.  
87 The analysis of tariffs, later known as the ‘Tariff Study’ had been circulated by the secretariat under the 
GATT document series numbered with ‘COM.IND/5/number’.  
88 The inventory of non-tariff barriers was continuously piled up and reported as addenda or corrigenda to the 
GATT under the document series numbered with ‘COM.IND/4/number’.  
89 GATT, L/3083, para. 3.  
90 GATT, L/3083, para. 4. 
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discretion.91  Moreover, the procedure that exporting countries notify trade barriers in 
importing countries almost amounted to adversely challenging importing Member’s national 
policy, which was ‘a political act’.92   
In particular, it was difficult to apply a common approach to all different non-tariff barriers. 
Some barriers were more suitable for some rules of conduct for general acceptance whilst 
others could be dealt with in a kind of multilateral bargaining.93  Therefore, the Contracting 
Parties had to consider possibilities of different approaches from case to case. Another 
specific difficulty lied in the magnitude of works the Contracting Parties had to carry out.  
The Contracting Parties found the work of inventory-building immense and technical, and, 
therefore, they decided to simplify the work with some groupings and a barrier-by-barrier 
approach.94   
As a result, all the notifications in the inventory were initially classified into five major 
categories from part 1 to 5 and one last category for all others.  The classification was 
considered to be temporary and open to any modification.  The Contracting Parties were 
concerned that their expected benefits from the Kennedy Round be neutralized by adoption of 
new intensified barriers and, therefore, required the Committee not confine itself to this early 
classification.95  In addition, Canada even suggested that discussion should not be limited to 
notifying countries and to those maintaining barriers but it emphasized the importance of 
broadening the list of subjects with all interested countries participating so that contracting 
parties could provide as much information as possible about each barrier and ensure that the 
Committee could obtain as a complete global picture of non-tariff barriers as possible.96   
 
                                           
91 GATT, L/3083, para.7. 
92 Winham (1986), pp. 86-87.  
93 GATT, L/3083, para.7. 
94 GATT, L/3083, para. 8. It was also recognized that “these preparations might become entangled in the 
immense amount of technical detail to be examined. It was thus desirable to adopt a pragmatic approach 
which should simplify the preparatory work.  It was felt that a barrier-by-barrier approach would best meet 
this criterion and that a first task was therefore to classify the barriers more rationally into categories, 
grouping them so that those having relation to one another might be considered together…to carry out the 
analysis...” 
95 GATT, L/3083, para.11.  
96 COM.IND/8, p.1. 
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Box 1. Prior to Tokyo Round - Classification of nontariff barriers97 
§ Part 1.  Government participation in trade 
§ Part 2.  Customs and administrative entry procedures 
§ Part 3.  Standards involving import and domestic goods 
§ Part 4.  Specific limitations on imports and exports (quantitative restrictions and the like) 
§ Part 5.  Restraints on imports and exports by the price mechanism 
§ Part 6. Other restraints on imports98 
 
 
Most of the categories in the classification went through subsequent modifications as more 
inventories had piled up. 99  However, the categories for customs procedures and standards 
had been maintained throughout negotiations.  The categories generally served a basis for 
organizing working groups during the Tokyo Round.100 
 
4.2.2.2 Building an inventory of standards problems 
 
Within a year, some 800 nontariff measures in 96 countries were notified by all Contracting 
Parties and they were thought be in force in nearly all countries parties to the GATT. 101  
The inventory documents formed the basis for the Committee’s analysis during its meeting in 
1969 and, under the category, ‘Standards involving import and domestic goods’, the 
following standards were identified as relevant non-tariff barriers:  
 
                                           
97 COM.IND/8, p. 3 and Annex in p.6.  
98 COM.IND/8, p. 3. Initially, there were some other miscellaneous nontariff measures classified under the 
category “Others” but they were subsequently discarded. Those under this category were advertising and 
transportation restraints, screen time requirements, local content and mixing requirements, and restrictive 
business practices.  
99 The first reorganized list of notification is provided under the GATT document series COM.IND/6/number. 
100 Winham (1986), p.87.  
101 L/3298, para.3.  The number of countries maintaining non-tariff or para-tariff measures was calculated 
by the author based on COUNTRY INDEX TO NOTIFICATIONS IN THE INVENTORY (GATT, 
COM.IND/W/21, 24 December 1969).  
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Box 2. Prior to Tokyo Round – Identifying standards-related measures102 
§ Industrial standards 
§ Health and safety standards 
§ Weights and measures 
§ Pharmaceutical standards 
§ Product content requirements 
§ Labelling and container regulations 
§ Processing standards 
§ Marking requirements 
§ Packaging requirements 
 
 
The early standards sub-categories incorporated large coverage.  They identified, as 
technical barriers, industrial standards, health and safety standards, weights and measures, 
pharmaceutical standards, product content requirements, labeling and container regulations, 
processing standards, marking requirements, and packaging requirements.  Industrial 
standards, health and safety standards and weights and measures constituted the majority of 
the category.   
The first category would include some of the measures which had tentatively been 
classified as “industrial standards”, such as specifications regarding performances of electrical 
goods, steel materials, pressure vessels, as well as many requirements concerning 
measurements, labelling of product content and ingredients. 103 
Labelling and container, marking and packaging were included at this early stage but had 
been continuously subject to the subsequent discussions on how to deal with them.  
Interestingly, at this early stage, processing standards were overtly identified as important 
standards barriers.  In addition, it is noted that pharmaceutical standards, some of which 
might belonged to heath standards, were under one of the sub-categories but were later 
excluded due to the reason that they either belonged to health standards or to intellectual 
                                           
102 Para.11, p.3 and Annex, p.6.  
103 MTN/3B/3.  
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property issues.  Since a plurilateral agreement for government procurement had been yet to 
be signed, standards probably included standards applied for government procurement. One 
member of the Group was of the view that an instrument drawn up by GATT should not, at 
this stage, include pharmaceutical products which were in a category of their own due to the 
special health problem involved.104 At that time, Agriculture standards as well as sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards were discussed in the Agriculture Committee. 
The inventory had no legally binding status.  Its primary function was to provide 
information on what constituted non-tariff barriers in general.  It was only intended to be 
exploratory and preparatory.  Thus, it involved no commitment on the part of any member of 
the Working Group to take or join in any action under discussion, and it is only tentative at 
the preparatory stage prior to the Tokyo Round.105 
 
4.2.2.3 An issue of distinguishing voluntary standards from compulsory regulations  
 
Based on the examination of the inventory, the Contracting Parties recognized that there 
was increasing number of standards and regulations which restricted trades. The standard-
related trade barriers were generally identified under categories of standards, regulations and 
their enforcement.  The Contracting Parties initially found it simple to distinguish, stating 
that the distinction was clearly made between compulsory regulations, issued by central 
government authorities and standards by local governments or by private organizations.106  
In this early stage of identifying standards trade barriers, the Contracting Parties intended to 
encourage multilateral harmonization schemes to be open and technical regulations as well as 
standards of local authorities and private standardization organizations to be prompted to 
apply international standards and resolve trade difficulties.107  Specifically with regard to 
technical regulations, the Contracting Parties found it plausible to take three basic approaches: 
(a) the development of uniform regulations; (b) the optional approach – a choice between a 
                                           
104 Ibid, para. 7.  
105 COM.IND/W/41, p.1 
106 COM.IND/W/36, p. 6. This document summarized the document Spec(70)62.  
107 COM.IND/W/36, p. 7.  
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national regulation and an international standard; (c) the “reference to standard” approach.108  
However, after having several subsequent meetings, the Contracting Parties realized the 
importance but, at the same time, the difficulty of making a distinction between regulations 
and voluntary standards. At this stage of discussion, the Contracting Parties seemed to believe 
firmly that compulsory regulations were issued by governmental authorities while voluntary 
standards were usually issued by private organizations on a regional, national or international 
basis.  In addition, the Contracting Parties also noted that voluntary standards were often 
made de facto mandatory by certain government actions such as adopting certain voluntary 
standards as government procurement standards.109  
Although the Contracting Parties considered two larges categories of standards, i.e. 
mandatory technical regulations and voluntary standards, they considered them from three 
basic aspects and must have found that those categories are not so different from each other in 
terms of the Code’s subject matters.  The three aspects then considered were their 
standardization purposes, standardization bodies, and trade effects.  
 
Standardization purposes  
The Contracting parties considered purposes of standards measures.  There were many 
cases in which the purpose was obvious and necessary, notably provision of information for 
protection of consumers and rules for safeguarding of plant, animal and human life.  
Generally speaking, however, to the extent that the object was to give consumers information 
helpful in making informed choices of goods suited to their particular purposes, there would 
seem to be no reason why any category of goods should be excluded on this ground.  Only if 
the second purpose were also involved, i.e. only if health or safety hazards were involved, 
there would be need to exclude certain types of goods, and even then this should not always 
be necessary, since a restriction on the end-use of a product might accomplish the purpose.  
Beyond the measures which could be explained on these grounds, there remained, however, 
a larger number of notifications concerning quality standards initially established by trade or 
professional associations (not always governmental) which appeared to reflect unduly the 
                                           
108 COM.IND/W/36, p. 7. 
109 COM.IND/W/36, p. 2. 
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practices of domestic producers only.  In such cases, these standards had come to operate as 
more or less severe restrictions on the use of imported products of satisfactory quality which, 
for the reason or another, did not fit within established definitions.  
In the absence of more knowledge of the detailed standards of these various bodies, it was 
not clear to what extent their provisions were confined to legitimate public objectives such as 
safety and to what extent they might constitute something resembling restrictive business 
practices with de facto limiting effects on import competition.  This problem was all the 
more serious as some such standards were gradually being written into local building code, 
fire regulations, and specifications for public contracts.  Even when this was not the case, 
consumer acceptance might severely restrict the sale of potential of products lacking the 
customary “seal of approval”.  
 
Standardization bodies 
  The Contracting Parties noted that role of governments in the field of standardization 
differed greatly from one country to another.  In some countries, there were more 
government compulsory regulations while, in other countries, there were more voluntary 
standards developed by private organizations, over which governments had little or no 
influence.  Furthermore, in certain countries regulations were generally issued by the 
government while in other countries they were in many cases instituted by regional or local 
authorities.  
  In this way, the early negotiators noted that there would be a potential problem caused by 
different standardization bodies and domestic systems in countries, stating that “[t]his great 
difference in government responsibility in the field of standardization was an important fact to 
bear in mind when seeking solutions to the problems of non-tariff barriers caused by 
standards. Some delegations pointed out, however, that the area of voluntary standards were 
largely confined to industrial products. Safety and health regulations were usually 
compulsory.”110 
 
Trade Effects  
                                           
110 COM.IND/W/36, para 6. 
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  The Contracting Parties considered trade effects of standards in their Inventory 
Examination Reports.  They noted that the development and enforcement of standards and 
regulations can have the trade barrier effects in different ways.  For example, they 
considered trade restrictive effects resulted from characteristics peculiar to national 
production, frequent modifications and their uncertainty, and short period of notice.  These 
kinds of trade effects are caused by both compulsory regulations and voluntary standards.111   
  The Contracting Parties also noted some trade effects are resulted from different types of 
standardization bodies’ membership, including producers, consumers, local authorities, 
government or mixed ones.112  The Contracting Parities found that most of technical barriers 
are based on equal treatments between national products and imported products.  However, 
disparities between countries in standards and regulations sometimes took place, putting 
foreign products at disadvantage, which become frequently apparent in the case of methods of 
enforcing standards such as testing or production inspection and certification.113   
  Thus, the Contracting Parties noted that trade restricted effects are caused by development 
or regulation or standards as well as in the method of enforcement of regulations or standards 
regardless of whether there are origin-based discriminatory practices or not.  Therefore, in 
terms of their trade effect, a distinction between regulations and standards was not so 
meaningful.  
 
4.2.2.4 An issue of balancing the resulting imbalance of implementation burden  
 
  The Contracting Parties felt that it was desirable to establish a set of principles or ground 
rules on standardization.  At that time, the Contracting Parties could not yet determine the 
form of those rules and principles, whether a code or guidelines or whether on a contractual or 
voluntary basis.114  However, the Contracting Parties seemed to have agreed that a set of 
principle or rules would be invalid if they are not applied to regulations imposed by public 
                                           
111 COM.IND/W/36, para 7.  
112 COM.IND/W/36, para 8.  
113 COM.IND/W/36, para. 9.  
114 COM.IND/W/36, para. 13.  
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authorities at national level.115   
  Then, there was a critical implementation problem in designing a code of guidelines since 
they would not put reciprocal burden on the Parties’ responsibility for implementation and, 
thus, imbalance among the Parties in their compliance.116 On the other hand it was pointed 
out that a code or guidelines would materially assist governments who did not direct 
responsibilities in the field of standardization to influence local authorities and private 
standardization bodies to align their practices and bring them into conformity with these 
guidelines. Additionally such a code or guidelines would have influence on the work of 
international standardization bodies. 
In the meantime, it was suggested that the code of guidelines might also deal with those 
areas where there was difficulty in reconciling the objective of maintaining adequate 
standards with the most-favoured-nation principle.  In the negotiators’ view, such a code of 
guidelines should supplement rather than replace existing GATT provisions such as those in 
Article XX.117  
 
4.2.3 The 1973 draft Standards Code  
 
4.2.3.1 Regulatory structure of the 1973 Draft Standards Code  
 
The earliest available draft code for preventing technical barriers to trade prior to the Tokyo 
Round Declaration is the proposed draft code of 1973 (hereinafter “1973 Draft Code”).118  In 
the text, drafters basically identified technical barriers in three categories: standards, 
conformity with standards and quality assurance systems.  Then, standards are further 
divided into mandatory standards and voluntary standards.  The term “mandatory standards” 
                                           
115  COM.IND/W/36, para. 14. “It was pointed out, within GATT, guidelines would have possible 
constraining offers only if they applied to regulations imposed by public authorities at national level. Such 
guidelines would have little significance with respect to regulations issued by local public authorities or as 
regards the numerous private standards and private control or testing procedures. These guidelines might not 
offer an effective solution for problems arising from such regulations, standards and control procedures. Also 
they would not constitute a comparable commitment on the part of all contracting parties.” 
116 COM.IND/W/36, para. 15.  
117 COM.IND/W/36, para. 16. 
118 COM.IND/W/108, p4-27. 
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is supposed to embrace “what would normally be described as technical regulation” in 
accordance with the footnote 2 of the Annex 1.2 to the 1973 Draft Code.   
Each term is defined in the Annex.  The meanings of the term “standard”, “mandatory 
standard” and “voluntary standard” are provided in such a way that the entire coverage of the  
proposed Agreement is delineated through the definition of the term “standards” and then, the 
entire scope is divided into two categories, mandatory standards and voluntary standards, for 
which respective definitions are provided.  As long as a certain specification is found to be a 
“standard” within the definition, it should belong either to the category of “mandatory 
standards” or to the category of “voluntary standard”.  The categories are exclusive to each 
other.  Therefore, the finding that a certain standard is a “mandatory standard” inevitably 
leads to the determination that the standard is not a “voluntary standard” and vice versa.  
Conformity with standards generally refer to test methods and administrative procedures 
for determining conformity with mandatory standards of central government, local 
government and other regulatory bodies and assurance of the conformity.  According to its 
definition provided in Annex 1 to the Draft Code, ‘conformity with standards’ means that the 
actual performance or properties of a product satisfy the performance or properties which are 
specified in the relevant standard.119  “Administrative procedures” are defined as the overall 
administrative procedures which are required to carry out in order to ascertain that products 
conform to certain relevant standards.  It may include administrative arrangements for 
controlling the frequency and location of tests, for carrying out tests and for supervising the 
control of quality by producers.120  
Quality assurance systems refer to certification systems. They are specifically defined as a 
formal arrangement having its own rules of procedure and management under which one or 
more quality assurance bodies provide an assurance that products approved or certified under 
the system conform to the requirements of the standards in question.121  
 
                                           
119 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1, paragraph 12. 
120 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1, paragraph 13. 
121 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1, paragraph 16. 
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Chapter II - Operative Provisions 
A. Standards 
 Section 2 Preparation, adoption and use of mandatory standards by central            
 government bodies 
 Section 3 Preparation, adoption and use of mandatory standards by local  
 government bodies and regulatory bodies other than central government  
 bodies 





Based on the two categories of standards, the 1973 Draft Code establishes its regulatory 
structure as show in <Box 3>.123 Article 2 in the 1973 Draft Code is applied to preparation, 
adoption and use of mandatory standards by central government bodies and Article 3 to 
preparation, adoption and use of mandatory standards by local government bodies and 
regulatory bodies other than central government bodies.  Article 4 is applied to preparation, 
adoption and use of voluntary standards.  
Thus, the early design of the regulatory structure was such that technical regulations and 
standards were addressed by different provisions, i.e. not identical sets of rules.  It is also 
noted that the regulatory structure is established not only based on two different sources of 
technical barriers but also based on their standardizing bodies.  Provisions for mandatory 
standards are further divided according to the levels of their standardizing bodies, and 
therefore, Article 2 is applied to central government bodies’ mandatory standards and Article 
3 to those of local and regulatory bodies other than central government bodies.   
In addition, definitions of mandatory standards bodies are provided.  Central government 
                                           
122 COM.IND/W/108, pp.4-6.  
123 The complete regulatory structure of the 1973 Draft Code is based on three sources of technical barriers, 
namely, standards, conformity with standards, and quality assurance systems.  Articles 2 through 4 address 
standards; article 5 through 8 deal with conformity with standards; and articles 9 through 15 are applied to 
quality assurance systems.  For the purpose of this study, analysis and discussion will be focused on 
“standards” only.  
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body and local government body are defined in terms of their normal meanings.  Regulatory 
body is defined as “any central or local government body or any other body which has legal 
power to enforce a mandatory standard.”  Therefore, it is clearly provided that mandatory 
standards body, no matter whether governmental or non-governmental, needs to acquire legal 
power to make the compliance with the standard mandatory.     
 
Figure 5. Regulatory scope of the 1973 Draft Standards Code  
 





Preparation, adoption and 
use of mandatory standards 






Preparation, adoption and 
use of mandatory standards 
by local government bodies 
and regulatory bodies other 







Preparation, adoption and use of 
voluntary standards    
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
 
On the contrary, the standardizing bodies for voluntary standards are defined in the Annex 
1 as “any non-governmental organization which prepares voluntary standards for public use. 
Some of these are national standards bodies as defined [in the Annex]”124 and a national 
standards bodies is defined as “a nationally recognized standards body which is, or is eligible 
to become, a member of non-governmental international standards bodies”.  Therefore, 
                                           
124 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.8, p. 25.  
86 
unlike the legal status of the standardizing bodies which prepare, adopt and use mandatory 
standards, voluntary standards bodies are non-government bodies according to the definition 
and therefore they are not required to possess any legal power.  
Accordingly, a conceptual concept of the 1973 Draft Code is drawn in <Figure 5>.  
Columns are divided based on the two different standards - mandatory standards and 
voluntary standards.  Different rows indicate three different levels of the standardizing 
bodies - central, local and non-government bodies.  The entire shaded space of the six inner 
boxes represents the entire scope that the Draft can possibly incorporate, which actually is 
covered by the current WTO TBT Agreement, and the bold lines surrounding each inner cell 
show the virtual scope of each relevant provision.   
The result of the analysis shows that the scope of the 1973 Draft Code was quite limited, 
covering, on the one hand, mandatory standards of regulatory bodies with legal power (central, 
local, or non-governmental) and, on the other hand, voluntary standards of non-governmental 
voluntary standardizing bodies.   
 
4.2.3.2 Distinction between mandatory standards and voluntary standards 
Broad definition of standards  
  The Contracting Parties in the early 1970s had difficulty in choosing the right 
terminologies to indicate the categories of standards-related non-tariff barriers which they 
intended to address and discipline through enactment of a code of conduct.  
  It seems that they have recognized broad and various meaning of the term ‘standards’ and 
‘quality assurance’ and they have made it clear that the Draft Code would take relatively 
broad meanings of the terminologies.  Therefore, the preamble of the ‘Annex 1: Definition’ 
explicitly recognizes that the terms regarding standards and quality assurance ‘are used in a 
variety of sense in different contexts and by different organizations.’125   
Annex 1.1 defines “standards” in a very broad sense.  They are, within the meaning of the 
Draft Code, “any specification which lays down some or all of the properties of a product in 
                                           
125 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1, preamble.  
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terms of quality, purity, nutritional value, performance, dimensions, or other 
characteristics”.126  They may also include test methods, and specifications concerning 
testing, packaging, marking or labelling to the extent that they affect products rather than 
processes.127  However, they do not cover standards which are “prepared for use by a single 
enterprise, whether governmental, semi-governmental or non-governmental, either for its own 
production or purchasing purposes.”128  The footnote to the definition adds that “[t]he term 
“standard” as used in this code has a wider meaning than in customary usage.”129   
Thus, the term ‘standard’ at the time seems to have been intended to be quite broad and 
inclusive.  It represented the entire coverage of the Draft Code and probably all perceived 
sources of technical barriers which the Draft had intended to address. As shown in the Annex, 
the term ‘standard’ covers not only substantive technical specifications but certain procedures 
like conformity procedures and quality assurance systems such as ‘testing’.  Also, the 
Draft’s preamble states that the adherents desire to “ensure that standards and methods for 
assuring conformity with standards do not create obstacles to international trade”.130  Here, 
the term ‘standards’ is probably meant to include both mandatory standards or technical 
regulation and voluntary standards. 
Distinction between mandatory and voluntary standards 
The Draft Code divides standards into ‘mandatory standards’ and ‘voluntary standards’ 
depending on the compliance formality.  ‘Mandatory standard’ means ‘a standard with 
which it is obligatory to comply by virtue of an action by an authority endowed with the 
necessary legal power.  The term includes the associated administrative provisions.’131  As 
additionally explained in the footnote to the definition, the term ‘mandatory standard is used 
                                           
126 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.1, first sentence.  
127 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.1, second sentence.  
128 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.1, third sentence.   
129 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.1, footnote 1. 
130  COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, preamble, 4th recital. The preamble also provides that the 
Contracting Parties recognize that “no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, environment and national security, or for the prevention of 
deceptive practices” Here, the term ‘measure’ is used probably referring to measures in general, implying that 
there may be certain measures which are subject to the Draft Code and these categories are what is called 
‘mandatory standards’ or technical regulations within the meaning of the Draft Code. 1973 Draft Code, 
preamble, 5th recital. 
131 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.2. 
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to embrace what would normally be described as technical regulation.’132   Therefore, 
‘mandatory standards’ includes technical regulations as its subset.  On the other hand, 
‘voluntary standard’ is defined as ‘a standard with which there is no legal obligation to 
comply’.133  In fact, all the other standards which are not considered to be mandatory 
standard would belong to the category of voluntary standards. 
The distinction is supposed to be made based on two main aspects of the standards in 
question.  One aspect is the legal status of the standardizing entity and the other is the 
question of whether the compliance with the standard is made mandatory or not.  If the 
standard in question is obligatory to comply and such obligation is “by virtue of an action by 
an authority endowed with the necessary legal power”, then such a standard is considered to 
be a “mandatory standard”.  On the contrary, in case of voluntary standard, there is no 
obligation to comply.  
 
Table 4. Terminologies and Definitions of the 1973 Draft Standards Code  
Terminology Definitions 
1.Standards The term “standard” means any specification which lays down some or all of 
the properties of a product in terms of quality, purity, nutritional value, 
performance, dimensions, or other characteristics. It includes, where applicable, 
test methods, and specifications concerning testing, packaging, marking or 
labelling to the extent that they affect products rather than processes.  It 
excludes standards which are prepared for use by a single enterprise, whether 
governmental, semi-governmental or non-governmental, either for its own 
production or purchasing purposes.134 
<Footnote 1> 




This is a standard with which it is obligatory to comply by virtue of an action 
by an authority endowed with the necessary legal power.  The term includes 
the associated administrative provisions.135 
<Footnote2> 
The term “mandatory standard” is used to embrace what would normally be 
described as technical regulation. 
3. Voluntary This is a standard with which there is no legal obligation to comply.136 
                                           
132 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.2, footnote 2.  
133 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.3.  
134 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.1.  
135 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.2. 






This term means the central government, its ministries and departments or any 
body subject to the control of the central government in respect of the activity 
in question. In the case of the European Economic Community the provisions 




This term means a government body which is not subject to the control of the 
central government in respect of the activity in question, such as  
(i) the authorities of States, Provinces, Lander, Cantons, etc. in the case of a 
federal or decentralized system, and (ii) local government authorities.138 
7. Regulatory 
Body 
This term means any central or local government body or any other body which 
has legal power to enforce a mandatory standard. This may or may not be the 
same body which prepared or adopted the standard.139 
8. Voluntary 
Standards Body 
This term means any non-governmental organization which prepares voluntary 




This term means a nationally recognized standards body which is, or is eligible 
to become, a member of non-governmental international standards bodies.”141  
   
In this early draft text of the Code, it was clear that a decisive criterion for diving 
mandatory standards and voluntary standards was legal obligation to comply.  The 
mandatory character of the compliance could be judged by legal basis of the standard in 
question and legal characteristics of the standards body.  Standards which were legally 
enacted and enforced based on law by a regulatory body, all central and local governmental 
bodies as well as some non-government bodies with legal power would be considered 
mandatory standards.  Voluntary standards are those standards, compliance with which is not 
mandatory and which are prepared, adopted and used by non-government bodies.  The factor 
of ‘legal’ enforcement or enforcement based on law was critical in distinguishing mandatory 
standard and voluntary standard.   
Domestic Standardizing Bodies 
  The distinction between ‘mandatory standard’ and “voluntary standard” becomes even 
clearer when the characteristics of their standardizing bodies are considered.  The 1973 
proposed GATT Code of Conduct for Prevention Technical Barriers to Trade mentions four 
                                           
137 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.5.  
138 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.6. 
139 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.7. 
140 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.8. 
141 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.9. 
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groups of domestic standardizing bodies, i.e. ‘central government bodies’, ‘local government 
bodies’ and ‘regulatory bodies other than central government bodies’, and ‘non-government 
bodies’.   
Majority of provisions applicable to ‘mandatory standard’ are entitled with specific 
mentioning of their standardizing bodies.  For example, articles such as Section 2, 5, 6, 9 and 
13 in the Code are entitled with the phrase ‘mandatory standards by(of) central government 
bodies’, showing that mandatory standards may be associated with central government bodies.  
In addition, Section 3, 7, 11, and 14 are entitled with the phrase ‘mandatory standards by(or of) 
local government bodies and regulatory bodies other than central government bodies’, 
showing that mandatory standards may also be prepared, adopted and used by local 
government bodies or regulatory bodies.  
  Definitions in the Annex provide what each body means.  In Annex 1.5, ‘[c]entral 
government body’ is defined as ‘the central government, its ministries and departments or any 
body subject to the control of the central government in respect of the activity in question. In 
the case of the European Economic Community the provisions governing central government 
bodies [would] apply’. 142  In addition, ‘[l]ocal government body’ is defined in Annex 1.6 as 
‘a government body which is not subject to the control of the central government in respect of 
the activity in question, such as (i) the authorities of States, Provinces, Lander, Cantons, etc. 
in the case of a federal or decentralized system, and (ii) local government authorities’.143  
Furthermore, according to Annex 1.7, ‘[r]egulatory body’ means ‘any central or local 
government body or any other body which has legal power to enforce a mandatory standard. 
This may or may not be the same body which prepared or adopted the standard’.144 
  On the contrary, provisions applicable to ‘voluntary standards’ rarely mentions the types of 
standardizing bodies.  Articles regulating voluntary standards such as Section 4, 8, 10, 12, 
and 15, for instance, do not state relevant standardizing bodies in their titles.  However, 
Annex 1.8 defines ‘voluntary standards body’ as ‘any non-governmental organization which 
prepares voluntary standards for public use. Some of these are national standards bodies as 
                                           
142 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.5. 
143 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.6 
144 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.7. 
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defined below’.145 Subsequently, Annex 1.9 defines ‘national standards body’ as ‘[t]his term 
means a nationally recognized standards body which is, or is eligible to become, a member of 
non-governmental international standards bodies’.146  
  The differences may clearly reflect how the Contracting Parties perceived the two types of 
standards, namely mandatory standards (or technical regulations) and voluntary standards.  
The 1973 Proposed Draft Code shows that the Contracting Parties understood that ‘mandatory 
standards’ were commonly prepared, adopted and used by central and local government 
bodies or any regulatory bodies with legal enforcement power while ‘voluntary standards’ 
were usually prepared, adopted and used by non-government bodies which had no legally 
enacting or enforcing power regardless of whether they were nationally recognized or not.  
Thus, it can be inferred from the terminology that ‘standards’ defined in the Code 
practically consist of two dimensions: (i) legally enforced ‘mandatory standards’ by or of 
government bodies or some regulatory bodies endowed with necessary legal power and (ii) 
‘voluntary standards’ under no legal enforcement regardless of the status of their 
standardizing bodies, national, local or non-governmental.  
 
4.2.3.3 Disciplines for mandatory standards and voluntary standards 
 
Article 2 in the 1973 Draft Code is applied to preparation, adoption and use of mandatory 
standards by central government bodies and Article 3 to preparation, adoption and use of 
mandatory standards by local government bodies and regulatory bodies other than central 
government bodies.  Article 4 is applied to preparation, adoption and use of voluntary 
standards. 
Disciplines of the three articles are mostly the same, but depending on the legal status of 
standardization body, strictness of implementation differs.  To mandatory standards prepared, 
adopted and used by central government bodies, a stricter level of implementation is applied 
through the phrase “…shall ensure that…”.  To mandatory standards by local government 
and regulatory bodies and voluntary standards, a less strict and indirect obligation to 
                                           
145 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.8.  
146 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.9.  
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implement is applied based on the phrase “[a]dherents…shall use all reasonable means within 
their power to ensure…”. 
 
Table 5. Common disciplines for mandatory standards and voluntary standards in 





Not… with a view to creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade 
2(a) 4(a) 
Use international standards as a basis 2(b) 4(c) 
Participation(or cooperation) in international 
standardization 
2(c) 





In terms of performance rather than detailed 
design 
2(d) 4(e) 
Except where the technical content… is 
substantially the same…  
  
- publish a notice 2(e)(i) 4(f)(i) 
- provide … a copy… upon request 2(e)(iii) 4(f)(ii) 
- allow reasonable time for comment 2(e)(iv) 4(f)(iii) 
- take account of comments 2(e)(v) 4(f)(iv) 
Publish all …standards 2(g) 4(h) 
Compliance by regional bodies  2(j), 2(k) 4(j), 4(k) 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
Mandatory standards and voluntary standards are subject to almost the same rules and 
obligations.  Neither mandatory or voluntary standards themselves nor their applications 
should be prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles to international trade 
or have the effect of creating an unjustifiable obstacles to international trade.   
  The 1973 Draft Code requires use of relevant international standards as a basis and 
adherents’ participation in international standardization; obligates standards to be established 
based on performance rather than detailed-designs; provides transparency rules for mandatory 
or voluntary standards which are not substantially the same as the technical content of an 
international standard.   
In general, adherents must publish all mandatory standards.  Likewise, they shall use all 
reasonable means within their power to ensure that standardizing bodies publish all voluntary 
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standards.   They shall also use all reasonable means within their power to ensure that 
regional standards bodies comply with provisions of the 1973 Draft Code in general and shall 
fulfill the provisions except to the extent that the regional standards bodies have fulfilled 
those obligations.   
  There are a few articles which provide different disciplines regarding mandatory standards 
and voluntary standards.   
  First, Article 4(d) provides disciplines for the case where adherents use voluntary standards 
in establishing mandatory standards.  It requires adherents to ensure that where aspects of a 
product are, or are likely to be, subject to a mandatory standard by a central government body, 
any voluntary standard which is to cover those aspects is suitable in form and content for use 
in whole or in part for the purpose of that mandatory standard. 
  Second, Article 2(e)(ii) and 2(h) provides stronger transparency rules concerning 
mandatory standards whereas there are no provisions requiring for comparable obligations.  
The former article obligate central government bodies to notify to the GATT Secretariat in 
case where mandatory standards deviate from relevant international standards.  The latter 
provision requires adherents to allow a reasonable interval between the publication of the 
mandatory standard and its entry into force so that producers in exporting countries adapt 
their products or methods of production to the requirements of the importing country, except 
where there are urgent problems of public safety, health, environmental protection or national 
security. 
  Third, exceptions to transparency procedures stipulated respectively in Article 2(e) and 4(e) 
concerning mandatory standards and voluntary standards are provided in Article 2(f) and 4(g).  
Grounds for invoking the exceptions, however, differ between mandatory standards and 
voluntary standards.  With respect to mandatory standards, adherents may omit such of the 
steps in the transparency provisions as they find necessary, ‘where urgent problems of safety, 
health, environmental protection or national security exist’.  Grounds for invoking the 
exception as regards to mandatory standards, thus, are related to the urgent situation that may 
arise.  On the contrary, grounds for invoking such exception in case of voluntary standards 
are more relevant to the purposes of the standards.  Regarding voluntary standards, any of 
the transparency procedure may be omitted, if necessary, ‘where a voluntary standard is 





4.3 “Standard” during the Tokyo Round Negotiations 
 
4.3.1 The TBT subgroup of the Trade Negotiation Committee  
 
  Tokyo Round negotiation launched with Tokyo Declaration adopted in Tokyo Ministerial 
Conference held in September 1973.  Immediately after the Tokyo Ministerial meetings, a 
Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) was created under paragraph 10 of the Declaration and 
was mandated to plan and set up proper procedures and supervise the overall progress of the 
negotiation.  The TNC itself was not intended to be a forum for negotiation since the agenda 
was extensive and technical.  Instead, the TNC created six specialized subcommittees, 
conforming to the six negotiating areas outlined in paragraph 3 of the Declaration.  
 
Box 4. Tokyo Round - Subcommittees of the Trade Negotiation Committee  
 
§ Group 3(a)  
 
Negotiations on tariffs 
§ Group 3(b)  Reduction or elimination of nontariff measures; or their trade-distorting 
effects 
§ Group 3(c)  Examination of the sector approach as a complementary negotiating 
technique 
§ Group 3(d)  Examination of the multilateral safeguards systems 
§ Group 3(e)  Negotiations on agriculture 




The six subcommittees were respectively assigned to deal with negotiations on tariffs, 
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reduction or elimination of nontariff measures, examination of the sector approach as a 
complementary negotiating technique, examination of the multilateral safeguard systems, 
negotiations on agriculture, and negotiations on tropical products.  They were, thus, assigned 
to continue and complete initial preparations for the negotiation. 
  Following the February 1974 meeting of the TNC, subcommittees began to work.  Each 
operational group held a series of meetings and submitted progress reports at the meetings of 
the TNC.  The TNC received these reports and assigned additional tasks to be subsequently 
reported or completed by designated dates.  Thus, the TNC met regularly throughout the 
negotiation to receive normal report of the subcommittees and monitored the pace and 
substance of the negotiation.147   
  Among the subcommittees, Group3(b) was assigned for non-tariff trade barriers.  The 
Group began its work by updating the inventory of nontariff measures and reassessing the 
categories of measures in the light of their usefulness in future negotiation.148  This data-
gathering and build-up of common information was to be separated from negotiation as much 
as possible.  In the meantime, the GATT Secretariat was asked to prepare progress reports 
on the contemporary developments and works of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) 
and the Customs Cooperation Council. 
 




(i) Quantitative Restrictions 
(ii) Technical Barriers to Trade 
(iii) Customs Matters 
(iv) Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 
(v) Government Procurement (added in July 1976) 
 
The structure of subcommittees went through two major changes during 1974, which 
were confirmed in a meeting of the TNC in February 1975.  Departing from the titles 
established in the Tokyo Declaration, the titles of working groups were changed to describe 
                                           
147 For the general negotiation procedures and operation, see Winham (1986), p. 97-100.  
148 MTN/3b/7.  
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substantive issues they were assigned to address.  The title ‘Group 3(b)’, for example, was 
changed to ‘Nontariff Measures Group’.   
  The other change was to further categorize the Group into subgroups.  Thus, the Nontariff 
Measures group was divided into five specific subgroups such as subgroups for quantitative 
restrictions, technical barriers to trade, customs matters, subsidies and countervailing duties, 
and government procurement (newly added in July 1976).  This structure remained mostly 
unchanged throughout the negotiation. 
  It was the TBT Subgroup which led meetings and negotiations to establish a TBT Code 
preventing such technical trade barrier as those resulting from standards, technical regulations, 
packaging, labelling, conformity assessment procedures and certification systems.  Unlike 
other subgroups, the TBT Subgroup already had a proposed draft code in which most of the 
detailed provisions and obligations had been decided before the adoption of the Tokyo 
Declaration.149  Most of its jobs during the Tokyo Round, therefore, was concentrated on 
fine-tuning certain provisions on which countries had different views.  Among several issues, 
the most fundamental and difficult ones were related to the coverage of the Code and 
reciprocity and ways to solve such imbalances among the prospective parties.  
 
4.3.2 Overview of major issues negotiated during the Tokyo Round 
 
As explained above, the progress of negotiations regarding standards issues was swift and 
smooth, facing few challenges and hindrances until the very last stage of the Tokyo Round 
negotiations.  This section briefly introduces major issues of the standards code negotiations 
and provides an overview of the entire negotiation process as illustrated in <Figure 6>  The 
entire timeline of the negotiations for standards code is divided into three time periods 
according to Winham (1986).   
In specific, the early phase spans from 1974 to 1977, the middle phase from 1977 to 1978 
and the end phase from 1978 to 1979.  The negotiation for the Standards Code was speedy 
so that not many technical issues were left undecided even during the early phase.  Thus, in 
this early phase, the Contracting Parties discussed the coverage of subject matters and 
                                           
149 Winham (1986), p. 90. 
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consistency of the proposed Code’s terminologies and concepts with their corresponding 
terms and definitions of the ECE/ISO Guide.  Then, after the middle phases, there were few 
technical issues left unresolved except for the issue of imbalance and difficulties that 
developing countries had faced in implementing the proposed Standards Code.  Finally, the 
Contracting Parties had to compromise the imbalance issue by adopting a dispute settlement 
system.  The overall progress of the negotiations for the Standards Code is summarized and 
illustrated in a brief flow chart shown in <Figure 6>.  
 
Figure 6. Major TBT issues negotiated during the Tokyo Round  
 
Source: Author’s analysis  
 
 
  Specific discussions and negotiations for establishing a TBT code began right after the 
conclusion of the Kennedy Round.  In this preparatory stage, inventories were gathered and 
common knowledge and information regarding nontariff measures was built.  Based on a 
series of inventory examinations, negotiators determined four categories of technical barriers 
to trade, namely, mandatory standards, voluntary standards, conformity with them and 
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certification systems, and established rules and obligations to regulate them.150  At that time, 
TBT issues were new and generally not so well-known to the Contracting Parties, not to 
mention that they were politically sensitive.151  As a result, the establishment of a proposed 
draft code for preventing TBT had progressed without much difficulty and, in June 1973, 
three months prior to the Tokyo Declaration, a concrete proposed draft had been completed 
and circulated among the Contracting Parties.  
  As the Tokyo Round initiated, the first task of the TBT subgroup was to determine the 
coverage of the Code.  Therefore, the subgroup reviewed feasibilities of applying the Code 
to such technical barriers as packaging, labelling and marking, SPS matters, health and 
sanitary issues as well as technical barriers for agricultural products.  In the meantime, the 
ECE/ISO was developing definitions of terminologies relating to standards and, when it had 
completed, the subgroup examined whether it would be appropriate to import or harmonize 
the TBT Code with the ECE/ISO definitions and, if so, how should the harmonization be 
brought about, adoption as a whole or in part.   
  During the middle phase, as the Code was pushed for adoption, one last issue was found to 
be critical and important.  It was issue of reciprocity.  Countries had different standard and 
standardization systems: some countries have centralized standardization system while the 
other have decentralized one intrinsic to their federal government system.  As a result, the 
same obligation would have different impact or burden of implementation on countries with 
different standards systems.  The EU, for instance, whose standard system was quite 
centralized, meaning most of their standards at the EU level were legally binding would be 
bound by heavier burden of implementation than the US, whose standard system was led by 
private institutions and most of its standards were not mandatory standards within the 
meaning of the Code.   
  This fundamental reciprocity problem was resolved during the final stage as the subgroups 
made some revisions to the Code’s dispute settlement system.  The revised dispute 
settlement mechanism provided that central governments were fully responsible for the 
Code’s implementation no matter whether their standard system was central or federal.  As a 
result, the EU, for instance, could sue the US when non-government standardizing bodies of 
                                           
150 See Chapter 4.1.2 of this thesis for more explanations.  
151 Winham (1986), pp. 195-197.  
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the latter acted inconsistently with the rules and violation of the Code.  
 
4.3.3 Coverage of the draft Standards Codes 
 
  In standards negotiations, the Working Group noted that the coverage of the Code was not 
so clear.  In general, the Group agreed that the Code would apply to trade in industrial 
product, and would apply neither to standards used for government procurement purposes nor 
to those used by private companies not to service standards.  However, ambiguity existed 
especially as regards to such subject matters as agricultural products, labelling and packaging, 
and marks of origins.  The Group need to discuss whether the proposed Code should deal 
with standards issues related to these matters and, if so, how should they be regulated.  
 
4.3.3.1 Applicability of the Code to agricultural products and SPS measures 
  
  As negotiation proceeded, the Group noted that the coverage of the Code was not limited to 
industrial products.  Standard issues were not restricted to trade in industrial products but 
they often involved problems of trade in agricultural products.  The Secretariat noted that the 
proposed Code made no distinction between standards according to their related types of 
products.152  In addition, it considered that some provisions in the Code could be regarded as 
having particular bearing on standards affecting agricultural products in practice.  For 
example, provisions stipulating exemption to certain transparency procedures in case of 
urgency would probably refer to sanitary and quarantine procedures for agricultural products.  
Therefore, the Group 3(b) needed to discuss with Negotiation on Agriculture Group 3(e) in 
order to review the applicability the Code to agriculture products.153  The main issue was to 
examine whether the Code provides an effective method of dealing with the adverse trade 
effects of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, and if not, what changes needed to be made 
                                           
152 MTN/3E/W/26, para. 3. 
153 GATT, COM.IND/W/108, para. 16.  
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or what would a appropriate and effective approach.  
  Basically, three approaches were discussed to deal with sanitary or phytosanitary trade 
barriers.  First approach was to lean on the jurisdiction of the “Committee for Preventing 
Technical Barriers to Trade” envisaged in Article 19 of the 1973 Draft Code; another 
approach was to establish a self-contained Code; and another alternative was to deal with the 
adverse trade effects on an individual or product by product basis.  The second approach had 
particular advantage since the “Enforcement” Article 21 specifically provides arbitral or 
consultative procedures if there was a provision which incorporates sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures in the Code’s coverage.154     
  The first approach, on the other hand, may be appropriate and adequate enough since the 
power conferred on the Committee may enable any contracting party or any competent body 
to consult for such specialized questions.  The idea was that the Code covers many aspects 
of standards which affect agricultural products in the same way that industrial products would 
be covered and thus, sanitary and phyto-sanitary matter could be dealt with separately under 
the auspice of the Code.  
  In order for SPS measures to be covered by the Code, they must come within the meaning 
of “standards” as defined in the Code.  The Working Group found it clear that a large range 
of SPS measures would be covered by the definition of ‘standard’, but less certain as regards 
to measures relating to processes and production methods.155 In addition, another aspect of 
the code’s coverage was related to an issue whether the definition of “standard” only includes 
“test methods” to the extent that they affect products rather than processes. 156  
  There was a view that, in some cases, such requirements would not seem to relate to the 
properties of a product as such and therefore, they are not covered as “standards”.  On the 
other hand, there was an opposite view that such requirements are covered by the code since 
they comprise “the properties of a product in terms of … other characteristics”.  In this case, 
the Group had to consider whether a certain class of sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
                                           
154 MTN/3E/W/26, paras. 4-6. 
155 Examples of SPS measures the Group considered included hygiene standards relating to the incidence of 
parasitic and cystic diseases or to permissible levels of residues in meat, processed foods etc.  On the other 
hand, examples of SPS process and production measures were, measures relating to process, to conditions in 
slaughter houses, dairy factories or processing establishments, or to conditions affecting producing countries 
with respect to the incidence of certain diseases.  
156 MTN/3E/W/26, para 8.  
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should be covered through a broad interpretation of a phrase such as “other characteristics”.157 
  In addition, the Group had to clarify whether the definition cover live animals if the 
proposed code applied standards which in turn are defined in terms of the properties of a 
product.  It was not clear whether a live animal to be regarded as a product for the purposes 
of the code.  In other words, it had to be made clear that the term “product” meant the 
product of a manufacturing process or, otherwise, anything which is the subject of 
commercial activity.158 
  Then, the Group reviewed provisions of the code which already covered or could cover 
subject matters of agricultural products and SPS measures.  It noted that certain provisions 
of the code could be interpreted as having in practice a particular bearing on standards 
affecting agricultural products.  In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the code, for 
example, it was recognized that no country should be prevented from taking measures for the 
protection, inter alia, of human animal or plant life.  To the Working Group, it was uncertain 
whether the provision meant that measures introduced on these grounds were exempted from 
the provisions of the code.  This point was discussed and it was suggested that such 
measures would be covered although with some modification in the procedural requirements 
where “urgency” is a factor.159  
  In this context, a point has been made that standards have been defined in the Draft Code in 
terms of quality, purity, nutritional value, performance etc., and, as such, the definition might 
cover a large number of sanitary and phytosanitary measures including those relating to the 
incidence of parasitic and cystic disease, permissible levels of residues in meat and processed 
foods, etc. It was, however, not clear whether it would cover regulations relating, inter alia, to 
the production or processing of a product, including for example, conditions in slaughter 
houses, dairy factories or other processing plants or to conditions affecting imports from 
certain producing countries where there was an incidence of certain diseases not prevalent in 
the importing countries.160  
 
                                           
157 MTN/3E/W/26, p 7.  
158 MTN/3E/W/26, para 9.  
159 MTN/3E/W/26, para. 10.  
160 MTN/3B/23, para. 31.  
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4.3.3.2 Applicability of the Code to health and sanitary regulations 
 
  The Working Group found that almost all countries had legislation for the protection of the 
health and safety of their human, animal and plant population.  With a view to deal with 
health and sanitary regulations, the GATT provides some disciplines in provisions of Article 
XX in dealing with general exceptions.  Particularly, the Article’s sub-paragraph (b) requires 
certain criteria to be exempted.  
  The Working Group noted that a large number of notifications from developing countries 
reported trade difficulties caused by the existence of what they consider as stringent health 
and sanitary regulations.161  Such difficulties included the prohibition of imports of certain 
products from particular sources, or from all sources, difficulties encountered because of the 
differences in standards concerning the use of additives and coloring materials, the rigorous 
application of regulations regarding requirements of import permits, production of health 
certificates and inspection of imports as well as production units and so forth.  In their 
notifications, the products affected by such regulations covered a wide range of agricultural 
products such as meat and meat products, poultry, fish, hides and skins, vegetables, fruits and 
processed fruit products.  In addition to the high level or totally different qualification in 
importers’ health and sanitary regulations, another cause for trade barrier was based on 
difficulty in knowing precisely the requirements under the mandatory health and sanitary 
regulations prescribed by the importing countries.162  
In the meantime, Agricultural Negotiation Group 3(e) had taken substantial discussion.  
Possible approaches discussed in the Agriculture Committee with a view to reduce or 
eliminate the adverse effects of health and sanitary regulations ranged from proposals for 
guidelines and principles including procedures for multilateral arbitration, to proposals that 
relied on bilateral consultations, to proposals to supplement GATT XXII consultations 
procedures and to proposals aimed at strengthening and elaborating Article XX(b).163  In 
sum, they proposed the following elements: (i) elimination of health and sanitary regulations 
where they no longer meet the requirements of the situation which had motivated their 
                                           
161 MTN/3B/23, para. 24.  
162 MTN/3B/23, para. 25. 
163 MTN/3B/23, paras. 27-8.  
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establishment; (ii) relaxation, where necessary, of measures currently in force so that they 
would not be more stringent than necessary; (iii) requirement that new measures should not be 
made more stringent than necessary; (iv) provision of equal treatment for imported and 
domestically produced goods; (v) requirement that measures taken by State or local 
authorities are consistent with national and international regulations’ (vi) application of health 
and sanitary regulations on a most-favoured-nation and non-discriminatory basis; and (vii) 
provision for greater co-operation between exporting and importing countries, with regard to 
importation, testing and issuance of certifications.164 
  Group 3(e) confirmed that some of the above elements and the principles are covered by 
the Draft Code on Standards and, as such, it would be necessary to examine if its provisions 
would provide solutions to problems in the field of health and sanitary regulations.165  
 
4.3.3.3 Applicability of the Code to labelling 
 
  The Group 3(b) wanted to clarify the problems which packaging and labelling requirements 
which were found to create barriers to international trade and to consider whether trade 
barriers related to packaging and labelling were covered by the proposed GATT instrument 
for preventing technical barriers to trade or whether a separate instrument should be drawn up 
to deal with these problems.166  
  There was a difference of opinion as to whether problems relating to marks of origin were 
covered by these terms of reference.167  Also, some delegation suggested that different 
problems arose in the field of labelling on the one hand and packaging on the other and that 
those might therefore be discussed separately.  One delegation suggested that there was 
some overlapping.168 
  It was pointed out that in some cases labelling was mandatory as such; in other cases it was 
not mandatory to label products but if labels were used they had to conform to certain 
                                           
164 MTN/3B/23, para. 29.  
165 MTN/3B/23, para. 30.  
166 MTN/NTM/W/5, para. 15. 
167 MTN/3B/12, para. 1.  
168 MTN/3B/12, para. 3.  
104 
requirements(conditional labelling); in yet other cases labelling was not subject to regulations 
(voluntary labelling). There were two types of mandatory requirements; in the first it was 
mandatory to show certain information and in the second it was mandatory to present 
information in a certain way.169  
  Some delegation said that conditional labelling requirements were in many cases less 
onerous than mandatory requirements. Some delegations said that problems might arise in 
certain cases because, while in theory it might be voluntary to use a label, in practice it was 
mandatory to do so to overcome consumer resistance or meet consumer tastes.170  
  Some delegations emphasized that the motivations behind these requirements could be very 
different. Some delegations said that if labelling was required the motive was to exercise 
control of some sort. Some delegations said that in some cases the motivations was consumer 
information while in others it was consumer protection (health and safety). Some delegations 
pointed out that in some cases labelling requirements facilitate trade. Some delegations said 
that in some other cases the unspoken or unconscious motivation could be to restrict trade. 
Many delegations pointe out however that in practice it would be difficult to identify 
motivations; it was the trade effect of labelling requirements that was important in the present 
context and the Group should concentrate on these. Some delegations said that differences in 
labelling requirements, both regarding the information required and the way in which it was 
presented, could create obstacles to trade. Some delegations said that problems might arise 
because different requirements were applied, in clear violation of Article III, to imported and 
domestically produced goods but that the more usual case was one in which barriers to trade 
were created even though imports were subject to the same requirements as domestically 
produced goods so that even though national treatment was granted the purpose of Article 
III:4 was defeated.171  
  Some delegations from developing countries said that labelling rules created more acute 
problems for their countries than for others. It was more difficult for them both to find out 
what the rules were and to follow them. Some delegations from developing countries 
expressed particular concern about the trade obstructive effects of complicated regulations. 
                                           
169 MTN/3B/12, para. 4.  
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Some delegations from developing countries pointed to difficulties created by the diversity of 
requirements in different export markets. Some delegations from developing countries said 
that it was difficult for them to follow certain requirements because the technology on which 
their export products were based was different from that used in importing countries and no 
allowance for this was made in the regulations.172  
  The secretariat noted that labels can be of different types. In current usage a label means a 
piece of paper; card, linen, metal etc. which is attached to a product and carriers some 
information about it. In the present context the fact that the label is detachable does not seem 
an essential feature and labelling has been taken to include marking by which information is 
applied directly to the product. Information can be conveyed in different ways – by writing, 
by symbols and in some cases by colour coding (e.g. of electric wiring). The information 
conveyed by labels or marking can also be of many different types. It can give e.g. the name 
of the product, the name of the manufacturer, factual details of the product’s composition or 
information about the product’s performance. Labels or marks can also have very specialized 
purposes. They can show the country of origin of products. There is a difference of opinion in 
the Group as to whether problems relating to marks of origin are covered by the proposed 
Code’s terms of reference. They can be registered trademarks. They can show that a product 
conforms to a certain standard.173  
 
4.3.3.4 Applicability of the Code to packaging 
 
  Some delegations pointed out that there were different types of requirements in this area. 
These dealt with material to be used with a view to its effect on the contents and the range of 
package sizes permitted. These might both have implications for international trade.174 Some 
delegations said that there were also requirements relating to the standard of fill; these could 
take the form either of average requirements or minimum requirements.175 Some delegations 
from developing countries mentioned the problem of the additional cost of certain kind of 
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packaging.176 
  The secretariat noted that packages serve different purposes. Goods are packed in 
commercial packages in the quantities required by direct consumers. These packages are 
usually designed to prevent damage to the contents. They are sometimes designed to prevent 
the contents from damaging other things, or to increase the consumer appeal of the product. 
Packages are made from different materials and take different forms – a pipeline is a package. 
Goods are also packaged to make up standardized lots which can be conveniently handled and 
transported. These packages were originally designed to be lifted by hand but more recently 
have also been designed for mechanical handling, e.g. by palettization and containerization.177  
  A package is material in which the commodity is wrapped, or filled. Packages serve 
different purposes. Goods are packed in commercial packages in quantities required by direct 
consumers; such packages are usually designed to prevent damage to the contents or to 
increase the consumer appeal for the product. Goods are also packed in containers for 
transporting them to their place of use; the containers protect not only the commodity itself 
but also the other goods, the transportation facilities and the personnel handling the 
containers.178  
  Labels also can be of different types. They generally provide written information to the 
customer on the commodity, its composition, mode of use and occasionally, its price. Labels 
may also have marks indicating the country of origin of products. Marks of origin may also 
have marks indicating the country of origin of products. Marks of origin1) may also be shown 
by embossing or engraving on containers or this. Footnote 1) there was a difference of opinion 
in Group 3(b) as to whether problems in the field of marks of origin were covered by its terms 
of reference. The Trade Negotiation Committee has, at its meeting in July 1974, decided that 
the problems in this field “should be taken up in the context of non-tariff measures at an 
appropriate time, but without delay in the course of the negotiations”.179  
  Requirements in the field of packaging and labelling may be mandatory or voluntary. For 
example, in the case of some products, it is mandatory to label a product. The mandatory 
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obligation may be of two types; it may be obligatory to show certain information on the label; 
it may be obligatory to present information in a certain way. In other cases it may not be 
mandatory to label a product, but if labels are used they are required to conform to certain 
requirements (conditional labelling); in some other cases labelling may be purely voluntary 
inasmuch as it is not required under any regulation.180  
 
4.3.3.5 Applicability of the Code to marks of origin 
 
The Work Group noted that there was GATT Article IX regulating Marks of origin.  If 
problems caused by marks of origin are considered and dealt with under the Code, then it 
would be necessary to clarify and prevent that relevant provision in the Code and GATT 
Article IX do not conflict with each other.  On the basis, the Work Group reviewed Article 
IX.  
The Work Group noted that Article IX reaffirms the principle of the MFN clause in respect 
of marks of origin and that “laws and regulations relating to marks of origin should be 
reduced to a minimum so as not to hamper international trade”.  The Article further states 
that in order to reduce the difficulties and inconvenience which such measures may cause to 
the commerce and industry of the exporting countries, each contracting party should as far as 
possible, permit required marks of origin to be fixed at the time of importation, should settle 
amicably any disputes that might arise and should “accord full and sympathetic consideration 
to such requests or representations as may be made by any other contracting party”. In 
addition to these provisions, the CONTRACTING PARTIES, at their thirteenth session, 
adopted a Recommendation on the subject. This recommendation calls upon the countries “to 
scrutinize carefully their existing laws and regulations, with a view to reducing as far as 
possible, the number of cases in which marks of origin are required”; it further suggest the use 
of standard wordings, cases where requirements should be exempted and states that penalties 
should not be imposed for failure to comply with marking requirements prior to importation, 
except in cases of fraudulent intent.181  
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4.3.4 Concepts and definitions of “standards” in the early negotiations 
   
When the Tokyo Round negotiations began, the Working Group found that the concept of 
standards and their conformity assessment procedures are complex and diverse.  Particularly 
in terms of their legal status and establishing entities, standards varied substantially.  
Therefore, some standards had legal basis while the others had not; and some were prepared, 
adopted or applied by a standardization body of the central government while the others were 
formulated and applied by a standardization body of the local government or non-government 
entities.  Also, standardizing bodies were domestic, regional or international.  
  Nevertheless, the Working Group seemed to have been certain that mandatory standards 
and their relevant works of central government bodies be directly regulated by the proposed 
code whereas, standards by local or non-government bodies be indirectly regulated by the 
code.  A direct obligation means that central government bodies were obliged to carry out 
obligations in the proposed code and ensure that central government standardizing bodies 
comply with provisions of the Code.  On the contrary, an indirect obligation means that the 
central government bodies would generally “use all reasonable means within their power” to 
ensure that subsidiary bodies act in compliance with the provisions of the code.  
  Although such distinction is made, the content of the obligation stipulated in the proposed 
code was almost identical; a significant difference is the degree or level of compliance.  
However, the Working Group agreed to make it clear that government signatories should 
accomplish compliance and be responsible for other standard bodies’ implementation of the 
proposed Code.  Thus, the Work Group agreed to say, “[i]t may be noted however that in 
default of compliance by subsidiary bodies with the code, a residual obligation is sometimes 
placed on government signatories to carry out the relevant provisions of the code.”182  
 
4.3.4.1 Concepts of “standard” in the early negotiations  
 
The Work Group in the beginning of the Tokyo Round recognized the concept of standard 
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as defined in the 1973 Proposed Code, which described, “…any specification which lays 
down some or all of the properties of a product in terms of quality, purity, nutritional value, 
performance, dimensions and other characteristics.”  
Then, the Group not only considered effect of standards as a trade barrier but their valuable 
aspects to industries.  The Group briefly discussed some beneficial impacts of standards as 
they help permit mass production, avoid resource waste, and better control inventories.183  In 
addition, the Group agreed that some are used to lay down minimum public health and safety 
conditions.  On the other hand, the Group noted a considerable impact of standards on 
international trade.  It noted there may be situations where countries misunderstand and 
dispute over performance, testing and inspection or cases in which standards or standards 
related procedure act like trade barriers.184 
Although the sources of trade barriers and problems may be divergent, a root cause for 
them was considered to be related with the domestic standardization process which often 
failed to take into account the practices and manufacturing processes used in other countries.  
Therefore, the Group noted that trade problems of standards arose regardless of whether 
certain standards were mandatory or voluntary.  Thus, in its note to the Secretariat in 
December 1974, the Group reported,  
 
“… Such standards, particularly if they were mandatory, posed problems 
to exporters as there was an obligation to comply with the specifications 
laid down. A foreign manufacturer was thus able to sell his product only if 
he adapted his production process to the requirements prescribed by 
different importing countries. Though there was no such obligation to 
comply in the case of voluntary standards, these may in practice pose 
problems similar to mandatory standards. This may be relevant in cases 
where there were wide differences between standards adopted by different 
countries and buyers such as governmental agencies and manufacturing 
associations who required that products which they purchased should 
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conform to particular national standards.”185  
 
  Then, the Group further noted those conformity assessment procedures, if they were 
unnecessarily rigorous or where they did not accept results of tests and inspections carried out 
in the exporting country, could also be another source of trade problems.  It reviewed some 
relevant notifications in the inventory which indicated such restrictive effects of conformity 
assessment procedures could vary from increased expenses and delays to practical 
impossibility for an exporter to market his product due to difficulties in obtaining necessary 
approvals.  
 
4.3.4.2 Terminologies and definitions in the draft Standards Codes and the 
ECE/ISO definitions 
 
As the TBT negotiation was proceeding, the definitions and terminologies were being 
established in the Economic Commission for Europe/International Organization for 
Standardization and there was a question of whether they should be harmonized or adopted 
into the TBT Code.  
Countries of the Sub-Group divided in views over whether it would be appropriate and 
possible to apply the ECE definitions to the draft Code.186  Following the disagreement, the 
Secretariat was asked to prepare a working paper which compared two sets of definitions and 
implications of the ECE definitions for the draft Code. 187  The working paper found that 
there was no one to one correspondence between the definitions in the proposed Code and the 
ECE definitions although majority of the definitions in the proposed Code were equivalent to 
those in the ECE definitions.  It compared terminologies and definitions used in the two sets 
of text.  The comparison table is replicated in <Table 6>. 
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Table 6. Comparison of the term “standard” in the draft Standards Codes and in the 
ECE definitions 
GATT terminology Corresponding ECE terminology 
English French English French 
“standard” 









technique” “technical regulation” “réglement technique” 
“voluntary 
standard” “norme” 
No definition but 
term might be: 
“voluntary technical 
specification” 















No definition but 
term might be: 
“voluntary 
standardizing body” 
No definition but term 
might be: “organisme 

















“organisme regional à 
activités normatives” 
Source: Reproduced from the working paper by the Secretariat (MTN/NTM/W/14). 
 
  The main differences in the terminology used in the two sets of definitions relate to the 
terminology of ‘standards’ and ‘quality assurance systems’.188  The ECE terms which 
corresponded to the proposed Code’s ‘standard’ in English and ‘spécification technique’ in 
French, were ‘technical specification’ and ‘spécification technique’ respectively.  The 
working paper noted that the ECE used the term ‘standards’, which was translated into French 
as ‘norm’, “in a very special, and in some respects a very limited, way.” 189  The working 
paper analyzed the different use of the terminology ‘standard’ had repercussion in several 
other terms. 
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In addition, the working paper noted that the ECE term corresponding to “quality assurance 
system” in the GATT proposed Code was “certification system” and this difference had 
repercussion in several other terms.190  This comparison table is also replicated in <Table 7>.  
Table 7. Comparison between the term “quality assurance system” in the draft 
Standards Codes and the term “certification system” in the ECE definitions 
GATT terminology Corresponding ECE terminology 































No definition but 






















No definition but 
equivalent might be: 
“regional certification 
arrangement” 
No definition but 
equivalent might be: 
“arrangement regional 
de certification” 




“qualité de member 




No definition but 
equivalent might be:  
“membership in a 
certification system or 
arrangement” 
No definition but 
equivalent might be: 
“qualité de member 
d’un système ou d’un 
arrangement de 
certification” 




“participation à un  




No definition but 
equivalent might be:  
“participation in a 
certain system or 
arrangement” 
No definition but 
equivalent might be: 
“participation à un  
système ou à un 
arrangement de 
certification” 
Source: Reproduced from the working paper by the Secretariat (MTN/NTM/W/14). 
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First, the definition of ‘standard’ in the proposed Code was significantly different from the 
definition of ‘standard’ in the ECE definitions.  The working paper noted that the GATT 
definition of “standard” was clearly more limited than the ECE definition of “technical 
specification”.  The evidence for the conclusion was related to the coverage of ‘standard’, 
which, unlike ‘technical specification’ used in the ECE definition, was a concept with 
exclusion of company standards, standards relating to services and codes of practice.191 
 
Table 8. “Standard”-related terms in the draft Standards Codes and their 
corresponding terms and definitions in the ECE definitions192 
Terms in the 
GATT Proposed 
Code 
Corresponding terms and definitions in the ECE Definitions 
1. “Standards” 2. Technical specification 
A document which lays down characterisation of a product or a service such 
as levels of quality, performance, safety, dimensions. It may include 
terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, packaging, marking or 
labeling requirements. A technical specification may also take the form of a 
code of practice. 
 
3. Standard 
A technical specification or other document available to the public, drawn 
up with the co-operation and consensus or general approval of all interests 
affected by it based on the consolidated results of science, technology and 
experience, aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits and 
approved by a body recognized on the national, regional or international 
level. 
 
Note 1: A technical specification which does satisfy all the conditions given 
in the definition may sometimes be called by other names, for example, 
“recommendation”.  
Note2: In some languages the word “standard” is often used with another 
meaning than in this definition, and in such cases it may refer to a technical 
specification which does not satisfy all the conditions given in the 
definition, for example, “company standard”.  
2. “Mandatory 
standard” 
4. Technical regulation 
A regulation containing or referring to a standard or a technical 
specification.  
Note: A technical regulation may be supplemented by technical guidance 
                                           
191 MTN/NTM/W/14, para. 9.  
192 MTN/NTM/W/14, Annex-Comparison of GATT and ECE Definitions, p. 5-10.  
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which outlines some way(s) to fulfil the regulation.  
 
1. Regulation 
A binding document which contains legislative, regulatory or administrative 
rules and which is adopted and published by an authority legally vested with 
the necessary power.  
 
6. Mandatory standard 




No corresponding definition 
4. “international 
standard” 
No definition of “international technical specification” 
 
18. International standard 
A standard adopted by an international standards organization or in certain 




No corresponding definition 
6. “Local 
government body” 
No corresponding definition 
7. “Regulatory 
body” 
No corresponding definition 
8. “Voluntary 
standards body” 
No corresponding definition 
9. “National 
standards body” 
11. National standards body 
A nationally recognized body whose principal function at the national level 
by virtue of its statutes or the law of the country, in the preparation and/or 
publication of national standards and/or approval of standards prepared by 
other bodies. This body is eligible to be the national member of the 
corresponding international and regional standards organization. 
14. “Harmonized 
standards” 
No definition of Harmonized Technical Specifications 
5. Harmonized standards 
Standards of the same scope that have been approved by different 
standardizing bodies and which are either technically identical or 
recognized as technically equivalent in practice.  
Note: Harmonization of standards is generally carried out in order to 
prevent or eliminate technical barriers to trade in the region of the world in 
which they are applied.  
 
 
  Second, the GATT Proposed Code consistently used the term ‘quality assurance system’ 
and the corresponding term used in the ECE definitions was ‘certification system’.  The 
working paper could not conclude whether the difference between the proposed Code’s 
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definition of ‘quality assurance system’ and the corresponding ECE definition ‘certification 
system’ were significant.  It considered that the ECE definition covered the only two 
methods that were in fact used to indicate conformity with certain standards, namely, 
certificates and marks.  On the other hand, the general formulation such as that used in the 
Code may be preferable because it would cover any other possible methods which might be 
used in the future.193  
 
Table 9. “Quality assurance system”-related terms in the draft Standards Codes and 
their corresponding terms and definitions in the ECE definitions194 
Terms of the GATT 
Proposed Code Corresponding terms and definitions in the ECE Definitions 
12. “Determination of 
‘conformity’ with 
standards” 
20. Conformity with standards or technical specifications 
 The conformity of a product or a service with all the requirements of 
specific standards or technical specifications.  
13. “Administrative 
procedures” 
21. Administrative procedures for determining conformity  
The administrative measures needed to determine whether or not a 
product or a service is in conformity with specific standards or 
technical specifications. It may include administrative arrangements 
for controlling the frequency and location of testing, for carrying out 
tests and for supervising the control of quality by producers.  
15. “Quality assurance 
body” 
Certification body. A governmental body, or other independent and 
impartial body meeting the needs of all parties interested in the 
function of the certification system, possessing the necessary 
competence and reliability to operate a certification system.  
16. “Quality assurance 
system” 
25. Certification system 
A system having its own rules of procedure and management, for 
carrying out conformity certification.  
24. Conformity certification  
The action of certification by means of a certificate of conformity or 
mark of conformity that a product or service is in conformity with 
specific standards or technical specifications.  
22. Certificate of conformity 
A document attesting that a product or a service is in conformity with 
specific standards or technical specifications.  
23. Mark of conformity  
A mark attesting that a product or a service is in conformity with 
specific standards or technical specifications.  
17. “International quality 27. International certification system 
                                           
193 MTN/NTM/W/14, para. 10.  
194 MTN/NTM/W/14, Annex-Comparison of GATT and ECE Definitions, p. 5-10.  
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assurance system” 
18. International quality 
assurance arrangement” 
Certification system organized and managed by a governmental or 
non-governmental international organization whose membership is 
open to all countries of the world.  
28. Regional certification system 
Certification system organized and managed by a governmental or 
non-governmental regional organization whose membership is 
usually limited to certain countries from a given region of the world.  
19. “Regional quality 
assurance system” 
20. “Regional quality 
assurance arrangement” 
No corresponding definition 
21. “Membership in a 
quality assurance system 
or arrangement” 
22. “Participation in a 
quality assurance system 
or arrangement” 
No corresponding definition 
 
  Having found stark differences, the sub-Group basically came to consider one of the two 
alternatives at the end; one option was to adopt only the terminologies used in the ECE 
definitions, which was expected to make little change in the burden of the Code’s obligations; 
and the other was to use both terminologies and definitions of the ECE list, which would 
entail some modifications of the coverage of the proposed Code.195  
 
4.3.4.3 Draft Standards Codes’ harmonization with the ECE/ISO definitions 
 
  As to the terminology, the Sub-Group reached an agreement to use the ECE/ISO terms.  
However, some of the ECE/ISO definitions did not meet the special needs of the Draft Code.  
A Finland’s note particularly viewed three main problems connected with the application of 
the ECE/ISO definitions for the Draft Code.196   
  The first problem it noted was that the ECE/ISO definitions were intended for general 
application whereas the GATT needed definitions for a specified use.  Thus, in some cases 
the scope of the ECE/ISO definition was wider than what was agreed for the coverage of the 
Draft Code.  The Finland’ report noted the definition of “technical specification” as a typical 
                                           
195 MTN/NTM/W/14, para. 4.  
196 MTN/NTM/W/35.  
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example.197  Since it was unlikely that the ECE/ISO definitions were amended to meet the 
specific needs of the Draft GATT Code, much easier way of resolving the problem was 
simply to add not limiting the scope of a definition.198  
  The second problem the Finland’s report found was caused by the different approach to the 
definitions.  In contrast to a normative purpose of establishing definitions by the ECE, the 
fundamental purpose of the GATT definition was to give the coverage of the Code.  Since 
the normative provisions were then included in the Operation Provisions and, therefore, some 
ECE/ISO definitions became too narrow for the purposes of the Draft Code.  The report 
considered the definitions of “standard” and “certification body” as representative examples. 
199  The report thought that this problem is more difficult to solve by adding note.  Instead, 
it suggested sending requests to the ECE and the ISO for consideration.200 
  The third problem was relevant to the appropriate definition for ‘standard in the Draft Code 
since the desired coverage of Draft Code had not yet been agreed.  The Finland’s report 
noted that most delegation considered a coverage given by the Draft Code would be too wide 
whereas a coverage given by the ECE/ISO definitions would be too narrow.201  The report 
made some proposals regarding the matter.  For instance, it suggested deleting the words 
“and publishing” in the ISO/ECE definition of ‘regulation’ but it also concluded that this 
suggestion was hardly significant because in practice all regulations of importance for 
international trade were anyway published.202  Another suggestion was made as regards to 
the definition of ‘technical specification’.  In terms of the coverage, the definition of the 
ECE/ISO text was too broad, so the report suggested excluding those specifications which 
deal with services, those which have the form of a code or practice or those which were 
prepared for use by a single enterprise, whether governmental or non-governmental either for 
its own production or purchasing purpose. Also, it emphasized the need of a note dealing with 
process only if and when the Code was to cover also agricultural products.203  The last 
comment was on the definition of ‘standard’.  The paper found the scope of the ECE/ISO 
                                           
197 MTN/NTM/W/35, para. 3.  
198 MTN/NTM/W/35, para. 4.  
199 MTN/NTM/W/35, para. 3. 
200 MTN/NTM/W/35, para. 4. 
201 MTN/NTM/W/35, para. 3..  
202 MTN/NTM/W/35, para. 5. 
203 MTN/NTM/W/35, para. 5.  
118 
definition partly too wide, partly too narrow for the purposes of the Code.  Since it would 
hardly be a case that the ECE and the ISO would make any amendment to their definitions, 
the report suggested to give a new definition for the term.204  
  In meetings of early 1976, the Sub-Group examined the specific drafting suggestions made 
by delegations regarding the Proposed Code.  The Subgroup also examined the applicability 
of the ECE/ISO definitions to the Proposed Code.  The Sub-Group agreed that the ECE/ISO 
terms could be used in the Proposed Code, but noted that some delegations preferred the 
terms “standard” to “technical specification”, “voluntary standard” to “standard” and 
“mandatory standard” to “technical regulation”. 205  In addition, countries suggested some 
modifications to the ECE/ISO definition, which was later termed to be ‘Hypothesis A’.  For 
instance, the US wanted the definitions of ‘technical specifications’ to include product-related 
processes and production method while Canada suggested to clarify the exclusion of patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, certification marks and registered industrial designs from the scope of 
‘technical specification’.206  
  Regarding the definition of ‘standard’, the US, and the EEC suggested to clearly exclude 
company standards and standards prepared by a single enterprises, whether governmental or 
non-governmental either for its own production or purchasing for its own consumption.207 
Also, the Sub-Group agreed to insert that for “standard”, the word “body” covers also a 
national standardizing system. 208  Besides, there were suggestions to clarify the meaning of 
the words ‘recognized body’.  Japan suggested to clarify and insert that standards are to be 
“approved by a body, either central government body, local governmental body, regulatory 
body, a body other than a central or local governmental body, a non-governmental 
organization or any other standardizing body, for continued application and with which there 
is no legal obligation to comply.”209  
  In respect of ‘technical regulations’, the sub-Group suggested to insert a sentence “For the 
purposes of the Code this definition covers also a standard of which the application has been 
                                           
204 MTN/NTM/W/35, para. 5.  
205 MTN/NTM/12.  
206 MTN/NTM/W/37, p. 2. 
207 MTN/NTM/W/37, p. 2.  
208 MTN/NTM/W/37, p. 2.  
209 MTN/NTM/W/50, p. 2. 
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made mandatory not by separate regulation but in virtue of a general law.”210 The Sub-Group 
also examined the question as to whether the term should also cover technical regulations 
which cite standards or technical specifications for illustrative purposes, in a descriptive or 
informative way.211 
  Therefore, the Sub-Group agreed that, in many cases, the detailed wording of the ECE/ISO 
definitions could be applied to the Code.  However, it agreed that in a number of cases the 
ECE/ISO definitions would need to be modified for the purpose of the Code.  It drew 
attention to two alternatives of harmonizing the proposed Code with the ECE/ISO definitions: 
hypothesis A and hypothesis B.  Hypothesis A was to use the ECE/ISO definitions without 
any modifications as such and any qualification for the purpose of the Code should be 
achieved through separate notes.  Hypothesis B was to achieve any qualification of the 
definitions through modification of definitions. 
In the subsequent meetings in late 1976, the Sub-Group discussed which versions of 
definitions to adopt.  Particularly, it noted any differences between Hypothesis B definitions 
and the ECE/ISO definitions with a view to avoid significant deviation of the proposed Code 
from the internationally agreed definitions.  For the purpose, the Finland’s report played 
important role in examining and ensuring the harmonization.212  The report came to the 
conclusion that only a few words needed definitions for the purpose of the Code: regulation, 
technical specification, standard, technical regulation, international body or system, regional 
body or system, central government body, local government body, certification body, 
membership in a certain system and participation in a certification system.213  The report 
suggested that the other terms in the ECE/ISO definitions could then be deleted from the list 
of the definitions in the proposed Code.214  
In addition, the report found that there were two main reasons for the differences between 
the Hypothesis B definition and the ECE/ISO definitions. 215  They differed in terms of 
coverage. The ECE/ISO definitions were made for general application whereas the 
                                           
210 MTN/NTM/W/37, p. 17. 
211 MTN/NTM/W/50, p. 3. 
212 MTN/NTM/W/70.  
213 MTN/NTM/W/70, para. 5.  
214 MTN/NTM/W/70, para. 6.  
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Hypothesis B definitions to meet the specific needs of the Code concerning its coverage.  
Another main reason for the difference was their normative characteristics.  Thus, some of 
the ECE/ISO definitions included normative elements; for the purposes of the Code, it was 
preferable to leave such elements out from the operative provisions of the Code. 
  In meetings of November 1976, the Sub-Group met and invited the Secretary-General of 
UNCTAD or his representative as an observer, Central Secretariat of the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Central Office its sister organization the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) to attend the session of the Sub-Group in an 
expert capacity.216  In those meetings, the Sub-Group had a detailed discussion of the 
proposals relating to the Operative Provisions of the Draft Standard Code, including proposals 
to deal with problems of developing countries.  The Sub-Group also discussed over the 
questions relating to the terms to be used in the Draft Standards Code, based on a suggestion 
made by the Finland report.217 At the meeting of the November 1976, the Sub-Group 
requested Mr. K. Bergholm from Finland to prepare a further paper on the terms which need 
to be defined for the purposes of the Draft Code and on the differences between the 
Hypothesis B and the ISO/ECE definitions.  
Accordingly, Mr. Bergholm from Finland continued his work on definition.218  In his 
subsequent report, he explained that, on one hand, it was obvious that creating an own set of 
definitions for standardization and certification by GATT in conflict with those prepared by 
ECE and ISO could lead to confusion and misunderstandings.  But, on the other hand, it was 
also considered to be equally obvious that some of the definitions prepared by ECE and ISO 
for general application would not meet the specific need of the Draft Code.  To solve this 
problem by adding footnotes to the ECE/ISO definitions had turned out to be cumbersome, 
and it was hard to avoid all ambiguities by this method.219   
Thus, he came to a conclusion that the best way was to base the presentation of the 
definition partly on Hypothesis A and partly on Hypothesis B.  He proposed that, in the 
Code, general terms for standardization and certification should normally have the meaning 
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218 MTN/NTM/W/86.  
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given to them by the definitions adopted by the ECE and the ISO taking into account –
according to the Vienna Convention on the interpretation of treaties – their context and in the 
light of the object and the purpose of the Code.  At the same time, to meet the specific needs 
of the Code, those terms which were essential for the coverage of the Code or for the 
obligations of the adherents and where the meaning of the term was not unambiguous should 
be specifically defined.220   
As a result, he prepared new draft texts for Section I as well as Annex 1 of the Draft Code 
also indicating the differences between the definitions for the specific purposes of the Code 
and the corresponding ECE/ISO definitions when such existed.221  All definitions of Annex 
1 had been revised in order to avoid any remaining ambiguities and to harmonize the 
wordings in different definitions.  Almost all amendments suggested by the Finland report 
were adopted by the Draft Code of 1977 and left unchanged throughout the remaining Tokyo 
Round negotiations.  
 
4.3.4.4 Definitions in the 1973 Draft Standard Code and the ISO/ECE definitions  
 
In the ECE/ISO definitions, the concept of “technical specification” and the concept of 
“standard” together represent the corresponding concept of “standard” in the GATT Draft 
Code.  They constitute the largest categories and contain an overlapping scope with each 
other.  In specific, the term “technical specification” is defined in a broad sense as “a 
document which lays down characterization of a product or a service such as levels of quality, 
performance, safety, dimensions. It may include terminology, symbols, testing and test 
methods, packaging, marking or labeling requirements. A technical specification may also 
take the form of a code of practice.”  The “standard” in the ECE/ISO context can be a 
technical specification or other document which has some special features like its availability 
to the public, its basis on cooperation and consensus, or general approval of all interests 
affected by it as well as its goal to promote optimum community benefits and approval by a 
recognized body.  
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221 MTN/NTM/W/86, para. 3.  
122 
Figure 7. Comparison of the early GATT model and the ECE/ISO model 













Source: Author’s analysis  
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The 1973 Draft Code in the GATT regime use the term “standards” share indicate “any 
specification which lays down some or all the properties of a product…” but the scope of the 
term excludes service standards and company standards.  In general, the GATT term share 
many common aspects with the ECE/ISO term.  
The Draft Code’s term “standards” are divided into the categories “mandatory standards” 
and “voluntary standards” depending on their compliance and “mandatory standards” are to 
embrace “what would be normally described as technical regulation.”  Thus, the scopes and 
relations between “standards”, “mandatory standards”, “technical regulations” and “voluntary 
standards” can be drawn as in < Figure 7>.   
There is no corresponding term for “voluntary standards” of the 1973 Draft Code in the 
ECE/ISO definitions.  Only “mandatory standards” and “technical regulations” are defined 
in the ECE/ISO text.   
The ECE/ISO definitions provide the meaning of “regulation” as “[a] binding document 
which contains legislative, regulatory or administrative rules and which is adopted and 
published by an authority legally vested with the necessary power”.  Based on the definition, 
the term “technical regulation” is defined as “[a] regulation containing or referring to a 
standard or a technical specification” and, thus, its concept is built on the definitions of 
“technical specifications”, “standards” and “regulation”.  
The term “mandatory standard” in the ECE/ISO context is defined as “[a] standard of 
which the application has been made mandatory by a regulation”.  Several aspects are 
noteworthy.  In the ECE/ISO context, the meaning of “mandatory standard” is based on only 
the concept “standard” which is separately defined from the term “technical specification”. 
However, in the 1973 Draft Code, the term “standard” shares, in a large part, common 
elements with the ECE/ISO’s “technical specification”.  Another point is related to the 
concept “mandatory”.  In both contexts, definitions imply that “mandatory” character is 
made by some authorities and is based on legal power; the 1973 Draft Code requires “an 
action of an authority endowed with the necessary legal power” and the ECE/ISO mentions 
“regulation”.  Last, according to the normative definitions of the ECE/ISO, “mandatory 
standard” is different from “technical regulation” in that the former requires application of the 
standard to be mandatory while the latter provides that standards or technical specifications 
are contained or referred to in a regulation which is a binding document.  A regulation is a 
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binding document, but the application of standards or technical specifications addressed by 
the regulation may or may not be obligatory.  
  Similarly, in the 1973 Draft Code, definitions of “mandatory standards” and “voluntary 
standards” are referring to “standard[s]”, stating that “[t]his is a standard with which it is 
obligatory to comply…” and “[t]his is a standard with which there is no legal obligation to 
comply” respectively.   
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Table 10. Draft Standards Codes’ major terms and definitions considered for harmonization with the ECE/ISO definitions  
ECE/ISO Definitions222 [Option 1] Hypothesis A223 
[Option 2] 
Hypothesis B224 
May 1977 Draft Code 
(MTN/NTM/W/94)225 
Technical specification 
A document which lays down 
characterisation of a product or a 
service such as levels of quality, 
performance, safety, dimensions. 
It may include terminology, 
symbols, testing and test 
methods, packaging, marking or 
labeling requirements. A technical 
specification may also take the 












A document which lay down 
characteristics of a product or a service 
such as levels of quality, performance, 
safety, dimensions. It may include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, testing and test methods, 
packaging, marking or labeling 
requirements. A technical specification 
may also take the form of a code of 
practice. 
 
Additional note:  
For the purposes of this Code such 
technical specifications are excluded 
which deal with services [or have the 
form of a code or practice.] 
Technical specification 
A document which lay down 
characteristics of a product such as 
levels of quality, performance, 
safety, dimensions. It may include 
or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, testing and 
test methods, packaging, marking 
or labeling requirements. 
Technical specification 
A specification contained in a 
document which lays down 
characteristics of a product such as 
levels of quality, performance, 
safety or dimensions. It may 
include, or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, testing and 
test methods, packaging, marking 
or labeling requirements as they 
apply to a product.  
 
Explanatory note: 
The Code deals only with technical 
specifications relating to products. 
Thus the wording of the  
corresponding ECE/ISO definition 
is amended in order to exclude 
services and codes of practice.  
 
                                           
222 MTN/NTM/W/14, Annex-Comparison of GATT and ECE Definitions, p. 5-10.  
223 Hypothesis A is that the ECE/ISO definitions would be used without any modifications as such and that any qualification of these definitions which was required for 
the purpose of the Code should b achieved through separate notes to this effect. MTN/NTM/W/38. 
224 Hypothesis B is that there were any qualification of the definitions was required for the purpose of the Code, this should be achieved by modifying the definitions 
themselves. MTN/NTM/W/38. 
225 MTN/NTM/W/94, pp. 31-33.  
126 
Standard 
A technical specification or other 
document available to the public, 
drawn up with the co-operation 
and consensus or general 
approval of all interests affected 
by it based on the consolidated 
results of science, technology and 
experience, aimed at the 
promotion of optimum 
community benefits and approved 
by a body recognized on the 
national, regional or international 
level. 
 
Note 1: A technical specification 
which does satisfy all the 
conditions given in the definition 
may sometimes be called by other 
names, for example, 
“recommendation”.  
Note2: In some languages the 
word “standard” is often used 
with another meaning than in this  
definition, and in such cases it 
may refer to a technical 
specification which does not 
satisfy all the conditions given in 




A regulation containing or 
referring to a standard or a 
technical specification. 
  
Note: A technical regulation may 
be supplemented by technical 
guidance which outlines some 










A binding document which 
contains legislative, regulatory or 
administrative rules and which is 
adopted and published by an 






A standard of which the 
application has been made 
Technical Regulation 
A regulation containing or referring to a 
standard or a technical specification.  
 
ECE note:  
A technical regulation may be 
supplemented by technical guidance 




For the purposes of this Code a 
technical regulation is a regulation or 
those parts of a regulation containing or 




A document which contains binding 
legislative, regulatory or administrative 
rules and which is adopted by an 
authority legally vested with the 
necessary power and publish. 
 
Additional note:  
For the purpose of this Code the words 
“and published” shall be deleted. 
 
Technical Regulation 
A regulation or those parts of a 
regulation containing or referring 















A document which contains 
binding legislative, regulatory or 
administrative rules and which is 
adopted by an authority legally 







A technical specification, including 
the applicable administrative 
provisions, with which compliance 
is mandatory.  
 
Explanatory note: 
The wording differs from the 
corresponding ECE/ISO definition 
because the latter is based on the 
definition of regulation which is 
not defined in this code. 
Furthermore the ECE/ISO 
definition contains a normative 
element which is included in the 
operative provisions of the Code.  
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mandatory by a regulation 
 
(No corresponding definition) 
Standard 
A technical specification or other 
document available to the public, drawn 
up with the cooperation and consensus 
or general approval of all interests 
affected by it, based on the consolidated 
results of science, technology and 
experience, aimed at the promotion of 
optimum community benefits and 
approved by a body recognized on the 
national, regional or international level.  
 
ECE notes: 
(1) A technical specification which does 
satisfy all the conditions given in the 
definition may sometimes be called by 
other names, for example: 
“recommendation”.  
(2) In some languages the word 
“standard” is often used with another 
meaning than in this definition, and in 
such cases it may refer to a technical 
specification which does not satisfy all 
the conditions given in the definition, 
for example: “company standard”.  
Additional note: 
(1) For the purposes of this Code the 
standard covers any technical 
Standard 
Any technical specification 
approved by a recognized body for 
continued application and with 
which there is no legal obligation 
to comply.  
 
Standard 
A technical specification approved 
by a recognized standardizing 
body for repeated or continuous 
application, with which 
compliance is not made mandatory.  
 
Explanatory note: 
The corresponding ECE/ISO 
definition contains several 
normative elements which are not 
included in the above definition. 
Accordingly, technical 
specifications which are not based 
on consensus are covered by the 
Code. [This definition does not 
cover technical specification 
prepared by an individual 
company for its own production or 
consumption requirement. (added 




specification approved by a recognized 
body for continued application.  
(2) For the purposes of this Code the 
word “or other document” shall be 
deleted. 
 
(No corresponding definition) 
Central government body 
Central government, its ministries and departments or any body subject to the 
control of the central government in respect of the activity in question. In the 
case of the European Economic Community the provisions governing central 
government bodies [would] apply.  
 
Note: If the EEC were to sign to the Code, the word “would” and the square 
brackets would disappear. 
Central government body 
Central government, its ministries 
and departments or any body 
subject to the control of the central 
government in respect of the 
activity in question. In the case of 
the European Economic 
Community the provisions 
governing central government 
bodies [would] apply.  
 
Explanatory note: 
If the EEC were to sign the Code, 
the word “would” and the square 
brackets would disappear.  
 
(No corresponding definition) 
Local government body 
Government body which is not subject to the control of the central 
government in respect of the activity in question, such as:  
(i) the authorities of States, Provinces, Lander, Cantons, etc. in the case of a 
federal or decentralized system, and  
(ii) local government authorities. 
Local government body 
Government body which is not 
subject to the control of the central 
government in respect of the 
activity in question, such as: 
(i) the authorities of States, 
Provinces, Lander, Cantons, etc. in 
the case of a federal or 
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decentralized system, and  
(ii) local government authorities.  
 
 
(No corresponding definition) 
Regulatory body 
Central or local government body or any other body which has legal power to 
enforce a technical regulation. This may or may not be the same body which 
prepared or adopted the technical regulation.  
 
Regulatory body 
A governmental or non-
governmental body which has 
legal power to enforce a technical 
regulation. This may or may not be 
the same body which prepared or 
adopted the technical regulation 
 
Standardizing body 
A body, governmental or non-
governmental, one of whose 
recognized activities is in the 
field of standardization. 
Standardizing body 
A body, governmental or non-governmental, one of whose recognized 
activities is in the field of standardization. 
Standardizing body 
A governmental or non-
governmental body, one of whose 
recognized activities is in the field 
of standardization. 
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National standards body 
A nationally recognized body 
whose principal function at the 
national level by virtue of its 
statutes or the law of the country, 
in the preparation and/or 
publication of national standards 
and/or approval of standards 
prepared by other bodies. This 
body is eligible to be the national 
member of the corresponding 
international and regional 
standards organization. 
(No corresponding definition) (No corresponding definition) (No corresponding definition) 
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4.3.5 Conceptual and rule developments in major draft Standards Codes 
 
4.3.5.1 Overview of the major draft Standards Codes 
 
During the Tokyo Round, the terminologies and definitions were subject to rigorous 
discussions from the beginning.  In the early period, the ECE/ISO was establishing 
normative definitions of many terms which were incorporated in the Draft Code and the 
negotiating countries in the GATT found it necessary to consider the ECE/ISO definitions 
with a view to minimized confusions and ambiguity when the terms in the Draft TBT Code 
were actually applied after entry into force.  Therefore, the first view years were fully 
devoted to identifying the discrepancies of terms and definitions between the early Draft Code 
and the ECE/ISO text and discussing ways to narrowing such discrepancies.  Accordingly, 
some options such as Hypothesis A and Hypothesis B were considered and, for the purpose of 
the GATT draft, modified definitions from the ECE/ISO definitions were eventually 
adopted.226  
After the revisions to the definitions in the Annex 1, the negotiators focused on amending 
disciplines and the regulatory structure.  For example, Article 3 was revised so that 
disciplines for technical regulations of local government bodies and regulatory bodies were 
clearly provided in this separate article.227  In the revised Article 3, majority of provisions 
remained the same as Article 2 for technical regulations of central government bodies, but 
obligations to participate in regional standardization and to make regional standardization 
bodies to comply with the Draft were exempted.  In addition, Article 3 adopted a new set of 
transparency procedures.   
In October 1978, a major change took place with respect to the regulatory structure and 
disciplines in relation to that regulatory structure.  In terms of regulatory structure, it became 
less meaningful to distinguish technical regulations and standards because both were ruled by 
the same provisions after the revisions.  The regulatory structure was established in such a 
                                           
226 Generally see the following documents: MTN/NTM/W/49, MTN/NTM/W/71, MTN/NTM/W/94.  
227 Generally see the following documents: MTN/NTM/W/119, MTN/NTM/W/150. 
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form that disciplines were no longer differentiated in accordance with types of standards and 
standardizing bodies but were now distinguished only in terms of the bodies.228  After these 
major revisions, the Draft remained unchanged until the finalization of the Tokyo Round 
negotiations. 229 
 
4.3.5.2 Development of standards definitions in major draft Standards Codes 
 
After the Tokyo Round negotiations, several terminologies were replaced.  For example, 
the term “Standards” was replaced by the term “technical specification”; the term “mandatory 
standards” by the term “technical regulations”; and the term “voluntary standards” by 
“standards”. See <Figure 8>.  Such replacement was largely influenced by the work of 
harmonization through which confusions and ambiguities resulting from gaps between the 
GATT draft code and the ECE/ISO text were minimized.  The changes in terms and 
definitions of major concepts are summarized in <Table 11>. 
 
Figure 8. Structure of the subject matters in the early draft Standards Codes 
 
Source: Author’s analysis  
 
                                           
228 Generally see MTN/NTM/W/192.  
229 Generally see the following documents: MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev.1, MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev.2, 
MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev.3, MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev.4, MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev.5.  
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Despite the replacement in terminology, the definition and elements of each respective 
concept remained generally unchanged but it can be inferred that some elements in definitions 
are influenced by or harmonized with those corresponding in the ECE/ISO context.  Thus, 
the definition of “technical specification” replacing “standard” of the early text remained 
almost intact, but adopted an explanatory note which explains different scope of the term 
from that of the ECE/ISO term.  
In case of “technical regulation” which replaced the term “mandatory standards”, the 
element that its compliance be mandatory or “it is obligatory to comply” in the expression of 
the previous Draft, was still contained.  In the previous text, the obligatory compliance was 
to be made “by virtue of an action by an authority endowed with the necessary legal power” 
but, in the revised text, such an element relating to the authority was removed.  In addition, 
an explanatory note was inserted to clarify that the meaning of the term in the GATT Draft 
Code was different from that in the ECE/ISO in that the latter is based on the definition of 
regulation while the former is not.  As a result, the legal characteristics and the role of the 
authority in making a technical standard became less important element, if not a no element at 
all, for determining the mandatory aspect of a technical regulation.  
The meaning of “standards” which replaced “voluntary standard” of the previous text was 
perceivably influenced by the ECE/ISO definitions.  The element that the compliance with 
them are “not made mandatory” is still contained but it became ambiguous whether such non-
mandatory compliance be found on a legal basis or not.  The element relating to the 
standardizing body was elaborated after the revision; for instance, the technical specification 
should be “approved by a recognized standardizing body” in order to be a standard.  Also, 
the element based on the phrase “for repeated or continuous application” was inserted.  
These elements regarding the standardizing body – approval and recognition – and the 
element of requiring a certain level of frequency were originally provided in the ECE/ISO 
definition of “standard”.  
Overall, it became less explicit that the concept of technical regulation is related to the 
authority with legal power and that the mandatory compliance be based on a certain legal 
form. Consequently, it became less evident whether the distinction between technical 
regulation and standard be made based upon legally binding force or the legal character of the 
standardizing bodies. 
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Table 11. Draft Standards Codes’ major terms and definitions negotiated during the Tokyo Round 
1973 Draft Code 
(COM.IND/W/108 )230 
May 1977 Draft Code 
(MTN/NTM/W/94)231 




The term “standard” means any 
specification which lays down some 
or all of the properties of a product 
in terms of quality, purity, 
nutritional value, performance, 
dimensions, or other characteristics. 
It includes, where applicable, test 
methods, and specifications 
concerning testing, packaging, 
marking or labelling to the extent 
that they affect products rather than 
processes.  It excludes standards 
which are prepared for use by a 
single enterprise, whether 
governmental, semi-governmental 
or non-governmental, either for its 
own production or purchasing 
purposes. 
Technical specification 
A specification contained in a 
document which lays down 
characteristics of a product such as 
levels of quality, performance, safety 
or dimensions. It may include, or deal 
exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
testing and test methods, packaging, 
marking or labeling requirements as 
they apply to a product.  
 
Explanatory note: 
The Code deals only with technical 
specifications relating to products. 
Thus the wording of the corresponding 
ECE/ISO definition is amended in 






A specification contained in a 
document which lays down 
characteristics of a product such as 
levels of quality, performance, 
safety or dimensions. It may 
include, or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, testing and 
test methods, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirements as they apply 
to a product. 
 
Explanatory note: 
This Agreement deals only with 
technical specifications relating to 




                                           
230 COM.IND/W/108, p. 4-28.   
231 MTN/NTM/W/94, pp. 31-33.  




The term “standard” as used in this 
code has a wider meaning than in 
customary usage. 
for Standardization definition is 
amended in order to exclude 
services and codes of practice. 
Mandatory Standards 
This is a standard with which it is 
obligatory to comply by virtue of an 
action by an authority endowed with 
the necessary legal power.  The 




The term “mandatory standard” is 
used to embrace what would 
normally be described as technical 
regulation. 
Technical regulation 
A technical specification, including the 
applicable administrative provisions, 
with which compliance is mandatory.  
 
Explanatory note: 
The wording differs from the 
corresponding ECE/ISO definition 
because the latter is based on the 
definition of regulation which is not 
defined in this code. Furthermore the 
ECE/ISO definition contains a 
normative element which is included 
in the operative provisions of the 
Code.  
 
Technical regulation  
(identical ) 
Technical regulation  
 
A technical specification, including 
the applicable administrative 








for Standardization definition 
because the latter is based on the 
definition of regulation which is not 
defined in this Agreement. 
Furthermore the Economic 
Commission for 
Europe/International Organization 
for Standardization definition 
contains a normative element which 
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is included in the operative 
provisions of this Agreement. For 
the purposes of this Agreement, this 
definition covers also a standard of 
which the application has been made 
mandatory not by separate 
regulation but by virtue of a general 
law.  
Voluntary Standards 
This is a standard with which there 
is no legal obligation to comply. 
Standard 
A technical specification approved by 
a recognized standardizing body for 
repeated or continuous application, 




The corresponding ECE/ISO definition 
contains several normative elements 
which are not included in the above 
definition. Accordingly, technical 
specifications which are not based on 











The corresponding ECE/ISO definition 
contains several normative elements 
which are not included in the above 
definition. Accordingly, technical 
specifications which are not based on 
consensus are covered by the Code. 
This definition does not cover 
technical specifications prepared by an 
individual company for its own 
production or consumption 
Standard 
A technical specification approved 
by a recognized standardizing body 
for repeated or continuous 
application, with which compliance 
is not mandatory. 
 
Explanatory note: 
The corresponding Economic 
Commission for 
Europe/International Organization 
for Standardization definition 
contains several normative elements 
which are not included in the above 
definition. Accordingly, technical 
specifications which are not based 
on consensus are covered by this 





cover technical specifications 
prepared by an individual company 
for its own production or 
consumption requirements. The 
word "body" covers also a national 
standardizing system. 
Central government body 
This term means the central 
government, its ministries and 
departments or any body subject to 
the control of the central 
government in respect of the activity 
in question. In the case of the 
European Economic Community the 
provisions governing central 
government bodies [would] apply. 
Central government body 
Central government, its ministries and 
departments or any body subject to the 
control of the central government in 
respect of the activity in question. In 
the case of the European Economic 
Community the provisions governing 




If the EEC were to sign the Code, the 
word “would” and the square brackets 
would disappear.  
 
Central government body 
 (identical ) 
 
Central government body 
Central government, its ministries 
and departments or any body subject 
to the control of the central 




In the case of the European 
Economic Community the 
provisions governing central 
government bodies apply. However, 
regional bodies or certification 
systems may be established within 
the European Economic 
Community, and in such cases 
would be subject to the provisions 
of this Agreement on regional 
bodies or certification systems. 
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Local government body 
This term means a government body 
which is not subject to the control of 
the central government in respect of 
the activity in question, such as  
(i) the authorities of States, 
Provinces, Lander, Cantons, etc. in 
the case of a federal or decentralized 
system, and  
(ii) local government authorities. 
Local government body 
Government body which is not subject 
to the control of the central 
government in respect of the activity in 
question, such as: 
(i) the authorities of States, Provinces, 
Lander, Cantons, etc. in the case of a 
federal or decentralized system, and  
(ii) local government authorities.  
 
Local government body 
 (identical ) 
 
Local government body 
A government other than a central 
government (e.g. states, provinces, 
Länder, cantons, municipalities, 
etc.), its ministries or departments or 
any body subject to the control of 
such a government in respect of the 
activity in question. 
Regulatory body 
 
This term means any central or local 
government body or any other body 
which has legal power to enforce a 
mandatory standard. This may or 
may not be the same body which 
prepared or adopted the standard. 
Regulatory body 
 
A governmental or non-governmental 
body which has legal power to enforce 
a technical regulation. This may or 
may not be the same body which 






 (identical ) 
 
(No corresponding definition) 
(No corresponding definition) (No corresponding definition) (No corresponding definition) 
Non-governmental body 
 
A body other than a central 
government body or a local 
government body, including a non-
governmental body which has legal 
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power to enforce a technical 
regulation. 
 
Voluntary standards body 
This term means any non-
governmental organization which 
prepares voluntary standards for 
public use. Some of these are 
national standards bodies as defined 
below. 
Standardizing body 
A governmental or non-governmental 
body, one of whose recognized 
activities is in the field of 
standardization.  
Standardizing body 
 (identical ) 
 
Standardizing body 
A governmental or non-
governmental body, one of whose 
recognized activities is in the field 
of standardization. 
National standards body 
This term means a nationally 
recognized standards body which is, 
or is eligible to become, a member 
of non-governmental international 
standards bodies.” 




4.3.5.3 Development of disciplines in major draft Standards Codes  
 
During the Tokyo Round negotiations, there had been few changes in disciplines applied to 
technical regulations and standards of the 1973 Proposed Draft Code until 1977.   After the 
harmonization process with respect to terminologies and definitions of the Draft with those 
corresponding terms in the ECE/ISO definitions, the sub-group began to discuss disciplines 
and their rules.  There were several major revisions and transformation of the regulatory 
structure to be noted.   
 
Deletion of Article 4(d) of the 1973 Draft Code in the January 1977 Draft Code 
 
  The 1977 January Draft Code deleted Article 4(d), which had made connection between 
mandatory standards and voluntary standards, requiring that when voluntary standards were to 
be adopted as mandatory standards, there should be some relevance between them.233  Thus, 
the Draft no longer explicitly provided requirement for such situation as where mandatory 
standards be based on relevant and suitable voluntary standards.  
 
Revisions to Article 3 of the 1973 Draft Code in the November 1977 Draft Code 
 
In the 1973 Draft Code, Article 3 provides that adherents should put best effort in ensuring 
that local government bodies and regulatory bodies other than central government bodies 
comply with the provisions of Article 2 with an exception to the obligation of the GATT 
notification.  In other words, the identical obligations except for the GATT notification 
obligation were applied to all kinds of mandatory standards or technical regulations in the 
revised drafts, regardless of their relevant bodies, - central, local, or non-government bodies.  
However, the November 1977 Draft Code began to contain more exceptions to the rules and 
procedures for technical regulations of central government bodies.  With respect to local and 
non-government bodies, instead of confirming provision which simply affirm the application 
of most of the Article 2 provisions with just one exceptions, Article 3 in the November 1977 
                                           
233 See MTN/NTM/W/71.  
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Draft Code now elaborated exceptions and replaced relevant provisions. It replaced Article 2 
transparency rules and procedures with a similar but separate set of rules in sub-paragraphs of 
Article 3(b) and the subsequent exceptions to it in Article 3(c) with a view to deal with urgent 
problems.234  
 
Insertion of ‘unnecessary obstacles to international trade’ and a list of reasons for 
exceptions where the relevant  international standards are inappropriate 
 
  First, there was general understanding that the second sentence of the existing Article 2(a) 
of the 1973 Draft should be and replaced and two proposals were considered regarding the 
issue. 235  Article 2 provided rules for “Preparation, adoption and use of technical regulations 
by central government bodies” and paragraph (a) provided that “Adherents shall ensure that 
technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles to 
international trade. They shall likewise ensure that neither technical regulations themselves 
nor their application have the effect of creating an unjustifiable obstacles to international 
trade”(emphasis added).  Switzerland proposed to replace the second sentence by “[t]hey 
shall likewise ensure that neither mandatory standards themselves not their application have 
the effect of creating obstacles to international trade which are disproportionate to the 
legitimate objectives of the regulations concerned”.  In the meantime, Canada suggested a 
replacement by the sentence “[t]hey shall likewise ensure that neither mandatory standards 
themselves nor their application have the effect of creating obstacles to international trade 
which are unnecessary for the achievement of the objectives of the mandatory standards 
concerned.”  However, none of the suggestions requiring ‘unjustifiable obstacles’, 
‘obstacles… disproportionate to the legitimate objectives of the regulations concerned’ or 
‘obstacles…unnecessary for the achievement of the objectives of…’ was eventually adopted 
without modification.  Instead, a combination of all three phrases was finally adopted in the 
corresponding provision of the Tokyo Round Standards Code, which provides “[t]hey shall 
likewise ensure neither technical regulations nor standards themselves nor their application 
                                           
234 MTN/NTM/W/119, pp. 8-9.  
235 MTN/NTM/W/37, p. 3.  
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have the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.236  
  Second, with respect to Article 2(b), the US proposed to insert a list of reasons for 
exceptions where international standards are considered to be inappropriate.  Specifically, 
the US proposed to add, “for such reasons as: (i) National security or the prevention of 
deceptive practices; (ii) Differing levels of protection for human health or safety, animal or 
plant life or health, or the environment; (iii) significant climatic or other regional factors; (iv) 
fundamental technological incompatibility between the international standard and the needs of 
the adherents concerned.” 237  Subsequently, these legitimate reasons for deviation from 
international standard seem to have been adopted.  In comparison, the corresponding passage 
of Article 2.2 in the Tokyo Round Standards Code reads, “…except where, as duly explained 
upon request, such international standards or relevant parts are inappropriate for the Parties 
concerned, for inter alia such reasons as national security requirements; the prevention of 
deceptive  practices; protection for human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or 
the environment; fundamental climatic or other geographical factors; fundamental 
technological problems.” 
 
4.3.5.4 Development of regulatory scopes and disciplines: An analysis of the 1978 
Draft Standards Code 
 
During the negotiation prior to the outcome in the Draft of October 1978, provisions of 
Article 2 dealt with preparation, adoption and use of mandatory standards (or technical 
regulations) by central government bodies; provisions of Article 3 with preparation, adoption 
and use of mandatory standards (or technical regulations) by local or non-governmental 
bodies; and Article 4 with that of voluntary standards (or standards).  However, the October 
1978 Draft finally incorporated a significantly different regulatory structure the previous 
structures.  As shown in <BOX 6>, the corresponding provisions Article A.1, A.2 and A.3 in 
the October 1978 to the respective Articles 2, 3, and 4 in the previous Drafts now provided 
                                           
236 Tokyo Round Standards Code, Article 2.1, third sentence.  
237 MTN/NTM/W/37, p. 3.  
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rules and obligations for technical regulations and standards by central government bodies, 
technical regulations and standards by local government bodies and regulatory bodies other 




Furthermore, the majority of provisions provided the same rules for technical regulations 
and standards and, where there were certain exceptions for either technical regulations or 
standards, they were so mentioned. Thus, in terms of disciplines, technical regulations and 
standards were now treated without major difference.  Only minor differences existed from 




  Concerning the majority of rules and procedures, the same provisions were applied to both 
technical regulations and standards.239  First, non-discrimination obligations and least-trade-
restrictiveness include prevention of technical regulations and standards which are prepared, 
adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles to international trade, guarantee of no 
                                           
238 See the 1978 Draft Standards Code in MTN/NTM/W/192.  
239 See MTN/NTM/W/192.  




II. Operative provisions 
  A. Technical Regulations and Standards 
    1. Preparation, adoption and use of technical regulations and standards by central  
      government bodies 
    2. Preparation, adoption and use of technical regulations and standards by local  
      government bodies and regulatory bodies other than central government bodies 




less favourable treatment between imports and like products of national origin or between 
products originating in other countries, and prohibition of technical regulations or standards 
which create by themselves or in effect unnecessary obstacles to international trade.240  
Second, with respect to both technical regulations and standards, adherents are obliged to use 
international standards as their basis except where such international standards are 
inappropriate and required to play a full part in the preparation of international standardizing 
bodies.241  Third, both technical regulations and standards are required to be specified in 
terms of performance rather than design.242  Fourth, whenever a relevant international 
standard does not exist or the technical content of a proposed technical regulation or standard 
is not substantially the same as the technical content of relevant international standards, and if 
the technical regulation or standard restricts trade, technical regulations and standards are to 
fulfill a series of transparency procedures. For instance, both of them are to be published as a 
notice in a publication at an early appropriate stage and particulars or copies of the proposed 
technical regulation or standard are to be provided upon request. 243  In addition, adherents 
are required to allow reasonable time for other adherents or interested parties respectively to 
make comments in writing and take them into account, and may omit such of the steps where 
urgent problems of safety, health, environmental protection or national security arise or 
threaten to arise.244  All technical regulations and standards are required to be published, but 
with exceptions to urgent circumstances.245 Adherents are obliged to use all reasonable 
means within their power to ensure that regional standardizing bodies comply with the 
obligations in general and fulfill the obligations even if they are members of regional 
standardizing bodies.246  
  When the entities which prepare, adopt and apply technical regulations or standards are 
central government bodies, the rules and procedures described above are applied identically 
with a couple of exceptions as explained in the immediately following section.  If those 
entities are local government bodies or regulatory bodies as defined in the Annex to the 
                                           
240 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.1(a), p. 3.   
241 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.1(b) and (c), pp. 3-4. 
242 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.1(d), p. 4. 
243 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.1(e)(i) and (iii), p. 4-5.  
244 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.1(e)(iv) through (viii), p. 5-6. 
245 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.1(f) and (g), p. 6. 
246 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.1(h) and (j), p. 7. 
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October 1978 Draft, several exceptions are provided and the level of obligation is degraded 
under the phrase ‘…use all reasonable means within their power to ensure…’ rather than the 
highest possible level of obligation under the word ‘ensure’.  These exceptions include such 
obligations as participation in international standardization process, GATT notifications, 
compliance of and compliance by members of regional standardization.247  In additions, 
local government and regulatory bodies are obliged to provide copies and receive comments 
through adherents.248 However, there is basically no distinctive difference in disciplines 
between technical regulations and standards.  
 
Different disciplines 
Among the transparency procedures, only technical regulations are required to be 
notified to the GATT secretariat. In specific, adherents are required to notify other adherents 
through the GATT secretariat. 249  However, a phrase ‘and standard’ appears in bracket 
following the word ‘technical regulation’, indicating that there has been a proposal to extend 
the obligation to notify to the GATT secretariat to standards as well.  This proposal which 
has never been officially adopted by any of the subsequent Drafts and final Standards Code.  
In addition, the Draft stipulates a provision for preparation, adoption and application of 
standards by non-government body, which generally assures application of the same rules and 
procedures except for GATT notification and obligation of compliance of and compliance by 
members of regional standardizing bodies.250  
 
The regulatory scope of the October 1978 Draft Code 
Consequently, distinction between technical regulations and standards based on their 
definitions became almost meaningless from the perspective of the regulatory operation of the 
TBT Code.  Instead, the disciplines were distinctive in terms of different levels of 
obligations and distinction between the standardizing bodies, whether central, local or non-
government bodies became more important.  Unlike in the final GATT Standards Code, the 
                                           
247 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.2, p. 7. 
248 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.2, p. 7. 
249 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.1(e)(ii), p. 5.  
250 MTN/NTM/W/192, 1978 Draft Code, Article II.A.3, p. 8. 
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1978 Draft Code still maintained the view that technical regulation was prepared, adopted and 
used by central government bodies, local government bodies and regulatory bodies with legal 
enforcement power whereas standards could be made and operated by any recognized body.  
Based on the analyses above, the conceptual scope of the October 1978 Draft Code’s 
regulatory framework is drawn as in <Figure 9>.  
 
Figure 9. Regulatory scope of the October 1978 Draft Standards Code 
 




Preparation, adoption and use of technical 
regulations and standards by central 
government bodies 
Local government bodies 
Article 3 
Preparation, adoption and use of technical 
regulations and standards by local government 









and use of standards 
by non-government 
bodies 






4.4 “Standards” in the Standards Code 
 
4.4.1 Terminology and definitions 
 
One of the major changes to the terminologies and definitions is the removal of the concept 
“regulatory body” from the definitions in the Annex and in the provisions of the Standards 
Code.  The relevant articles are structured, as shown in <Box 7>, in a way that technical 
regulations and standards are treated by the same article; relevant articles are distinguished by 
different standardization bodies, central, local or non-governmental bodies.  The term 
“regulatory body” is no longer used in the main body of the Code.  In addition, the definition 
of “regulatory body” in the Annex is excluded.  Instead, the non-government body is, then, 
defined as a body “other than a central government body or a local government body, 




As a result, it is inferred from the overall regulatory structure that the Standards Code now 
incorporates, in principle, technical regulations prepared, adopted and applied by non-
Box 7. Tokyo Round - Provisions for “standards” in the Standards Code 
 
…… 
II. Operative provisions 
  A. Technical Regulations and Standards 
    1. Preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations and standards by     
      central government bodies 
    2. Preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations and standards by  
      local government bodies 
    3. Preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations and standards by  




government bodies, which include regulatory body with legal power to enforce certain 
technical specifications.  This means that the scope of technical regulation is no longer 
restricted to the category in which technical regulation is prepared, adopted, and applied by 
governmental or regulatory body with legal power; the scope now is widened to incorporate 
technical regulation by virtually any body.  This change may reflect some socio-economic 
changes during the negotiation period that non-government bodies were playing more and 
more important role in preparing, adopting and applying certain technical regulations.  
Another noteworthy revision was made to the definition of technical regulation.  In the 
explanatory note, it was added in the last sentence that “[f]or the purposes of this Agreement, 
this definition covers also a standard of which the application has been made mandatory not 
by separate regulation buy by virtue of a general law”.  Therefore, the legal basis of the 
mandatory character was expanded to actually incorporate a quite wide scope of laws, 
regulations and provisions.  This conceptual change may also reflect the changing trend that 
the concept “technical regulation” was evolving and less confined to the concept “regulation”.  
 




A specification contained in a document which lays down 
characteristics of a product such as levels of quality, performance, 
safety or dimensions. It may include, or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirements as they apply to a product. 
 
Explanatory note: 
This Agreement deals only with technical specifications relating to 
products. Thus the wording of the corresponding Economic 
Commission for Europe/International Organization for Standardization 
definition is amended in order to exclude services and codes of 
practice. 
2. Technical regulation A technical specification, including the applicable administrative 
provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. 
 
Explanatory note: 
The wording differs from the corresponding Economic Commission 
for Europe/International Organization for Standardization definition 
because the latter is based on the definition of regulation which is not 
defined in this Agreement. Furthermore the Economic Commission for 
Europe/International Organization for Standardization definition 
contains a normative element which is included in the operative 
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provisions of this Agreement. For the purposes of this Agreement, this 
definition covers also a standard of which the application has been 
made mandatory not by separate regulation but by virtue of a general 
law. 
3. Standard A technical specification approved by a recognized standardizing body 




The corresponding Economic Commission for Europe/International 
Organization for Standardization definition contains several normative 
elements which are not included in the above definition. Accordingly, 
technical specifications which are not based on consensus are covered 
by this Agreement. This definition does not cover technical 
specifications prepared by an individual company for its own 
production or consumption requirements. The word "body" covers also 
a national standardizing system. 
6. Central government 
body 
Central government, its ministries and departments or any body 
subject to the control of the central government in respect of the 
activity in question. 
 
Explanatory note: 
In the case of the European Economic Community the provisions 
governing central government bodies apply. However, regional bodies 
or certification systems may be established within the European 
Economic Community, and in such cases would be subject to the 
provisions of this Agreement on regional bodies or certification 
systems. 
7. Local government 
body 
A government other than a central government (e.g. states, provinces, 
Länder, cantons, municipalities, etc.), its ministries or departments or 
any body subject to the control of such a government in respect of the 
activity in question. 
8. Non-governmental 
body 
A body other than a central government body or a local government 
body, including a non-governmental body which has legal power to 
enforce a technical regulation. 
 
 
4.4.2 Regulatory structure of the Standards Code 
 
The expansion of the scope of “technical regulation” implies that some technical 
specifications which had previously belonged to the category of “standard” are now moved to 
the category of “technical regulation”.  One example subject to such a shift would be those 
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technical specifications which are prepared, adopted, and applied by some non-government 
bodies such as industrial associations which do not have legal power to enforce but are 
definitely in charge of establishing and applying them.  
 
Figure 10. Regulatory scope of the Tokyo Round Standards Code 
 




Preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations 




Preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations 





Preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations 





Last point to note is related to the scope of standard.  The insertion of the phrase 
“approved by a recognized standardizing body for repeated or continuous application” in the 
final text is based on the harmonization process with the ECE/ISO definitions.  These 
elements are important to make distinction between standards for public purposes and those 
for individual or private purposes, the latter of which is explicitly excluded from the scope of 
“standards” for the GATT draft’s purpose.  Another aspect of the “standards” scope is 
inferred from the changed regulatory structure.  The regulatory structure now covers 
standards of all three levels, central, local and non-governmental levels, technical 
specifications which were previously left in the grey area are not subject to either Article 2 or 
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3.  For example, standards prepared, adopted, and applied by central government bodies are 
now clearly subject to Article 2 and standards by local government bodies are to Article 3.  It 
became certain that even if certain technical specifications were enacted and applied by 
government authorities, as long as the compliance with them were not mandatory, they were 
considered as “standards” and subject to specific provisions in the Code.  
 
4.4.3 Disciplines for “standards” and “technical regulations” 
 
4.4.3.1 Common disciplines for technical regulations and standards by central 
government bodies 
 
  Article 2 of the GATT Standards Code provides almost the identical sets of rules for 
technical regulations and standards prepared, adopted and applied by the central government 
bodies. The principles of least-trade restrictive means, non-discrimination and international 
harmonization are applied without any modification or exception to technical regulations- and 
standards-related activities of the central government bodies.  
  Article 2.1 provides that the central government should neither prepare, adopt or apply 
technical regulations and standards with a view to creating obstacles to international trade, nor 
treat them based on any discriminatory treatments.  Not only technical regulations and 
standards themselves but their application should not have the effect of creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade.  
  Article 2.2 requires international harmonization for both technical regulations and 
standards prepared, adopted, or applied by the central government.  It requires technical 
regulations or standards to be based on relevant international standards, except where such 
international standards are inappropriate for such reasons as national security requirements, 
prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment, fundamental climatic or other geographical factors and 
fundamental technological problems.  
  Article 2.3 further encourages harmonizing technical regulations or standards on as wide a 
basis as possible, providing that Parties play a full part within their limits of their resources in 
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preparation by appropriated international standardizing bodies of international standards.  
  Article 2.4 prefers performance-based technical regulations and standards rather than 
design or descriptive characteristics. Article 2.7 requires Parties to promptly publish adoption 
of all technical regulations and standards in such a manner to enable interested parties to 
become acquainted with them. Article 2.10 makes sure that the obligations in Article 2 are 
generally abided by when Parties are adopting a regional standard as a technical regulation or 
standard.  
  Article 2.5 provides procedural rules and obligations for notification and comment-and-
reply mechanism regulating the preparation and adoption of technical regulations and 
standards by the central government bodies.  It generally considers two situations in which 
Parties must notify and be in charge of other Parties’ response.  One of them is a situation 
where a relevant international standards does not exist and the other is a situation where a 
central government body’s proposed technical regulation or standard is not substantially the 
same as the technical content of relevant international standards.  In any of such cases, 
Parties have to make a public notice at an early appropriate stage of the introduction of a 
particular technical regulation or standard (Article 2.5.1), and have to provide, upon request, 
without discrimination particulars or copies of the proposed technical regulation or standard 
and, whenever possible, identify the parts which in substance deviate from relevant 
international standards (Article 2.5.3).  Also, Parties have to allow, without discrimination, 
reasonable time for the other parties or interested parties in the other parties, respectively for a 
proposed technical regulation and a proposed standard, to make comments, discuss and take 
the written comments and the results of discussions into account (Article 2.5.4 and Article 
2.5.5, respectively for technical regulation and standards).   
  The procedural steps for notification and comment-and-reply may be omitted when there 
are urgent problems of safety, health, environmental protection or national security arising or 
threatening to arise. However, after adoption of a technical regulation or standard for urgent 
problems, Parties should provide, upon request, other parties and interested parties in other 
parties with copies of them, respectively (Article 2.6.2).  Also, even after the adoption of a 
technical regulation or standard for urgent problems, Parties should allow other Parties and 
interested parties in other parties to present comments, discuss them and take them into 
account (Article 2.6.3). 
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  Article 3 and Article 4 provides central government bodies’ responsibility to ensure 
compliance by local and non-government bodies with Article 2 and prevents them from 
influencing local or non-government bodies to be inconsistent with Article 2.  Thus, Article 
3 in respect of local government bodies and Article 4 in respect of non-government bodies 
provides that Parties, who are perhaps mostly likely to be represented in central government 
bodies, shall not take measure which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or 
encouraging such local government bodies or non-government bodies, respectively, to act in a 
manner inconsistent with any provisions of Article 2.  
 
4.4.3.2 Different disciplines for technical regulations and standards by central 
government bodies  
 
  Thus, most of the provisions in Article stipulate the identical procedural and substantive 
rules and obligations for technical regulations and standards.  It is noted, however, that 
central government bodies are free from the obligation to notify to the GATT of its 
standardization and application of standards.  Such obligation to notify to the GATT is 
applied with respect to technical regulations.  In specific, Parties are obliged to notify to 
other Parties through the GATT secretariat of the products to be covered by technical 
regulations together with a brief indication of the objective and rational of proposed technical 
regulations (Article 2.5.2).  Parties should also allow a reasonable interval between the 
publication of a technical regulation and its entry into force in order to allow time for 
producers in exporting countries, and particularly in developing countries, to adapt their 
products or methods of production to the requirements of the importing country (Article 2.8).  
When a technical regulation is to be adopted for urgent problems, Parties should notify 
immediately after the adoption other Parties through the GATT secretariat of it (Article 2.6.1). 
 
4.4.3.3 Obligations for standard-related activities by local government bodies: 
GATT Standards Code Article 3 
   
  Article 3 of the GATT Standards Code provides rules and obligations for preparation, 
adoption and application of technical regulations and standards by local government bodies.  
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The provision sets out requirements in a so-called ‘best effort (or best endeavor)’ language, 
with a specific phrase ‘shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to 
ensure’.  When compared with the expression ‘shall ensure’ used in Article 2 for central 
government bodies’ technical regulations and standards, the obligations represented in the 
‘best effort’ term in Article 2 for local government bodies’ technical regulations and standards 
may be considered to be somewhat degraded.  Therefore, it is likely that local government 
bodies may justify themselves more easily for non-compliance with the rules and obligations 
of Article 2 through the application of the ‘best effort’ phrase.  Compared with central 
government bodies, who must abide by all rules and obligations of Article 2, local 
government bodies can endeavor as far as possible to comply with them. 
  Also, some exceptions are specified for local government bodies.  Unlike central 
government bodies, local government bodies are exempted from playing a full part in the 
preparation by international standardizing bodies of international standards for products for 
which they either have adopted or expect to adopt technical regulations or standards in 
accordance with Article 2.3.  In addition, local government bodies are not required to make 
regional standardizing bodies of which they are members comply with provisions of Article 2 
in general as stipulated in Article 2.9 and 2.10.  These requirements to participate in 
international standardization process and to ensure regional standards to be consistent with the 
Article are applied only to central government bodies, not to local government bodies.  
  The obligation for local government to provide information is applied only with respect to 
preparation, adoption and application of their technical regulations, not to their activities 
relevant to standards.  In specific, local government bodies are obliged, upon request, to 
provide without discrimination, to other Parties particulars or copies of the proposed technical 
regulation and, whenever possible, identify the parts which in substance deviate from relevant 
international standards (Article 2.5.3).  When urgent problems of safety, health, 
environmental protection or national security arise or threaten to arise, local government 
bodies may omit such of steps enumerated in Article 2.5, but they, upon adoption of a 
technical regulation, have to provide, without discrimination other Parties with copies of such 
technical regulations (Article 2.6.2).  
  In addition, local government bodies are responsible for comment and discussion through 
the Parties or understandingly through their central government bodies.  Therefore, in regard 
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to technical regulations, local government bodies shall allow through their central government 
bodies, without discrimination, reasonable time for other parties to make comments in writing, 
discuss these comments upon request, and take these written comments and the results of 
these discussions into account (Article 2.5.4).  When urgent problems of safety, health, 
environmental protection or national security arise or threaten to arise, local government 
bodies may omit such steps provided in Article 2.5, but they with the help of central 
government bodies, upon adoption of technical regulation, have to allow, without 
discrimination, other Parties to present their comments in writing upon request, discuss these 
comments with other Parties and take the written comments and the results of any such 
discussion into account (Article 2.6.3).  
 
4.4.3.4 Obligations for standard-related activities by non-government bodies: 
GATT Standards Code Article 4 
 
  Article 4 provides rules and obligations for preparation, adoption and application of 
technical regulations and standards by non-governmental bodies.  It basically makes sure 
that Parties ensure non-governmental bodies within their territories to comply with provisions 
of Article 2.  Similarly with the way of assuring local government bodies’ compliance or 
namely, ‘best effort’ practice, Parties are obliged to ‘take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them’ to bring non-government bodies’ activities relating to technical regulations 
and standards into conformity with Article 2.  
  Unlike the exceptions for local government bodies, non-government bodies are required to 
take a full party in preparation of international standardizations with respect to their technical 
regulations or standards and thus article 2.3 applies.  Also, non-government bodies’ best 
effort to ensure activities of regionals standardizing bodies in conformity with Article 2 is 
required and, thus, provisions of Article 2.9 and Article 2.10 apply.  
Non-government bodies are exempted from notifying their technical regulations or standards 
to other Parties or interested parties in other Parties, respectively, through the GATT 
secretariat.  In other words, Article 2.5.2 does not apply.   
  However, all other rules for transparency provided in Article 2.5 and 2.6 are applied to 
activities of non-government bodies regarding technical regulations and standards.  Non-
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government bodies are required to provide other Parties or interested parties in other Parties 
with information of their technical regulations or standards, allow, without discrimination, 
reasonable time for comment and discussion when their technical regulations or standards 
deviate from international standards and may have a significant effect on trade of other Parties 
or other interested parties in other Parties.  
 
Table 13. Common and different disciplines for central, local and non-government 
bodies in the Tokyo Round Standards Code 















Use of international standards as a basis; deviation 
allowed when duly explained 
0 0 
Article 2.3 
Participation in international standardization 
X 0 
Article 2.4 
Preference for performance-basis 
0 0 
Article 2.5 
When deviating from international standards and 
having a significant trade obstacle 
  
- 2.5.1 
publish a notice of a proposed technical regulation or 
standard in publication 
0 0 
- 2.5.2 




Provide copies of the proposed technical regulation 
or standard upon request 




Allow reasonable time for comment and discussion 
with respect to technical regulations 
0 (through Parties) 0 (to other Parties 
and to interested 
parties in other 
Parties) 
- 2.5.5 
Allow reasonable time for comment and discussion 
with respect to standards 
0 0 
Article 2.6 
Where urgent problems arise or threaten to arise, 





Notify immediately the GATT secretariat of the 
particular technical regulation 
0 0 
- 2.6.2 
Provide copies of the technical regulations and 
standards upon request 




Allow reasonable time for comment and discussion 
with respect to technical regulations and standards 
0 (through Parties) 0 (to other Parties 
and to interested 
parties in other 
Parties) 
-2.6.4 
Take into account the result of consultation carried 
out by Article 14(dispute settlement) 
0 0 
2.7 




Allow a reasonable interval for producers in 
exporting  countries and particularly developing 
countries, with respect to technical regulations 
0 0 
2.9 
Ensure compliance of regional standardizing bodies 
with Article 2 
X 0 
2.10 
When adopting regional standards, fulfil the 
obligations of Article 2 with respect to technical 





4.5 “Standards” during the Uruguay Round Negotiations 
 
4.5.1 Overview of the Uruguay Round negotiations on “standards” 
   
  The Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations was launched on September 22, 1986, 
with ultimate goals to remove distortions to international trade, to further the objectives of the 
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GATT and to develop a more open, viable and durable multilateral trading system.251  The 
negotiation round had fifteen negotiating groups including many non-tariff measures groups 
such as standards, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, trade-related 
investment measures and some sensitive sector groups such as agricultural products and 
tropical products groups.  
  The Non-Tariff Measures (NTM) Group whose goal was to ‘reduce or eliminate non-tariff 
measures, including quantitative restrictions’ dealt with the issues of technical barriers to 
trade.252  In September 1987, the TBT Committee took note of the Negotiating Plan for 
MTN Agreements and Arrangements and agreed to prepare a list of items that might be 
addressed in discussions on the further improvement, clarification or expansion of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.253  The items suggested by individual parties for 
discussion and examination included items relating to the further improvement of the 
Agreement, items relating to the further clarification of the Agreement, items relating to the 
further expansion of the Agreement.254    
Among the items relating to the further improvement of the Agreement, the most important 
ones included issues for the adoption of Code of Good Practice for non-governmental 
standardizing bodies, voluntary draft standards and their status, information on voluntary 
standards being made mandatory by legislation, establishing a method of ensuring 
compatibility of standards issued by recognized national bodies and other standardization 
bodies within parties, transparency on bilateral standards-related agreements, transparency on 
regional standards activities, languages for exchange of documents.255  Items relating to the 
further clarification of the Agreement included issues on process and production methods, and 
re-examination of the provisions of the Agreement in the light of the recommendations and 
decisions adopted by the Committee.  Items relating to the further expansion of the 
Agreement contained issues concerning testing, inspection and type approval, transparency of 
the operation of certification systems, transparency in the drafting process of standards, 
technical regulations and rules of certification systems, and extension of major obligations  
                                           
251 GATT Doc. No. MIN.DEC (Sept.20, 1986), p.1.  
252 GATT Doc. No. MIN.DEC (Sept.20, 1986), p.5.  
253 TBT/M/25, para. 17.  
254 See MTN.GNG/NG8/W/25.  
255 See MTN.GNG/NG8/W/13.  
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Table 14. A summary of major issues negotiated during the Uruguay Round 
 Issues related to 
technical regulations 
Issues relate to 
standards 
Issues related to central 
government bodies 
- Proposal by Canada to amend Article 2.1 with the insertion of sub-
paragraphs for ‘unnecessary obstacles to trade’256 
Issues related to local 
government bodies 
- Proposal by the EC on extension of major obligations, particularly the 
obligation of notification, under the Agreement to local government 
bodies through amendment of Article 3.1.257  
Issues related to non-
government bodies 
 - Proposal by the EC on the Code 
of Good Practice for non-
governmental standardizing 
bodies.258 




 - Proposal by India on voluntary 
draft standards and their status259 
 - Proposal by India on information 
on voluntary standards being 
made mandatory by legislation260 
 - Proposal by the US on 
transparency on bilateral 
standards-related agreements261 
 - Proposal by the US on 
transparency on regional standards 
activities262 
- Issues raised by the US on process and production methods263  
- Proposal by New Zealand on process and production methods264 
- Proposal by the Nordics (Finland) on re-examination of the provisions 
of the Agreement in the light of the recommendations and decisions 
adopted by the Committee265 
- Proposal by Japan on transparency in the drafting process or standards, 
technical regulations and rules of certification systems266  
- Issue of the Agreement’s coverage on labelling requirements267 
 
                                           
256 Relevant documents are TBT/W/144.  
257 Relevant documents are MTN.GNG/NG8/W/8, TBT/W/113, TBT/W/147.  
258  Relevant documents are MTN.GNG/NG8/W/8, TBT/W/124, TBT/W/137, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/71, 
TBT/W/146, TBT/W/158, TBT/W/168, TBT/W/178, TBT/W/179, TBT/W/187. 




263 Relevant documents are MTN.GNG/NG8/W/1, TBT/W/108/Add1, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/58. 
264  Relevant documents are MTN.GNG/NG8/W/58, TBT/W/15, TBT/W/24, TBT/W/27, TBT/W/33, 
TBT/W/33/Add.1, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/24. 
265 Relevant documents are MTN.GNG/NG8/W/13, TBT/Spec/23, TBT/W/156, TBT/W/159. 
266 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/6.  
267 Relevant documents are TBT/M/40, TBT/Spec/23, TBT/M/42, TBT/W/159, L/7107. 
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under the Agreement to local government bodies.  
These issues may be divided into categories of issues related to technical regulations or 
those related to standards or those to both and also into categories of issues related to central 
government bodies, local government bodies, non-government bodies or both.  <Table 14> 
illustrates relevant issues of each category.   
Among the three categories of issues submitted to the TBT Committee, main discussion 
was concentrated on enhancing the implementation of local government bodies with respect 
to their technical regulations and standards, the operation of the Agreement concerning 
standards activities and clarification of the Agreement’s coverage, regarding the including of 
PPMs, labeling in particular.  In addition, the negotiation also addressed the Agreement’s 
disciplines concerning testing and inspection procedures268 and overall improvement in 
transparency269.  Overall, the Agreement’s regulatory structure went through a significant 
change with the annexation of the Code of Good Practice for standards disciplines to the 
Agreement.  The overview of the negotiation process and major issues discussed during the 
Uruguay Round is summarized and depicted in <Figure 11>.  
As Stewart(1993) describes, there had been little negotiation progress over the issues stated 
above until 1989.270  The early negotiations concentrated on discussion over the testing and 
inspection procedures, improvement in transparency, insertion of the Code of Good Practice 
for Standards preparation and application, clarification of the Agreement’s coverage with 
respect to PPMs and compliance of local government bodies. In the middle of 1990, the MTN 
negotiation group had to prepare a final draft package in order to submit it to the Trade 
Negotiations Committee meetings scheduled at the end of July.  Accordingly, the first draft 
text, namely, the July 1990 Draft, was completed, reflecting all of the proposals and 
suggestions discussed in the previous sessions.271  In September and October 1990, the 
informal group met and revised the July 1990 Draft, reflecting the results of consultation 
                                           
268  Relevant documents are TBT/W/118, TBT/W/119, TBT/W/126, TBT/W/127/Rev1, TBT/W/138, 
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/69.  
269 Relevant documents are TBT/W/120, MTN/GNG/NG8/W/34, MTN/GNG/NG8/W/34/Add.1, 
MTN/GNG/NG8/W/34/Rev.2, MTN/GNG/NG8/W/34/Rev.3, MTN/GNG/NG8/W/35.  
270 Stewart (1993), pp. 1099.  
271  Negotiating Group on MTN, AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE, 
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3, 23 July 1990.  
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during the informal meetings.  This draft, namely the October 1990, had left still unresolved 
major issues like (1) compliance of local government, which needed to be specified and 
intensified; (2) dispute settlement procedures, which needed to be reconsidered in the 
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement; (3) relation with the regime for SPS measures 
based on the outcomes under the Negotiating Group on Agriculture; and (4) insertion of the 




In 1991, as the negotiation formally restarted, the fifteen original negotiating groups were 
reduced to seven, among which the fourth “Rule-Making” group addressed a broad scope of 
issues, including TBT.272  In preparing the so called Dunkel Draft, the group discussed 
several remaining issues including compliance of local government bodies, dispute settlement 
procedures, Code of Good Practice for standards, SPS measures and clarification of 
                                           
272 Stewart (1993), p. 1103.  
Figure 11. Major TBT issues negotiated during the Uruguay Round 
 
Source: Author’s analysis  
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unnecessary obstacles to trade.  During the period between the Brussel’s Draft and Dunkel’s 
Draft, the TBT negotiations were largely carried out in the form of informal consultations, 
which eventually led to a completion of the final draft by the end of 1991.273  The Brussel 
versions and Dunkel versions are almost identical, except for the disciplines on conformity 
assessment procedures by local government and non-government bodies.274 
 In general, the TBT negotiations was progressed rather swiftly and considered to be less 
controversial when compared with other areas of negotiation.  The outcome was also proved 
to be successful.275 
 
 
4.5.2 Major issues related to both “technical regulations” and “standards” 
 
4.5.2.1 An issue of Article 2.1 “unnecessary obstacles to international trade” 
   
Article 2.1 of the Tokyo Round Standards Code provides that technical regulations and 
standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles to 
international trade.  Furthermore, the subsequent provision of the Article stipulates non-
discrimination principle.  The last sentence of the Article requires that neither technical 
regulations nor standards themselves nor their application have the effect of creating 
“unnecessary obstacles to international trade”.  
In practice, the implementation and application of the provision for “unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade” was quite limited since it lacked specific criteria for determining 
whether certain measures are necessary trade obstacles or not.  Nevertheless, there was 
increasingly need for governments as well as non-governmental bodies to adopt not only 
measures for traditional purposes such as protection of human, plant, or animal life or health 
or protection of environment but also measures for relatively new policy concerns as quality 
                                           
273  Trade Negotiations Committee, DRAFT FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 
1991. 
274 Stewart (1993), p. 1104.  
275 Stewart (1993), p. 1105.  
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control, industrial compatibility and information.  Also, some measures were applied 
according to implementation of intergovernmental protocols and conventions and 
international or regional standards.  
 
Box 8. Uruguay Round - Canada’s amendment proposal for Article 2.1  
 
Article 2 
Preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations and standards by central 
government bodies 
 
With respect to their central government bodies: 
 
2.1 Parties shall ensure that technical regulations and standards are not prepared, adopted or 
applied with a view to creating obstacles to international trade.  Furthermore, products imported 
from the territory of any Party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country in relation to 
such technical regulations or standards.  They shall likewise ensure that neither technical 
regulations nor standards themselves nor their application have the effect of creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade.  In so doing, Parties shall, inter alia, ensure that technical 
regulations and standards including changes thereto: (emphasis added) 
 
2.1.1 do not contain requirements that are greater than necessary to meet objectives 
consistent with this Article and the specific circumstances giving rise to their adoption; 
2.1.2 are based on an acceptable degree of risk associated with their objectives by taking into 
account, inter alia, scientific and technical evidence, consumer applications, relevant 
processing technology; 
2.1.3 are not maintained if the circumstances giving rise to their adoption no longer exist or 
if the changed circumstances can be addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner; 
2.1.4 are not applied in such a way as to affect imported products either originating in 
geographic areas where the problem being addressed does not occur or destined for 
industrial or consumer application where the problem does not exist; 
2.1.5 are consistent with provisions of this Article when adopted to secure compliance with 
international agreements or standards; 
2.1.6 are consistent with provisions of this Article if different from international standards for 




Therefore, some Parties found it necessary to incorporate more specific principles and rules 
for applying the provisions.  Particularly, Canada proposed to introduce principles of 
proportional and digressive application to address the problem of limited application. Thus, it 
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proposed to insert several new sub-paragraphs following the provision preventing creation of 
unnecessary obstacles to trade.276  The original content and format of Canada’ amendment 
proposal is reproduced in < Box 8>. 
 
Box 9. Uruguay Round – Amendment proposals for Article 2.1 and 2.2  
 
Article 2 
Preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations by central government bodies 
 
2.1 Parties shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from 
the territory of any Party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other 
country.  
2.2 Parties shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  
For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.  
Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia, national security requirements; the prevention 
of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment.  In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration 
are, inter alia, available scientific and technical information, related processing 




Thus, the provision for preventing “unnecessary obstacles to international trade” and its 
proposed sub-paragraphs were separated from Article 2.1 of the Tokyo Round Standards 
Code and were provided in the early July 1990 Draft by an independent Article, that is, 
Article 2.2.277  The content and format of Article 2.2 in the July 1990 Draft, however, was 
soon revised and shortened.  Article 2.2 of October 1990 Draft contains four relevant 
sentences, instead of provisions and subsequent sub-paragraphs, which require “legitimate 
purposes” for technical regulations, suggest an indicative list of examples of legitimate 
purposes and ask to assess risk with consideration of relevant elements.278  The original 
proposals for Article 2.1 and 2.2 are reproduced and provided in <Box 9>.  
                                           
276 TBT/W/144, pp. 5-6.   
277 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3, p. 5.  
278 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3/Rev.1, pp. 4-5.  
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  These legal elements as well as the format of Article 2.2 first represented in October 1990 
Draft has been maintained throughout the UR negotiation process and was finally adopted 
without any changes by the WTO TBT Agreement.  
 
4.5.2.2 An issue of enhancing the compliance of local government bodies 
 
  Article 3 of the Tokyo Round Standards Code rules for preparation adoption and 
application of technical regulations and standards by local government bodies.  In practice, 
implementation by local government bodies was found to be limited.  Not only the limited 
compliance but non-reciprocal burden of obligation among Parties were main problems.  In 
other words, local governments of some Parties played major and leading roles in domestic 
standardization and thus were considered more important in economic and trade terms than 
those of other Parties.  However, they were not directly addressed by the TBT Agreement 
and often escaped the regime while central government bodies which play equally important 
roles in domestic standardization were directly ruled by the TBT Agreement and that with the 
full force of the obligation.   
On the reasoning, the EEC proposed to enlarge the obligations of Parties so that Parties 
became more responsible for the compliance of local government bodies.  Particularly, the 
EEC proposed to include a procedure by which a draft technical regulation of a local 
government body is notified through the Party to other Parties, whenever its technical content 
deviates from relevant international standards or previously notified national technical 
regulation and the draft technical regulation may have a significant effect on trade of 
Parties.279  Thus, the EEC proposed to replace Article 3 of the Tokyo Round Standards Code 
by a provision with two sub-paragraphs.  In the proposed provision, as shown in <BOX 10>, 
Article 3.1 requires Parties to “ensure” that local government bodies and non-government 
bodies comply with all the provisions of Article 2 without exceptions.  The proposed Article 
only mentions that Parties have to note, at the same time, that notification shall not be 
required for technical regulations if their technical content is substantially the same as that of 
previously notified domestic technical regulation of central government body and that 
                                           
279 See TBT/W/113.  
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contracts with other Parties, including the notification, provision of information, comments 
and discussion shall take place through the Party concerned.  
 
Box 10. Uruguay Round - EEC’s amendment proposal for Article 3  
Article 3 
Preparation, adoption and application of technical regulation by local government bodies 
and non-governmental bodies 
 
3.1 Parties shall ensure that local government bodies and non-government bodies within their 
territories comply with the provisions of Article 2, noting that: 
3.1.1 notification shall not be required for technical regulations the technical content of 
which is substantially the same as that of previously notified technical regulations of 
central government bodies of the Party concerned; and that  
3.1.2 contracts with other Parties, including the notifications, provision of information, 
comments and discussion referred to in Article 2, paragraph 5 and 6, shall take place 
through the Party concerned.  
 
 
Exactly the same contents and format of the proposed Article 2 by the ECC are represented 
in the July 1990 Draft and October 1990 Draft.280  However, the October 1990 Draft 
considered another alternative as well which seems to have been based on a revival of the 
previous contents and formats found in Article 3 of the Tokyo Round Standards Code. The 
alternative provisions reads as follows: 
 
Box 11. Uruguay Round - An alternative amendment proposal for Article 3  
 
[3.1 Parties shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that local 
government bodies and non-governmental bodies within their territories comply with the 
provisions of Article 2, with the exception of the obligation to notify proposed technical 
regulations. Contracts with other Parties may be required to take place through the Party 
concerned. In addition, Parties shall not take measures which require or encourage such bodies to 




By the time Dunkel Draft was written, local government obligations were added with more 
provisions and Parties are not only required not to take measures which require or encourage 
                                           
280 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3, p. 8. MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3/Rev.1, p. 7. 
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local or non-governmental bodies to act inconsistently with Article 2, but also required to be 
fully responsible for the observance of all provisions.281  Thus, Parties’ responsibility in 
implementing the provision was more tightened through the five paragraphs in the final 
Agreement.  
 
4.5.2.3 An issue of covering process and production methods 
 
  Annex 1.1 of the Tokyo Round Standards Code defines “technical specification” as a 
document which lays down characteristics of a product such as levels of quality, performance, 
safety or dimensions.  It further explains that it may include, or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, packaging, marking or labeling requirements 
as they apply to a product.  Its footnote conforms that the Tokyo Round TBT Agreement 
deals only with technical specifications relating to products while excluding services and 
codes of practice unlike the meaning of the corresponding term in the ISO/IEC definition.  
However, Article 14.25 reads: “The dispute settlement procedures set out above can be 
invoked in cases where a Party considers that obligations under this Agreement are being 
circumvented by the drafting of requirements in terms of processes and production methods 
rather than in terms of characteristics of products.” 
Thus, the definition of “technical specification” explicitly sets the scope of the Agreement 
to be limited to products only whereas the scope of dispute settlement procedures can be 
invoked in cases where there is a circumvention in terms of PPM rather than in terms of 
characteristics of products.  The inconsistency between the two provisions has long confused 
Parties and, despite several years of the Agreement’s operation, there was no clear consensus 
among them on the Agreement’s coverage of PPMs before the Uruguay Round began.  
Accordingly, the US proposed the issue of the Agreement’s coverage on PPMs at meetings 
during the Uruguay Round negotiation and New Zealand made subsequent proposal regarding 
the issue.  The US pointed out that PPMs had been widely used and were being increasingly 
used, particularly in areas of industrial process and agricultural production and accordingly 
proposed that the definition of a technical specification be amended to include process and 
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production method.282  It suggested that the definition of “technical specification” in Annex 
1.1 encompass PPMs and the “Explanatory Note” applicable to technical specifications be 
deleted.  It also proposed to amend some words in Article 14.25 of the Agreement but 
basically suggested to maintain it applicable scope to PPMs-related matters.  
 





Annex 1.1 Technical specification 
A specification contained in a document which lays down characteristics of a 
product such as levels of performance, quality, safety or dimensions. It may 
include, or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements, processes, conditions of growth and 
production methods.  
 
Article 14.25 of the Agreement 
The dispute procedures set out above can be invoked in cases where a Party 
considers that benefits under this Agreement are being nullified or impaired by the 
drafting of requirements in terms of processes and production methods rather than 





Process or Production Method (PPM) : 
One or more planned actions in a series of conditions or operations (e.g. 
mechanical, electrical, chemical, inspection, test) by means of which a material or 
product advances from one stage to its final state. PPMs include conditions of 
growth as well as controlled treatments that subject materials or products to the 
influence of one or more types of energy (e.g. human, animal, mechanical, 
electrical, chemical, thermal) as required to achieve a desired reaction, change, 
result or performance.  
 
PPM Standard (or PPM provision within a product or process standard) : 
Standard or provision that specifies the process or production method to be 
employed in one or more stages in the design, manufacture, delivery, installation, 
treatment, or utilization of equipment, structures or products, or that specifies 
methods or conditions in accordance with which a product is to be grown or raised. 
Testing or certification for conformity with these methods, rather than the 
characteristics of the final product, is required in conjunction with one or more 




                                           
282 See MTN.GNG/NG8/W/1 and MTN.GNG/NG8/W/24.  
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Furthermore, the US tried to insert a definition of “Process or Production Methods (PPMs) 
and “PPM standard (or PPM provision within a product or process standard)” and suggested 
detailed definitions of them respectively.283  In response to the US proposal, New Zealand 
basically stated its support for amending the relevant provisions and expressed its view that 
there was no major legal problems in applying to PPMs the substantive disciplines of the 
Agreement such as principles of transparency, national treatment, use of international 
standards as a basis.284  
 





Article 14.25 of the Agreement 
The dispute procedures set out above can be invoked in cases where a Party 
considers that benefits under this Agreement are being nullified or impaired by the 
drafting of requirements in terms of processes and production methods rather than in 





Annex 1.1 Technical specification 
A specification contained in a document which lays down characteristics of a product 
such as levels of performance, quality, safety or dimensions. It may include, or deal 
exclusively with terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, packaging, marking 
or labelling requirements, processes, conditions of growth, and production methods.  
 
It may also include processes and production methods insofar as they are necessary 
to achieve the requirement characteristics of a product. (insertion proposed) 
 
Process and production method 
Wherever appropriate, Parties shall specify technical regulations and standards in 
terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics, or processes 
and production methods. (insertion proposed) 
 
                                           
283 See TBT/W/108/Add.1.  
284 See MTN.GNG/NG8/W/58. New Zealand noted that there was a need to consider one aspect of the 
regime. One area where specific PPM-related provisions would be required was the determination of 
conformity. Provisions needed to be made for the cooperation of the exporting country in the process of 
determining conformity, since the testing procedures under Article 5.1 cannot, because of the nature of PPMs, 
be applied.  In order to ensure implementation of a PPM-based regulation or standard, means other than 
testing would be required. New Zealand illustrated a possibility of on-site inspection in the exporting country 
as an example.  It also examined a need to establish a principle of equivalency, so as to allow exporting 
parties to meet the regulation or standard by a PPM which may not be exactly the same.  Acceptance of this 
principle, as New Zealand explained, would help remove a potential source of unjustified trade barriers. Thus, 
New Zealand proposed to amend Article 5.2 as well, explanation of which would be out of the scope of this 
study.  
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Nevertheless, New Zealand proposed to clearly include PPMs into the definition of 
technical specification and, thus, suggested to insert an additional sentence after the definition 
of the Tokyo Round Agreement to clearly extend its scope to PPMs.  Also, it proposed to 
insert a broader and simpler overall definition of PPMs than the ones proposed by the US, if it 
were to include any definition; basically, it believed that a definition was not absolutely 
necessary.  Then, it had the view that incorporation of PPM in the coverage of the 
Agreement and its subsequent operation itself would be effective enough to prevent a 
circumvention and PPM related trade barrier and therefore, proposed to delete Article 14.25, 
legal basis to dispute against circumvention through PPM measures where an alternative non-
PPM standard is available.  
Eventually, the definition of technical specification was deleted in the final draft and 
definitions of technical regulations and standards were revised to include PPMs.  Article 
14.25 of the Tokyo Round Standards Code was deleted since the provisions for consultation 
and dispute settlement went through substantial changes at the final stage.  Particularly, 
scope of invocation extended to “any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement”, well 
encompassing matters related to products as well as procedures and production methods.285  
 
4.5.2.4 An issue of considering a labelling as a technical regulation 
 
  Prior to the Committee meeting on 31 May 1991, the US had commented that Mexico had 
not notified some requirements on the labelling of certain textile products.  At the May 
meeting, Mexico responded that the requirement on the labelling bore only commercial 
information, not quality standards, and it was applied to all products regardless of their origin.   
  Mexico reasoned that, since the requirement on the labelling was not relevant to product 
quality, it was not a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1 of the 
agreement.286  Mexico interpreted that the second sentence of Annex 1.1 of the Agreement 
was illustrative of the first, so that a labelling requirement should be notified only if it 
contained product specifications. 
                                           
285 TBT Agreement, Article 14.1.  
286 TBT/M/40, pp. 3-4.  
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  On the contrary, the US argued that there was no notification before the entry into force of 
the regulations without any opportunity to comment provided.287  The US had the view that 
labelling is a technical regulation if its compliance was mandatory, regardless of the 
characteristics of labelling requirements.  
  Finland and the EC agreed with the US.  According to Finland, the drafters of the 
Agreement had intended that the second sentence of Annex 1.1 should be additional to the 
first, not merely illustrative of it.  Therefore, all labelling requirements, as long as they were 
mandatory, were technical regulations and should be notified regardless of what was printed 
on the label.  Finland further noted that the inclusion of “test methods” in the second 
sentence of Annex 1.1 was a strong supporting evidence for its position.  It explained that a 
test method could not include technical specifications which laid down “characteristics of a 
product”, yet it was clear that it was covered by the term “technical specifications”. 
Furthermore, the new draft text of the Agreement which had been negotiated in the Uruguay 
Round included the word “also” at the beginning of the second sentence in Annex 1.1, and 
this pointed again to the conclusion that this sentence was additional to the first.288  Finland 
argued that if labelling requirements were not mandatory, they were covered by the meaning 
of “standards” given in Annex 1.3, and were notifiable upon request to other interested Parties 
under Article 2.5.3 of the Agreement.  The US and the EC consented to Finland’s 
interpretations and arguments.289   
Upon the request by the delegation of Mexico to clarify the coverage of the Agreement 
with respect to “labelling requirements”, the Committee began to examine whether the 
obligation to notify labelling requirements is also applied to labelling requirements that did 
not contain “technical specifications” under Article 2.5 of the Agreements.  The obligation 
of notification is provided in Article 2.5 and the Committee explained that the provision 
addressed “technical regulations or standards” which “may have a significant effect on trade 
of other Parties” and its sub-paragraph 2 requires all such technical regulations to be notified.  
Having reviewed the notification obligation, the Committee, then turned to examine the 
                                           
287 See TBT/Spec/23.  
288 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3, p. 41. The definition of “technical specification” in Annex 1.1 to the 
Tokyo Round Standards Code did not include the word “also”. However, the corresponding definition of 
“standards” in the 1990 July Draft contains the word “also”.  
289 TBT/Spec/23, para 5.  
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definition of technical regulations, which are mandatory technical specifications, and labelling 
requirements are explicitly described as one possible type of technical specification.  
Accordingly, the Committee concluded that as long as it is mandatory for a product to bear a 
label if it is to enter the domestic market, and that the labelling requirement may have a 
significant effect on trade, then the labelling requirement should be notified.  It confirmed 
that this would hold regardless of what is printed on the label. The relevant passage in the 
note by the Secretariat reads,  
 
  “It would therefore appear that as long as it is mandatory for a product 
to bear a label if it is to enter the domestic market, and that the labelling 
requirement may have a significant effect on trade, then the labelling 
requirement should be notified. That conclusion would appear to stand 
regardless of what is printed on the label. In some circumstances it may 
be that technical specifications have to be printed on the label; but even 
if the label contains nothing more than consumer information (e.g. on 
cleaning or washing guidelines), it would seem that it should be notified 
as long as the label is mandatory and it may have a significant effect on 
trade.” 
   
  Subsequently, the Committee agreed to conclude with adoption of the draft decision which 
was reproduced as in the following <Box 14>.  
 
Box 14. Uruguay Round - The Committee decision on the scope of labelling 
 
In conformity with Article 2.5 of the Agreement, Parties are obliged to notify all mandatory 
labelling requirement that are not based substantially on a relevant international standard and that 
may have a significant effect on the trade of other Parties. That obligation is not dependent upon 
the kind of information which provided on the label, whether it is in the nature of a technical 





The draft decision was adopted at the 13th Annual review meeting held on 19 October 
1992. 290   In the draft decision, notification was not require for mandatory labeling 
requirements that did not use relevant international standards as their basis.  
 
4.5.2.5 Discussion on information of voluntary draft standards and voluntary 
standards being made mandatory by legislation  
   
  The Tokyo Round Standards Code treats technical regulations and standards almost equally 
in terms of their obligations.  Therefore, most of provisions sets out the same rules and 
procedures for technical regulations and standards except for notification obligation.  The 
Code provides different provisions in accordance with standardization bodies, that is, central 
government bodies, local government bodies and non-government bodies.  Thus, Article 2, 
Article 3 and Article 4 respectively provides for preparation, adoption and application of 
technical regulations and standards by central government bodies, local government bodies, 
and non-government bodies.  
  Years of the operation of the Standards Code after the Tokyo Round had proved, however, 
that implement of the Code with respect to voluntary standards was not fulfilled and that 
relatively less sufficiently despite their importance as a trade barrier.  Particularly, 
information of draft standards and standards which were to be made mandatory by legislation 
was neither notified nor hard to obtain, constituting significant trade barriers.   
  Accordingly, India proposed to make it a requirement that standards and standards being 
made mandatory by legislation be notified in advance.  India said, “Many parties are not 
notifying voluntary draft standards although these are national standards.  In some cases, 
even though these are not national standards, their wide adoption by the local industry gives 
them a status similar to that of national standards.  Article 2.5.2 requires notification only of 
technical regulations.  Considering that many voluntary standards can hinder trade because 
of their wide adoption, it is essential that voluntary standards covering products of trade 
                                           
290 See L/7107. The background information regarding the Committee’s thirteenth annual review of the 
implementation and operation of the Agreement is found in TBT/34.  
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significance are also notified.”291 
  Within the meaning of definition 3 in Annex 1, standards contain technical specifications 
approved by a recognized standardizing body but with which compliance is not mandatory.  
Although their compliance may not be made mandatory, their wide adoption and use by the 
national industry can constitute as high trade barriers as those created by technical regulations 
whose compliance is mandatory.  
  In addition, it was found to be a common practice that voluntary standards were favorably 
taken into account when mandatory standards were being enacted.  Furthermore, some 
standards were made mandatory by a set of multiple legal basis, which information was not 
easily obtained by foreign producers.  Therefore, the negotiating parties were concerned 
about the powerful trade barrier effect of voluntary standards despite their voluntary 
characteristics.  
  India, for example, raised issues regarding voluntary standards which were made 
mandatory, describing and proposing that “[i]n some cases, voluntary standards are made 
mandatory as they are referred to in legislation.  This information should be also notified to 
other Parties.  In many cases, statutory orders under different pieces of legislation make 
standards mandatory.  This information should be notified as this changes the status of the 
voluntary standards”.292  Thus, India suggested that at least transparent transformation from 
voluntary standards to mandatory standards as well as their information would help reduce 
trade barriers.  
  It is important to note, however, that the Committee described the issue slightly differently 
from India’s proposal.  The Committee first mentions definition of “technical regulation” in 
Annex 1.2.  It further noted that the explanatory note to Annex 1.2 definition states that 
technical regulation also includes a standard of which the application has been made 
“mandatory not by separate regulation but by virtue of a general law”.  Therefore, although 
notification obligation in Article 2.5.2 is applied only to technical regulations, standards 
which are made mandatory by statutory order or legislation are considered technical 
regulations, and the Agreement can apply the provision of Article 2.5.2 to standards which are 
                                           
291  MTN.GNG/NG8/W/25, para. 12.  The original communication from India is documented in 
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/9.  
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being made mandatory.  
 
4.5.3 Issues of inserting a Code of Good Practice for ‘standards’ 
disciplines 
 
The issue of inserting a Code of Good Practice for ‘standards’ disciplines was first 
submitted in late 1985 during the Second Three-Year Review Meeting on the operation and 
implementation of the TBT Agreement.  The idea was first presented and largely drafted by 
the EU but the first proposal went through significant changes and revisions in terms of its 
status and purposes.  In short, initially, the code of Good Practice was proposed to replace 
Article 4 of the GATT Standards Code but this idea was modified to replace the entire 
disciplines for standards and put in an annex to the Agreement.  The relevant documents 
regarding the issues are discussed below and summarized in <Table 15>.  
Table 15. List of Uruguay Round negotiation documents for Code of Good Practice 
Date Document Number Title of the Document 
13/11/
1985 
TBT/23 SECOND THREE-YEAR REVIEW OF THE OPERATION 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
06/02/
1986 
TBT/M/20 MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD ON 31 OCTOBER – 
1 NOVEMBER 1985 – Chairman: Dr. B.N. Singh 
15/09/
1987 




MTN.GNG/NG8/W/25 AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE: 
ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT PROPOSED FOR 
NEGOTIATION – Note by the Secretariat 
07/07/
1988 
TBT/W/110 A CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR NON-
GOVERNMENTAL BODIES IN THE AGREEMENT ON 
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE – Proposal by the 
European Economic Community 
17/07/
1989 
TBT/W/124 CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR NON-
GOVERNMENTAL STANDARDIZING BODIES – 
Proposal by the European Economic Community 
15/02/
1990 
TBT/W/137 CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR THE PREPARATION, 
ADOPTION AND APPLICATION OF STANDARDS – 
Revised Proposal by the European Economic Community 
15/06/ TBT/W/146 FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE CODE OF 
177 
1990 GOOD PRACTICE FOR THE PREPARATION, 
ADOPTION AND APPLICATION OF STANDARDS IN 
THE AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO 
TRADE – Communication from the ISO Central Secretariat 
03/07/
1992 
TBT/W/158 GATT SECRETARIAT PARTICIPATION IN AN AD HOC 
ISO/IEC MEETING ON THE ISO/IEC CODE OF GOOD 
PRACTICE FOR STANDARDIZATION, GENEVA, 22 
MAY 1992 – Note by the Secretariat 
 
 
4.5.3.1 An initial proposal by the EC for the Code of Good Practice for Non-
Governmental Standardizing Bodies 
 
  At the second three-year review of the operation and implementation of the Agreement 
after the conclusion of the Tokyo Round Standards Code, the Code’s parties have presented 
their views to improve the regime.  During the Tokyo Round negotiations, there had been 
significant concerns about unbalancing legal effect of the Standards Code between countries 
with centralized standardization system and those with federalized or fragmented 
standardization system.  The experience in the early several years of the Agreement’s 
operation proved that those concerns were real and significant.  Especially, the EEC believed 
that there was an urgent need to address the issue which lacks reciprocity.  
The EC noted that Parties in which the central government had only limited responsibilities 
in standards activities, the implementation of the Agreement’s obligation was found to be less 
burdensome than in Parties with highly centralized standards system.  Moreover, the EC 
emphasized that the activity of private standards organizations was becoming increasingly 
important, as many governments were changing their policies to prefer market-led 
standardization to government-led standardization. 
On this background, the EEC submitted two suggestions to improve operation of the 
Agreement, including implementation by local and private standardization bodies in particular.  
Those two ideas were “(1) the possible extension to local government bodies of all major 
obligations under the Agreement; and (2) the establishment of a “code of good practice” for 
non-governmental standardizing bodies”.293  The latter idea is represented in <Figure 12>.  
                                           
293 TBT/23, p. 1. 
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Figure 12. Initial proposal for Code of Good Practice replacing Article 4 
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Source: Author’s analysis  
 
 
With the suggestion, the EEC explained that the purpose of establishing a code of good 
practice was “to make the obligations already laid down in Article 4, 6 and 8 of the 
Agreement more concrete, and to provide some yardstick by which the performance of both 
Parties and private bodies could be measured.”294 Article 4 provides for preparation, adoption 
and application of technical regulations and standards by non-government bodies; Article 6 
for determination by local government bodies and non-governmental bodies of conformity 
with technical regulations or standards; Article 8 for certification systems operated by local 
government and non-governmental bodies.  Then, its idea was to take a “best effort” 
                                           
294 TBT/23, p. 2.  
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approach when obliging those private bodies to voluntarily accept and abide by the code of 
good practice.  Thus, it presented its idea, stating, ‘[p]arties could be obliged to take all 
reasonable measures to persuade private bodies to adhere to a voluntary code of good 
practice”.  
At this stage, the EEC had only a general idea about the format and contents of the code of 
good practice.  It suggested that the Committee might draft the code by including already 
existing obligations like transparency, non-discrimination but “in a more detailed or practical 
form”.295  As part of obligation, the EEC considered it useful to extend the obligation of 
GATT notification to draft standard in drafting a code of good practice.  In addition, it 
provided an idea that Parties should also notify to the GATT the names of the private 
standardization bodies which committed to accept the code of good practice.  
The EC’s idea of inserting a code of good practice for non-government bodies was 
proposed during the Uruguay Round negotiation.296  The Committee confirms the EC’s idea 
and need of such a code by saying that the aim of the proposed code was “to ensure that [non-
governmental standardizing] bodies comply with the basic obligations of the Agreement 
while taking into account the fact that only central governments have accepted obligations 
under the Agreement”.  The stated goal contains two factors: the first message is that the 
primary objective of having a code of good practice was to ensure implementation of non-
government standardizing bodies; and second is that the reach of the obligation was only 
limited to central governments.  To deal with the latter limitation, the Committee considered 
a “best effort” approach as well as Parties’ full responsibility for implement under the dispute 
settlement procedures.  The Committee, thus, describes,  
“Parties are therefore required to “take such reasonable measures as may be available to 
them to ensure” that [non-governmental] bodies comply with the relevant provisions of the 
Agreement. Article 14.24 enables a Party to invoke the dispute settlement procedures in cases 
where it considers that its trade interests are significantly affected by another Party’s failure to 
achieve satisfactory results under Article 4, 6 and 8.”297   In addition, the Committee 
described the EC’s proposal to require non-government bodies to notify their proposed 
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296 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/25, pp. 3-4.  
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technical regulations and rules of certification.  It confirmed that Parties were not required 
for non-government bodies’ such notification under the exemptions in Article 4.1 and 8.1 but 
that non-government bodies were obliged for other transparency procedures such as provision 
of a copy and information, comments and discussion under the respective Article as well as 
general obligation for information under Article 10.1 and 10.2.298  
After making an initial proposal for the Uruguay Round negotiation, the EC provided 
further studies on a possibility of and need for inserting a code of good practice as an annex to 
the Agreement.  According to a subsequent proposal made by the EEC, there were generally 
three reasons for why a code of good practice was desirable.299  First, it emphasized equally 
significant trade barrier effects from standards by non-governmental bodies to those caused 
by standards by government bodies.  It noted that when standards and technical regulations 
established by non-government bodies are used on a nation-wide basis, they can, in practice, 
create no less serious trade barriers.300  Second, it pointed out a world-wide shift towards a 
greater use of standards and technical regulations drawn up by non-governmental bodies and 
a lesser use of standards and technical regulations drawn up by central government bodies. 301  
Last, it noted lack of successful functioning of the Agreement in terms of transparency in 
activities by non-government bodies.  The EEC explained such lack of success based on 
three probable factors: (i) insufficient incentives both for non-government bodies and Parties 
to achieve full implementation; (ii) insufficiently strict or elaborate substantive requirements; 
and (iii) not very practical, operation or even relevant for non-governmental bodies since the 
substantive obligations are primarily those of Parties, and then applied to non-governmental 
bodies.302  
Overall, the EC pinpointed that the most fundamental problem of the rules in the 
Agreement lied in the indirect compliance mechanism based on the language that Parties were 
obliged to “take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure” non-
government bodies’ implementation.  It explained that the ‘best effort’ or ‘second level’ 
operation was a main cause for the ineffective operation: 
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“As a result, the “best effort” obligations of the Agreement have by and large 
remained a dead letter.  This has worked to the disadvantage of Parties 
where central government bodies have an important role in standardization, 
testing and certification and to the advantage of Parties where other factors 
play an important role. It has also limited the relevance of the Agreement in 
preventing or eliminating technical barriers to trade. By covering other bodies 
than central government bodies, the Agreement implicitly recognizes that 
those other bodies can, and in practice sometimes do, create problems for 
imported products.”303 
   
  Specifically, the EC described that bodies other than central government bodies were not 
aware of the extent that they were already covered by the Agreement, and, even if they knew 
that they were covered, they had difficulty figuring out precise operational rules.  It further 
noted that obligation of central government was not always applicable to or relevant for other 
standardizing bodies.304  
  Accordingly, the EC strongly proposed to establish a code of good practice in the 
Agreement.  It firmly believed that the approach would be “the most realistic and logical 
way of dealing with important “best effort” level obligations”.305  It explained that the 
advantage of a code was that it would “directly address[ ] the actors concerned and stipulate a 
number of clear, practical and relevant principles of good practice for them to follow”.306 
The EC proposed that the scope of a code of good practice be extensive enough to cover 
not only standards but also technical regulations, pre-standards, conformity procedures and 
certification systems, and those of non-governmental bodies both at national, local, or 
regional levels, not to mention private level.307   
Also, it proposed to revise Article 4 by replacing it with provisions as shown in <Box 11>.  
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Box 15. Uruguay Round - EC’s initially proposal to replace Article 4 by a code 
Article 4 
Preparation, adoption and application of standards by non-governmental bodies 
 
4.1 Parties shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that non-
governmental standardizing bodies within their territory as well as non-governmental regional 
standardizing bodies of which one or more of their non-governmental standardizing bodies are 
member, accept and comply with the code of good practice for non-governmental standardizing 
bodies in annex 4 to this Agreement. In addition, Parties shall not take measures which have the 
effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging non-governmental standardizing bodies to 
act in a manner inconsistent with the code of good practice in annex 4.  
 
4.2 As soon as possible after a non-governmental standardizing body within their territory or a 
non-governmental regional standardizing body of which one or more of their non-governmental 
standardizing bodies are member, has accepted or withdrawn from the code of good practice in 
annex 4, Parties shall notify other Parties through the GATT secretariat of this fact, except to the 
extent that the non-governmental regional standardizing body has fulfilled this obligation. The 
notification shall include the name and address of the body concerned and the products covered by 
its current and expected standardization activities.  
 
* New or revised phrases are underlined by author.  
 
 
 The proposed provisions required Parties to put “best effort” in ensuring acceptance and 
compliance by non-governmental standardizing bodies and non-governmental regional 
standardizing bodies of the code of good practice annexed to the Agreement.308 The rest of 
the provisions are basically identical with the corresponding provisions in the Tokyo Round 
Standards Code. 
Then, the EC also suggested a draft code.  The EC proposed to make acceptance of the 
code voluntary.  Even though the code was operated on a voluntary basis, the EC had the 
view that the code would be “self-reinforcing, by denying certain benefits to non-parties” and 
“self-policying, by granting other parties the right to comment and lodge complaints”.309  
Thus, an idea of inserting a code of good practice which was intended to exclusively deal 
with standards and technical regulations by non-governmental bodies was proposed so that 
implementation by non-governmental bodies could be better guided and fulfilled.  At this 
early stage, the primary purpose of establishing a separate voluntary code was to identify 
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which non-governmental bodies were subject to the operation of the TBT regime and 
therefore, the Parties were asked to notify those non-governmental standardization bodies 
which would voluntarily accept the code.  Also, the code was intended to provide non-
governmental standardization bodies with concrete and more practical obligations to follow 
so that they could more easily understand the rules under the TBT regime. 
  The EC proposal was discussed at meetings of the TBT Committee in September and 
November 1989.  Many Parties agreed to the proposal.  In particular, the Parties were 
supportive of the ideas of directly addressing non-government standardizing bodies with a 
more clear rules through a voluntary code of good practice.  In addition, they responded 
positively toward the suggestions of introducing a regular monitoring system on a 
governmental level in the Committee, establishing transparency in the activities of non-
governmental standardizing bodies through multiple instruments like provision of information 
upon request, use of open standardization procedures based on comments and responses, the 
use of the ISONET network, requirements of using international standards as a basis and 
active participation in international standardization and stimulation of coordination between 
standardizing bodies within the national territory. 310 
 
4.5.3.2 A revised proposal for the Code of Good Practice for Standards 
 
During the negotiations in September and November 1989, the Parties commented on 
several aspects of the EC’s draft code of good practice, upon which the EC subsequently 
provided a revised proposal of the code.311  One of the major revision proposals was made to 
the coverage of the proposed code, which resulted in some reshuffles of the regulatory 
structure of the TBT Agreement as well as an expansion of the scope of the Code.  Other 
proposals were related to improve the transparency of the work programmes of standardizing 
bodies, to insert general provisions for definitions, membership, and notification procedures 
in the code, and to include development concerns as legitimate reasons for deviating from 
international standards.312  
                                           
310 See TBT/W/137.  
311 TBT/W/137, p. 8-10.  
312 TBT/W/137, p. 2-3. 
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The most important revision was made as regards to the scope of the Code.  There were 
comments to change the scope of the code from addressing standards activities of non-
governmental standardization bodies to dealing with standards by all standardizing bodies, 
whether governmental or non-governmental, local, national or regional.  Accordingly, the 
EC not only revised the title and contents of the draft code but provided proposed revisions to 
relevant provisions of the Tokyo Round TBT Agreement.  Among the proposals, the scopes 
of Article 2 and 3, in particular, were subject to amendments.  For instance, all references to 
standards were removed from Article 2 and 3 of the Agreement and thus, provisions of Article 
2 and 3 were left to exclusively deal with technical regulations by central government bodies 
and technical regulations by local and non-government bodies, respectively.313   
In the meantime, Article 4 was made to incorporate a larger scope than the previously 
proposed one, with the exclusion of technical regulations by non-governmental bodies but 
with the inclusion of all standards by central and local government bodies.  As the scope of 
Article 4 was extended to standards of central and local government bodies, substantive 
requirements such as non-discrimination and prohibition of unnecessary obstacle were newly 
added and they were applied exclusively to standards prepared, adopted and applied by 
central governmental standardizing bodies.  Also, compliance of the code of good practice 
was required with respect to central government standardizing bodies while compliance of it 
was required on the ‘second best’ level with respect to local and non-governmental 
standardizing bodies.  These substantive changes in Article 4 of the revised proposal are 
represented in < Box 16>.  
In sum, the proposed code of good practice was no longer a mere improvement of 
disciplines to replace Article 4 governing non-governmental standardizing bodies; rather, it 
was now designed to be a whole new set of rules and procedures addressing all voluntary 





                                           
313 TBT/W/137, p. 4-6.  
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Box 16. Uruguay Round - EC’s revised proposal for amending Article 4 and the 
relevant parts in the February 1990 Draft 
 
Article 4 
Preparation, adoption and application of standards 
 
4.1 With respect to their central government bodies Parties shall ensure that standards are not 
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles to international trade. Furthermore, 
products imported from the territory of any Party to the GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national 
origin and to like products originating in any other country in relation to such standards. They shall 
likewise ensure that their standards themselves nor their application have the effect of creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  
 
4.2 Parties shall ensure that their central government standardizing bodies accept and comply with 
the code of good practice for the preparation, adoption and application of standards in annex 4 to 
this Agreement.  They shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that local government or non-governmental standardizing bodies within their territory as well as 
non-governmental regional standardizing bodies of which they or one or more bodies within their 
territory are member, accept and comply with this code of good practice. In addition, Parties shall 
not take measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such 
standardizing bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with the code of good practice in annex 4.  
 
4.3 As soon as possible after a body mentioned in Article 4.2 has accepted or withdrawn from the 
code of good practice in annex 4, Parties shall notify other Parties through the GATT secretariat of 
this fact, except in the case of a regional body, to the extent that the regional body has itself 
fulfilled this obligation. The notification shall include the name and address of the body concerned 
and the products covered by its current and expected standardization activities.  
 
* New or revised phrases are underlined by author.  
 
 
As a result, the distinction of technical regulations and standards under the regime became 
more important than before since such a distinction would determine an applicable set of rules 
and procedures.  In other words, if a technical specification was determined to be a technical 
regulation, then either Article 2 or 3 would apply to it whereas if a technical specification was 
found to be a standard, then Article 4 and, to the extent that the subject standardization body 
had previously accepted the code, the code of good practice would apply.   
Such a restructuring of the Agreement’s regulatory structure, or the division of provisions 
for technical regulations and standards, also led to some subsequent amendments in the 
original text of the code of good practice.  
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First, now that the code was to deal with all standards, a feasibility of implementing it from 
the standpoint of the standardization bodies concerned within the ISO/IEC system was 
considered.  Therefore, the ISO Central Secretariat reviewed the revised version of proposed 
code and concluded that the obligations in the code could be met without significant technical 
obstacles by the ISO/IEC system.  Nevertheless, it had made a few suggestions to harmonize 
the code’s terminologies and phrases with those of the ISO/IEC system.  For example, it 
suggested to change words “the product concerned” for “the subject matter covered” since 
standardization activities of standardizing bodies might be wider than standardization of 
products; it also suggested to change the term “national member body of ISONET” for the 
term “national member of ISONET” which was adopted in the ISONET Constitution; and it 
suggested to change the wording “the relevant product classification” for “the classification 
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number relevant to the subject matter”.314  
 
Box 17. Uruguay Round - EC’s revised proposal for amending Article 4 and the 
relevant parts in the July 1990 Draft  
 
Article 4 
Preparation, adoption and application of standards 
 
With respect to their central government bodies 
 
4.1.1 Parties shall ensure that products imported from the territory of any other Party shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin 
and to like products originating in any other country in relation to such standards. 
 
4.1.2 Parties shall ensure that standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to 
creating obstacles to international trade. Parties shall likewise ensure that neither standards 
themselves nor their application have the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade. In doing so, Parties shall comply with the provisions of Article 2, sub-
paragraphs 1.2.1 to 1.2.6.315  
 
4.2 Parties shall ensure that their central government standardizing bodies accept and comply with 
the code of good practice for the preparation, adoption and application of standards in annex 4 to 
this Agreement.  They shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that local government or non-governmental standardizing bodies within their territory as well as 
regional standardizing bodies of which they or one or more bodies within their territory are 
member, accept and comply with this code of good practice. In addition, Parties shall not take 
measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such 
standardizing bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with the code of good practice in annex 4.  
 
4.3 As soon as possible after a body mentioned in Article 4.2 has accepted or withdrawn from the 
code of good practice in annex 4, Parties shall notify other Parties through the GATT secretariat of 
this fact, except in the case of a regional body, to the extent that the regional body has itself 
fulfilled this obligation. The notification shall include the name and address of the body concerned 
and the products covered by its current and expected standardization activities.  
 
 
* New or revised phrases are underlined by author.  
 
 
With respect to the cost of implementing the code of good practice, the ISO Central 
                                           
314 TBT/W/146, pp. 1-2.  
315 These numbers are probably mistakenly put.  The referred numbers of sub-paragraphs of Article 2 would 
be more appropriate if they were from “2.2.1 to 2.2.6”, rather than “1.2.1 to 1.2.6”.  The relevant sub-
paragraphs provide elaborated obligations for “unnecessary obstacles to international trade”.   
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Secretariat suggested that there should be a more thorough study since the costs for adjusting 
and publishing their work programmes by standardizing bodies which had accepted the Code 
would depend on their respective structures and volume of work and, therefore, the costs have 
to be assessed by individual standardizing bodies themselves.316  
Following intensive discussions and responding to the ISO’s feasibility review of the 
proposed code of good practice, the GATT drafters submitted a revised version of the code in 
July 1990.317  In that version of the code, some terminologies and concepts were changed as 
the ISO had suggested and more detailed obligations were added for contents of 
notification.318  In addition, “all interested parties in other Parties” were allowed to make 
comments in writing, which standardizing bodies shall discuss and take them and results of 
the discussion into account.319  Furthermore, it was proposed to give companies of Parties 
the same right of participation in regional bodies or system as any other companies 
participating in those bodies or system.  The exact paragraph reads, “[c]ompanies established 
or incorporated in the territories of Parties shall be accorded the right of participation in 
regional bodies or systems in the same manner as it is accorded to any other companies 
participating in those bodies or systems”.320 
 
Second, the original provisions of Article 4 in the Tokyo Round TBT Agreement went 
through several amendments as its scope had been expanded to all standards, whether 
governmental or non-governmental.  In the text of July 1990 Draft TBT Agreement, Article 
4 contains three provisions.  Provisions of the paragraph 1 are applied only with respect to 
central government bodies; they generally provide for non-discrimination principles and 
prohibition of unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  However, unlike the previous 
February 1990 Draft, non-discrimination principles and prohibition of unnecessary obstacles 
were respectively put in separate sub-paragraphs, sub-paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2.  Furthermore, 
the sub-paragraph 1.2 makes references to the corresponding provision of Article 2, providing 
more elaborated obligations in implementing least-trade-restrictiveness principle.  Paragraph 
                                           
316 TBT/W/146, p. 4.  
317 See MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3 and MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3/Corr.1.   
318 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3/Corr.1, pp. 48-51.  
319 TBT/W/146, p. 50.  
320 TBT/W/146, p. 51.  
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2 of Article 4 rules for mandatory compliance by central government standardizing bodies of 
the code of good practice in annex 4 and “best effort” level of compliance by local and non-
government standardizing bodies, which were unchanged from the previous version.  
 
4.5.3.3 The final version of the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, 
Adoption and Application of Standards 
 
The July 1990 Draft was an outcome of very hard work over the past several years and 
successfully had been based on a large agreement among the negotiating Parties.  To the 
Group’s surprise and disappointment, the US submitted at the July meeting of the Negotiating 
Group 8 in 1990, only six weeks before the finalization deadline, a draft proposal which 
contained several aspects entirely different from the July 1990 Draft and the “philosophy” 
that went against spirit of the previous negotiations.321   
In specific, the US had made proposal generally to strengthen second-level obligations 
with regard to regional and national standardizing bodies alike.  In other words, it proposed 
basically to abolish any obligation with respect to national bodies, whether the government or 
their bodies themselves; at the same time, it suggested to impose a binding obligation on 
government to ensure that private, non-governmental regional bodies “comply with a whole 
set of new and very far-reaching obligations” with respect to regional bodies.322  
The negotiating Group considered the US proposal as “a major backward and against the 
spirit, if not the letter, of Punta del Este” and foresaw even worsening imbalance between the 
Parties, reporting,  
“This created a fundamental and unacceptable imbalance in rights and 
obligations, in the sense that there would be no obligation whatsoever for 
the more than six hundred standardizing bodies in the United Standards on 
the one hand, and extremely stringent first-level obligations for the 
European regional bodies on the other hand. This would, at the same time, 
                                           
321 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/84, p. 1. The original text of the proposal made by the US is not available.  
322 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/84, p. 2.  
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represent a fundamental legal inconsistency, in the sense that a 
government would have no obligations toward a given national body for 
its national activities, but first-level obligations toward exactly the same 
body as a member of a regional organization.”323 
 
  However, the US was determined in pushing forward its proposal.  It firmly stated that the 
US had long opposed the EEC’s proposal for inserting a code of good practice, and its 
opposition basically stemmed from expected inability to implement the code and such 
inability was resulted from the domestic standardization system in which the US could not 
prescribe acceptance by private standardizing bodies.324   In conclusion, the US urged 
continued constructive dialogue in informal consultations and strongly expressed its 
unwillingness to approve the current draft.325  
The conflict between the EC and the US with respect to the proposed insertion of the code 
of good practice was eventually resolved through subsequent informal meetings.  After 
continued discussions in series of informal meetings, - meetings on 18-20 September, 8-10 
October, and 17-18 October - the Negotiating Group finally reached agreement on most of the 
issues on the table.  The remaining issued included obligations of Articles 3 and 7 with 
respect to the activities of local government bodies, Article 14 on dispute settlement 
procedures, the relation of the TBT Agreement to the forthcoming SPS Agreement and the 
final provisions of Article 15.326  
 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary and Partial Conclusion  
 
This chapter concentrated on the conceptual development of ‘standard’ during the past 
                                           
323 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/84, p. 2, second paragraph.  
324 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/84, p. 2, fifth paragraph.  
325 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/84, p. 3, first paragraph.  
326 MTN.GNG/NG8/W/83/Add.3/Rev.1, p. 1.  
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negotiation history of the GATT/WTO.  It first reviewed the very early discussions over the 
concept and the coverage of ‘standard’ during the drafting period of the Standards Code right 
after the Kennedy Round.  Then, it moved on to examine the rigorous conceptualization 
process during the Tokyo Round, including discussion over applicability of the Agreement to 
various subject matters like SPS measures, health and sanitary regulations, labeling, 
packaging and marks of origin.  It traced how the overall coverage of “standard” (the entire 
subject matter) was finally determined, and how the concept of ‘standard’ (one of the subject 
matters) was developed and harmonized with the ISO/ECE normative definitions.  Then, the 
chapter analyzed the concept of ‘standard’ – its definition, regulatory scope and disciplines in 
major draft Standards Codes.  Finally, it reviewed the negotiation for inserting the Code of 
Good Practice annexed to the TBT Agreement during the Uruguay Round.   
The analysis of this chapter primarily shows that the concept of “standards” went through 
substantial changes over the past several decades of negotiation and revision.  In particular, 
the concept of “standard” has long developed in line with the concept of “technical 
regulations” and the former’s relation with the latter experienced significant alterations until 
the WTO TBT Agreement was adopted.  
One of the major findings of this chapter’s analysis shows that the requirement of voluntary 
compliance which strictly depended on legal criteria, such as existence of legal basis and 
evidence of legal enactment and legal enforcement in the past drafts, has evolved to be 
defined in more general term and become ambiguous on this legal criteria in the current TBT 
Agreement.  In addition, the concept of ‘standard’ which could be largely confirmed by its 
non-governmental standards body in previous drafts has now been changed in such a way that 
it can be adopted or applied by both governmental and non-governmental standards bodies 
and, thus, the factor of standards body has no longer a critical implication for its concept.  
Moreover, the analysis finds that the treatment of ‘standard’ was almost equivalent to that of 
‘technical regulation’ in the earlier drafts and the final version of the GATT Standards Code; 
but revisions during the Uruguay Round have led to a result in which the current TBT 
Agreement establishes relatively indirect and less strict disciplines for ‘standards’.   
The ambiguous distinction between ‘standards’ and ‘technical regulations’, in itself, creates 
a serious loophole in the operation of the TBT Agreement.  Unlike the GATT Standards 
Code which treated “standards” almost equivalently as “technical regulations” except for a 
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few transparency obligations, the current TBT regime’s treatment of ‘standards’ is more 
apparently different from its treatment of ‘technical regulations’.  This legal consequence 
makes the loophole even more serious.    
These findings altogether imply that the multilateral trading system’s treatment of ‘standard’ 
has become more general and less direct, which potentially causes increasing uncertainty in 
the interpretation of the definition and less effectiveness in pressuring the Agreement’s 
implementation.  The potential ineffectiveness of the Agreement may be a legal and 
regulatory problem but generally provided definition of ‘standard’ probably allows more 
flexible application of the concept ‘standard’.  
 In sum, the concept of “standard” has developed to incorporate a wider scope.  At the 
same time, the distinction between ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’ has evolved to be 
more ambiguous.  Now that the disciplines for “standards” became relatively lax and indirect 
compared to the disciplines for ‘technical regulations’, it may be possible to lean on the 
flexibility in the concept of ‘standard’ and ambiguity in the distinction between ‘standard’ and 
‘technical regulation’, and interpret the legal criterion of “voluntary/mandatory” compliance 
in a way to enlarge scope of ‘technical regulation’ in order to expand the practically effective 





Table 16. Comparison of different versions of Code of Good Practice  
Obligations Original Code of Good Practice (TBT/W/124, 
27/07/1989) 




-- D. In respect of standards, the standardizing body shall accord 
treatment to products originating in the territory of any other 
Party to the GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
no less favourable than that accorded to like products of 





-- E. The standardizing body shall ensure that standards are not 
prepared, adopted or applied with a view, to or with the effect 
of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  
Use of 
international 
standards as a 
basis 
A. Where standards are required and international 
standards exist or their completion is imminent, non-
governmental standardizing bodies shall use them, or 
the relevant parts of them, as a basis for the standards 
they develop, except where such international 
standards ore relevant parts are inappropriate for inter 
alia such reasons as the prevention of deceptive 
practices; protection for human health or safety, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment; 
fundamental climatic or other geographical factors; 
fundamental technological problems.  
F. Where international standards exist or their completion is 
imminent, the standardizing body shall use them, or the 
relevant parts of them as a basis for the standards it develops, 
except where such international standards or relevant parts 
would be ineffective or inappropriate for instance, because of 
an insufficient level of protection or fundamental climatic or 




B. with a view to harmonizing standards on as wide a 
basis as possible, non-governmental standardizing 
bodies shall, in an appropriate way, play a full part 
within the limits of their resources in the preparation 
by appropriate international standardizing bodies of 
international standards for products for which they 
either have adopted, or expect to adopt, standards. 
For non-governmental standardizing bodies on a 
national or local level, participation in a particular 
G. With a view to harmonizing standards on as wide a basis as 
possible, the standardizing body shall, in an appropriate way, 
play a full part within the limits of its resources in the 
preparation by relevant international standardizing bodies of 
international standards regarding subject matter for which it 
either has adopted, or expects to adopt, standards. For 
standardizing bodies within the territory of a Party, 
participation in a particular international standardization 
activity shall, whenever possible, take place through one 
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international standardization activity shall, whenever 
possible, take place through one delegation 
representing all non-governmental standardizing 
bodies in the national territory that have adopted, or 
expect to adopt, standards for the products to which 
the international standardization activity relates.  
delegation representing all standardizing bodies in the territory 
that have adopted, or expect to adopt, standards for the subject 




C. Non-governmental standardizing bodies shall 
make every effort towards the establishment of, and 
their association with a member body of ISONET on 
the national territory or the regional level and 
towards the acquisition by this member body of the 
most advanced membership type possible. 
K. The national member of ISO/IEC shall make every effort to 
become a member of ISONET or to appoint another body to 
become a member as well as to acquire the most advanced 
membership type possible for the ISONET member. Other 
standardizing bodies shall make every effort to associate 





on a national 
consensus 
D. Non-governmental standardizing bodies on a local 
or national level shall make every effort to avoid 
duplication of or overlap with the work of other non-
governmental standardizing bodies on the national 
territory or with the work of non-governmental 
regional standardizing bodies which covers the 
national territory. They shall also make every effort to 
achieve a national consensus on the standards they 
develop and on the comments they make under 
paragraph I. 
H. The standardizing body within the territory of a Party shall 
make every effort to avoid duplication of, or overlap with, the 
work of other standardizing bodies in the national territory or 
with the work of relevant international or regional 
standardizing bodies. They shall also make every effort to 
achieve a national consensus on the standards they develop. 
Likewise the regional standardizing body shall make every 
effort to avoid duplication of, or overlap with, the work of 
relevant international standardizing bodies.  
Performance 
rather than design 
E. Wherever appropriate, non-governmental 
standardizing bodies shall specify standards in terms 
of performance rather than design or descriptive 
characteristics. 
I. Wherever appropriate, the standardizing bodies shall specify 
standards based on product requirements in terms of 
performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics. 
 F. Each year, non-governmental standardizing bodies 
shall publish a work programme. After six months, 
this work programme shall be updated. Both the 
annual work programme and the update shall be 
published in a national or, as the case may be, 
regional publication of standardization activities. If 
the text of the publication is not in English, French or 
Spanish, an identical version in one of those 
J. At least once every six months, the standardizing body shall 
publish a work programme containing its name and address, 
the standards it is currently preparing and the standards which 
it has adopted in the preceding period. A standard is under 
preparation from the moment a decision has been taken to 
develop a standard until that standard has been adopted. The 
titles of specific draft standards shall, upon request, be 
provided in English, French or Spanish. A notice of the 
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languages shall be added. The publication shall 
include an indication that all interested parties in 
Parties to the GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade may request that a copy of the text of any 
individual draft standard in the annual work 
programme or, as the case may, the update be sent to 
them at the start of the public inquiry for that 
standard. No later than the time of publication of the 
annual work programme or update, nongovernmental 
standardizing bodies on a national or local level shall 
transmit the same information to ISONET via the 
national member body of ISONET. Non-
governmental standardizing bodies on a regional 
level shall transmit this Information to ISONET 
either via an international affiliate of ISONET or via 
one or more national member bodies of ISONET. 
existence of the work programme shall be published in a 
national or, as the case may be, regional publication of 
standardization activities.  
The work programme shall for each standard indicate, in 
accordance with any ISONET rules, the classification relevant 
to the subject matter, the stage attained in the standard’s 
development, and the references of nay international standards 
taken as a basis. No later than at the time of publication of its 
work programme, the standardizing body shall notify the 
existence thereof to the ISO/IEC Information Centre in 
Geneva.  
The notification shall contain the name and address of the 
standardizing bod, the name and issue of the publication in 
which the work programme is published, the period to which 
the work programme applies, its price (if any), and how and 
where it can be obtained. The notification may be sent directly 
to the ISO/IEC Information Centre, or, preferably, through the 
relevant national member or international affiliate of ISONET, 
as appropriate.  
 G. Before adopting a standard, non-governmental 
standardizing bodies shall hold a public inquiry of at 
least 60 days on the draft standard. No later than the 
start of this public inquiry, nongovernmental 
standardizing bodies shall publish a notice 
announcing the period of the public inquiry on the 
draft standard concerned in a national or, as the case 
may be, regional publication of standardization 
activities. If the text of the notice is not in English, 
French or Spanish, an identical version in one of 
those languages shall be added. The notice shall 
include an indication that all Interested parties In 
Parties to the GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade may request that a copy of the draft standard 
be sent to them. No later than the time of publication 
L. Before adopting a standard, the standardizing body shall 
allow a period of at least sixty days for the submission of 
comments on the draft standard by interested parties in a Party 
to the GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. This 
period may, however, be shortened in cases where urgent 
problems of safety, health or environment arise or threaten to 
arise. No later than at the start of the comment period, the 
standardizing body shall publish a notice announcing the 
period for commenting in the publication referred to in 
paragraph J. Such notification shall include, as far as 
practicable, whether the draft standard deviates from relevant 
international standards.  
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of the notice, non-governmental standardizing bodies 
on a national or local level shall transmit the same 
information to ISONET via the national member 
body of ISONET. Non-governmental standardizing 
bodies on a regional level shall transmit this 
information to ISONET either via an international 
affiliate of ISONET or via one or more national 
member bodies of ISONET. 
 H. Any interested party in a Party to the GATT 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is entitled 
to receive the text which it has requested of a draft 
standard submitted to public inquiry. Copies of such 
drafts will be sent by airmail or other speedy means 
of delivery at the start of the public inquiry or, if the 
request has been received after the start but before the 
end of the public inquiry, as promptly as possible. For 
this service a reasonable fee may be charged, which 
shall, apart from the real costs of delivery be the 
same for domestic and foreign parties. 
(The corresponding provisions would be paragraphs M and P) 
 I. Non-governmental standardizing bodies shall take 
comments on their draft standards into account 
whenever those comments have been received during 
the period of public inquiry, and originate from non-
governmental standardizing bodies that have 
accepted this code of good practice. Such comments 
shall be replied to as promptly as possible. Non-
governmental standardizing bodies shall make an 
objective effort to resolve dissenting viewpoints. 
Where such a comment contests a proposed deviation 
from an international standard, it is up to the non-
governmental standardizing body that has prepared 
the draft standard to explain why that deviation is 
necessary for a legitimate objective such as 
mentioned in paragraph A. 
N. The standardizing body shall take into account, in the 
further processing of the standard, the comments received 
during the period for commenting. Comments received 
through standardizing bodies that have accepted this code of 
good practice shall, if so requested, be replied to as promptly 
as possible. The reply shall include an explanation why a 
deviation from relevant international standards is necessary.  
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 J. Once the standard has been adopted, it shall be 
promptly published. 
O. Once the standard has been adopted, it shall be promptly 
published.  
 K. When a request is received from an interested 
party in a Party to the GATT Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade for a copy of a standard which they 
produced, non-governmental standardizing bodies on 
a national or local level shall promptly provide that 
copy. Nongovernmental standardizing bodies on a 
regional level shall promptly provide the requested 
copy or information as to where it can be obtained. A 
reasonable fee may be charged for copies, which 
shall, apart from the real costs of delivery, be the 
same for foreign and domestic parties. 
M. On the request of any interested party in a Party to the 
GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the 
standardizing body shall promptly provide, or arrange to 
provide, a copy of a draft standard which it has submitted for 
comments. Any fees charged for this service shall, apart from 
the real cost of delivery, be the same for domestic and foreign 
parties.  
 
P. On the request of any interested party in a Party to the 
GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the 
standardizing body shall promptly provide, or arrange to 
provide, a copy of its most recent work programme or a 
standard which it produced. Any fees charged for this service 
shall, apart from the real cost of delivery, be the same for 
domestic and foreign parties.  
 L. Non-governmental standardizing bodies shall 
afford sympathetic consideration to and adequate 
opportunity for prompt consultation regarding 
complaints with respect to any of the good practices 
in this code whenever those complaints originate 
from non-governmental standardizing bodies that 
have accepted this code of good practice. They shall 
make an objective effort to resolve such complaints. 
Q. The standardizing body shall afford sympathetic 
consideration to, and adequate opportunity for, consultation 
regarding representations with respect to the operation of this 
code presented by standardizing bodies that have accepted this 
code of good practice. It shall make an objective effort to 
solve any complaints.  
 M. Non-governmental standardizing bodies shall 
notify their central government authorities or, in the 
case of a regional body, those of their members, as 
soon as possible of the fact that they have accepted or 
withdrawn from this code of good practice. The 
notification shall include the name and address of the 
body concerned and the products covered by its 
current and expected standardization activities. Non-
governmental regional standardizing bodies may 
C. Standardizing bodies that have accepted or withdrawn from 
this code shall notify this fact to the ISO/IEC Information 
Center in Geneva. The notification shall include the name and 
address of the body concerned and the scope of its current and 
expected standardization activities. The notification may be 
sent either directly to the ISO/IEC Information Centre, or 
through the national member body of ISO/IEC or, preferably, 
through the relevant national member or international affiliate 
of ISONET, as appropriate.  
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alternatively make this notification to all Parties of 
the GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 














5.1 Chapter Overview 
 
‘Standard’ in the WTO TBT Agreement has a different fate than ‘technical regulation’.  
The former is subject to rather general obligations which are, in principle, conditionally 
applied upon acceptance.  On the contrary, the latter is subject to relatively specific 
obligations which are directly applied without any prior acceptance.  Therefore, the 
distinction between ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’ is significantly critical in 
determining which set of obligations and rules are applied to a subject matter at issue.  
However, the WTO TBT Agreement contains a fundamentally inherent limitation in which 
legal elements applied to distinguishing ‘standard’ from ‘technical regulation’ is too general 
to provide concrete criteria.   
The key legal element for the distinction is the criterion “voluntary/mandatory” compliance 
for ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’ respectively and, unfortunately, it is far from clear to 
grasp and apply in practice. For instance, the terms “voluntary” or “mandatory” can be 
perceived either from legal perspective or from economic perspective or from probably from 
both.  To be specific, a “voluntary/mandatory” character in general can be judged by 
evidence of ex ante legal basis, enactment and/or enforcement or it can be judged by proof of 
ex post results or forces that make the compliance “voluntary” or “mandatory” or it can be 
judged by both factors in a causal link - which means existence of legal basis or some 
government actions as a cause and existence of their effect that forces certain compliance.  
In fact, the vague concept of “voluntary/mandatory” compliance was one of the most 
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critical legal issues in recent US-Tuna II dispute.  Views and arguments sharply divided 
regarding its interpretation.  Therefore, the chapter plans to examine this key concept of 
“voluntary/mandatory” compliance perceived and interpreted in recent TBT disputes with a 
view to clarify the dividing line between ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’.  In addition, it 
also reviews current interpretation and application of the concepts ‘standard’ and ‘technical 
regulation’.  The analysis in this chapter not only examines legal interpretations by panels 
and the AB but also considers valuable views and arguments of the disputants because such 
discussions to clarify and establish the legal concept of “voluntary/mandatory” compliance 
are at a very early stage.  The examination finally categorizes three basic approaches to 
interpret the concept of “voluntary/mandatory” compliance as found in the dispute and 
analyzes each of them.     
 
 
5.2 Determination of a ‘Standard’  
 
5.2.1 A context in which a ‘standard’ is determined in disputes 
 
In disputes, the concept of “standards” has been interpreted and applied in the context of 
examining Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement which requires Members to use relevant 
international standards as a basis for their technical regulations.  The analysis of Article 2.4 
in dispute is generally conducted based on three questions: (i) whether a standard submitted 
by a disputant is a “relevant international standard” or whether a relevant international 
standard exists; (ii) whether the relevant international standard is “used as basis for” the 
technical regulation at dispute; and (iii) whether the relevant international standard is an 
“ineffective or inappropriate means” for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued. 
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Then, the examination under the question whether a standard submitted by a disputant is a 
“relevant international standard” is further decomposed into three parts: (i) whether a 
document submitted by a disputant is a ‘standard’, (ii) whether it is an “international” 
                                           
327 Panel report, EC-Sardines, paras. 7.61-7.139. Panel report, US-Tuna, para.7.625 and paras. 7.627-7.740.  
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standard, and (iii) whether it is “relevant” international standard within the meaning of the 
TBT Agreement.328  In this way, the meaning of ‘standard’ has been considered in disputes 
as a part of the concept “international standard” as used in Article 2.4.   
However, the actual approach to determine a ‘standard’ constituting an “international 
standard” in US-Tuna II was different from that in EC-Sardines.  In the following section, 
the different ways of examination and determination of an “international standard” are 
reviewed and analyzed.  
 
5.2.2 The determination of a ‘standard’ in EC-Sardines 
 
In EC-Sardines, the Panel interpreted that “international standards” are “standards that are 
developed by international bodies”.  Accordingly, it reviewed, first, whether Codex Stan 94, 
which was submitted by the complainant as a “relevant international standard”, fell within the 
scope of the definition of ‘standard’ provided in Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement and, 
second, whether the Codex Alimentarius Commission was an international body within the 
meaning of Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement.329  The Panel’s interpretation of the term 
“international standard” was, thus, based on the definition of ‘standard’ as provided in Annex 
1.2 of the TBT Agreement.  
Then, the Panel referred to the definition of ‘standard’ in Annex 1.2 and noted that the 
meaning of the term ‘standard’ is composed of three major aspects: (i) it must provide “for 
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes 
and production methods”; (ii) compliance with it must not be mandatory; and (iii) it must be 
approved by a “recognized body”.330   
The Panel, after setting out the criteria, did not enter into rigorous examinations on these 
legal elements.  It only saw that there was no disagreement among the disputants and that 
there was no reason for it to disagree with the disputants’ position.331  The parties to the 
dispute basically recognized the Codex Alimentarius Standard as an international “standard” 
                                           
328 Panel report, EC-Sardines, paras. 7.61-7.99. Panel report, US-Tuna, paras. 7.630-7.707.  
329 Panel report, EC-Sardines, para. 7.63.  
330 Panel report, EC-Sardines, paras. 7.64-7.65.  
331 Panel report, EC-Sardines, para. 7.65. 
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because it contains “more than 200 standards” and these standards were developed by the 
Codex Commission, “an internationally recognized standard setting body”, and the Codex 
Standard at issue was “not mandatory”.332 
Therefore, the Panel’s review in EC-Sardines was exclusively based on legal elements 
driven from the definition of ‘standard’ in Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement although it did 
not go through close examinations since there were not disputed issues in the case.   
 
5.2.3 The determination of a ‘standard’ in US-Tuna II 
 
In US-Tuna II, Mexico, the complainant argued that the AIDCP (Agreement on 
International Dolphin Conservation Program) Resolution to Adopt the Modified System for 
Tracking and Verification of Tuna is an international standard because “it provides rules 
expressly dealing with the characterization of tuna as dolphin-safe and non-dolphin safe”, 
which meets the first criterion; its compliance is not mandatory because it provides that 
“[a]pplication for the procedures for the use of the AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certificate 
shall be voluntary for each Party, especially in the event that they may be inconsistent with 
the national laws of a Party”, which fulfills the second; and “the AIDCP Standard was 
prepared and approved by the AIDCP member governments, which constitutes a recognized 
body”, which satisfies the third.333  
However, the US argued that the definition of ‘dolphin-safe’ in the AIDCP tuna tracking 
resolution does not constitute a relevant international standard within the meaning of Article 
2.4 of the TBT Agreement as it is not (i) a standard, (ii) international, or (iii) relevant.  For 
the purpose of this study, the following passages only reviewed its argument regarding the 
question whether the AIDCP definition is a standard.  
First, the US stated that the AIDCP standard “set[ ] out a definition for purpose of an 
intergovernmental agreement”, not “rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related 
processes and production methods”.334 The US argued that the definition did not “itself 
establish any rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or their related processes and 
                                           
332 Panel report, EC-Sardines, paras. 4.26-4.27.  
333 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.633. 
334 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.638.  
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production methods, or aspects such as labeling and that the definition in the AIDCP 
resolution, simply defines a term.335 Second, the US argued that the AIDCP definition of 
“dolphin-safe” in the tuna tracking resolution was not “for common and repeated use” 
because it was drafted “for the specific purpose of defining a term in an international 
agreement” and that the AIDCP does not purport to establish a definition of “dolphin-safe” 
for application outside the context of the AIDCP resolutions.336 Third, it contended that the 
dolphin-safe definition in the AIDCP resolution was not contained in “a document approved 
by a … body” because the resolution was approved by the parties to the AIDCP and “neither 
the AIDCP nor the parties to it constitute[d] a “body” (i.e. a “legal or administrative entity 
that has specific tasks and composition”)”.  Furthermore, even if the AIDCP was a “body”, 
the US argued, it did not have recognized activities in standardization and therefore would not 
constitute a “recognized” body.337  Thus, the US tried to show that the AIDCP standard was 
not a ‘standard’.  
After reviewing the arguments of the disputants, the Panel began its analysis by considering 
the meaning of the term “international standard”.  It noted that the term “international 
standard” is not defined in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement, but it noted that it is defined in 
the ISO/IEC Guide 2.  It stated that, in the absence of a specific definition of a term in 
Annex, it should be understood to have the same meaning as in the ISO/IEC Guide 2.  
Accordingly, the Panel referred to the definition of “international standards” as provided in 
the ISO/IEC Guide 2. 338  The Guide defines “international standard” as a “standard that is 
adopted by an international standardizing/standards organization and made available to the 
public”.  
Based on the definition of “international standard” in the ISO/IEC Guide 2, the Panel 
viewed that an “international standard” is composed of three elements: “(i) a standard; (ii) 
adopted by an international standardizing/standards organization; and (iii) made available to 
the public”.339  
The Panel first considered the meaning of “standard”.  It noted that the term “standard” is 
                                           
335 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.638. 
336 Panel report, US-Tuna, footnote 884.  
337 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.640.  
338 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.663.  
339 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.664.  
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defined both in Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement and in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 and that there 
exist some differences between them, which is also clearly stated in the Explanatory Note to 
Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement.  Then, the Panel viewed that the term “standard” as used 
in the definition of an “international standard” in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 should be read in its 
proper context, which is “as it is defined in the ISO/IEC Guide itself”.340  However, it 
mentioned that the AB, in EC-Sardines, had confirmed that, according to the Chapeau of 
Annex 1, “the terms defined in Annex 1 should apply for the purpose of the TBT Agreement 
if these definitions depart from those in the ISO/IEC Guide 2”341  Accordingly, the Panel 
made reference to the definition of ‘standard” in the ISO/IEC Guide 2, but only to the extent 
that they are not differently provided in the definitions of Annex 1 in the TBT Agreement. 
The Panel restated that the definition of “standard” in the Guide is a “document, established 
by consensus and approved by a recognized body that provides, for common and repeated use, 
rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of 
the optimum degree of order in a given context”.342  From the definition, it drew out two 
specific elements to examine and even additionally considered whether the subject 
international standard AIDCP resolution was based on consensus in spite of its recognition 
that it was not an element required for the purpose of the TBT Agreement.  
In respect of the question whether the AIDCP resolution was “a document that provides 
rules, guidelines or characteristics”, the Panel found that its provisions were related to “the 
capture, unloading, storage, transfer and processing of tuna” and, therefore, it is such 
document for tuna fishing and tuna.343  
Regarding the element of “for common and repeated use”, the Panel agreed with the US 
view that the ordinary meaning of “common” is “shared … of general application” and of 
“repeated” is “frequent” and expressed its view that this component “would not be one that 
was drafted for the specific purpose of defining a term in an international agreement” but 
concerns “the general applicability of the rules, guidelines or characteristics therein provided. 
This in term has a bearing on the frequency of the use of such rules, guidelines or 
                                           
340 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.671.  
341 AB report, EC-Sardines, para. 224.  
342 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.672.  
343 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.673. 
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characteristics.” 344   Also, after examining the certification system under the AIDCP 
resolution, the Panel concluded that the AIDCP is a document which includes symbols, 
packaging, marking or labeling requirements. 345 
Thus, the Panel in US-Tuna II primarily referred to the definition of “international standard” 
in the ISO/ECE Guide and basically examined two criteria which are common in both 
definitions in the Guide and the Annex 1.2 of the Agreement.  In this process, the Panel did 
not separately consider ‘standard’ criteria provided in Annex 1.2 of the Agreement.  
 
5.2.4 A comparison of the two approaches for determining the 
concept ‘standard’ in disputes 
 
The approach taken by the Panel in US-Tuna II was, in principle, significantly different 
from the approach taken by the Panel in EC-Sardines.  First of all, the Panel in US-Tuna II 
interpreted the term ‘standard’ in the context of “international standard” defined in the 
ISO/IEC Guide 2 even though the term ‘standard’ is also defined in Annex of the TBT 
Agreement and the chapeau of the Annex implies that the terms in the TBT Agreement would 
override the corresponding terms in the ISO/ECE Guide 2 only to the extent that both 
definitions depart from each other.    
Second, although the definition of “standard” in the Guide and the definition in Annex 1 of 
the TBT Agreement are largely identical to each other, they differed in some major aspects.  
Unlike the definition of the TBT Agreement, for instance, the definition of “standard” in the 
ISO/IEC Guide 2 additionally requires standards to be based on “consensus”.  The Panel 
seems to have recognized this fact that consensus is not required for “standards” for the 
purpose of the TBT Agreement.  Nevertheless, it proceeded to examine and subsequently 
confirmed that the subject international standard was based on consensus.   
Third, the Panel in US-Tuna II did not examine whether compliance with the subject 
international standard was voluntary, as provided for in the definition of “standards” in Annex 
1.2 of the TBT Agreement.  In its conclusion that the AIDCP resolution constituted a 
                                           
344 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.674 
345 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.675. 
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“standard” for the purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the Panel only summarized 
two reasons as evidence.  Based on its finding that the AIDCP resolutions’ “dolphin-safe 
definition … provide[d], for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
tuna fishing and tuna products…”, the Panel concluded that the AIDCP resolution was a 
‘standard’.346  Based on this preliminary determination, the panel proceeded to review the 
next question of whether the standard constituted an “international standard” within the 
meaning of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.  
  In conclusion, the approach taken by the Panel in EC-Sardines seems to be more 
appropriate because a determination of “international standard” should be based on 
examinations of both the term ‘standard’ and the term ‘international’ and an examination of 
the concept of ‘standard’ should be based on the criteria driven from Annex 1.2 of the TBT 
Agreement, rather than from the definition in ISO/ECE Guide.  
 
5.3 Determination of a ‘Technical Regulation’  
 
5.3.1 The three criteria driven from the definition of ‘technical 
regulation’ 
 
The determination of a certain specification as a ‘technical regulation’, ‘standard’ or 
‘conformity assessment procedure’ leads to a finding on the applicability of the TBT 
Agreement to that specification at issue.  In the disputes where disputants were fighting over 
a violation of provisions applied to ‘technical regulations’, the AB has confirmed that 
characterization of a certain measure as a ‘technical regulation’ is “a threshold issue because 
the outcome of the issue determines whether the TBT Agreement applicable”.347 
In order to determine whether a disputed measures is a ‘technical regulation’ or not, panels 
have commonly considered the definition of ‘technical regulation’ provided in Annex 1.1 of 
                                           
346 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.677.  
347 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 59. AB report, EC-Sardines, para. 175.  
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the TBT Agreement and drew out three criteria from the definition in order to follow in their 
examinations, which the AB subsequently affirmed ad appropriate.  The three criteria for 
this examination are such questions as (i) whether the document is applied to an identifiable 
product or group of products; (ii) whether the document lays down one or more characteristics 
of the product; and (iii) whether compliance with the product characteristics is mandatory.348  
In this way, panels and the AB generally apply the definition and largely take a textual 
approach to determine a ‘technical regulation’ with a view to apply the TBT Agreement.  
Nevertheless, they pointed out that “the proper legal character of the measure at issue cannot 
be determined unless the measure [was] examined as a whole”.349 
 
5.3.2 The criterion “identifiable product or group of products” 
 
In EC-Asbestos, the AB elaborated the element “identifiable product or group of products”.  
It stated that a technical regulation must be applicable to an identifiable product or group of 
products otherwise enforcement of the regulation will be impossible.350  However, this does 
not mean that a measure at issue must expressly identify, name, or specify the product.  The 
AB reasoned that nothing in the text of the TBT Agreement suggested that “those products 
need be named or otherwise expressly identified in a ‘technical regulation’.”351  The AB also 
considered that there could be a ‘technical regulation’ which did not expressly identify 
products by name, but simply made them identifiable, for instance, through the ‘characteristic’ 
that was subject of regulation. 352   
Accordingly, the AB in the EC-Asbestos found that, even though it was true that the 
products to which the EC regulation’s prohibition applied could not be determined from the 
terms of the measure itself, the products covered by the measure were identifiable.  It 
                                           
348 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 67. Panel report, US-Clove cigarette, paras. 7.23-7.41.  
349 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 64. AB report, EC-Sardines, para. 192.  
350 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 70.  
351 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 70. The AB added, “[h]owever, in contrast to what the Panel suggested, 
this does not mean that a “technical regulation” must apply to “given” products which are actually named, 
identified, or specified in the regulation.”  
352 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 70. The AB added, that ‘the identifiable product or group of products need 
not be expressly specified in the document: the identified product coverage of a measure can also be 
determined according to the substance of the measure at issue.  
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observed that “all products must be asbestos free; any products containing asbestos are 
prohibited”.353  
In EC-Sardines, the EC argued that the product covered by the EC regulation was limited 
to preserved sardine philchardus and the measure did not regulate preserved fish made from 
sardinops sagax; and, therefore, sardinop sagax, the product contended by the complainant 
was not an identifiable product under the EC measure.354  However, confirming the panel’s 
rejection to the claim, the AB explained that although the EC Regulation did not expressly 
identify sardinops sagax, this did not necessarily mean that it was not an identifiable 
product.355  It noted that the measure would be applicable to “a range of identifiable products 
beyond sardina philchardus” and since sardinops sagax was prohibited from being identified 
and marketed under an appellation including the term “sardines”, the EC measure was 
enforced against the species, which demonstrated that “preserved sardinops sagax [was] an 
identifiable product for the purpose of the EC Regulation”.356 
In US-Clove Cigarette, the Panel observed that the measure at issue was explicitly 
identifying the products under its coverage, namely, cigarettes and any of their component 
parts.357  Unlike in EC-Asbestos case, the Panel noted that the titles of the US regulations 
and their relevant provisions consistently and expressly identified products they covered.  
In US-COOL, the Panel observed that “[a]t first glance” the COOL statue explicitly defined 
“covered commodity” for country of origin labeling purposes as including “(i) muscle cuts of 
beef … and pork” and “(ii) ground beef … and ground pork”.358  In addition, the Panel went 
further to find out whether the COOL measure still satisfied the criterion if the actual products 
at dispute were livestock – cattle and hogs from which meat was produced.  To the question, 
the Panel quoted the AB’s view in EC-Sardines that the products did not need to be expressly 
identified and that the requirement to identifiable products was related to aspects of 
compliance and enforcement.359  Similarly, the Panel reasoned that, in addition to the fact 
that the COOL measure identified inter alia beef and pork as part of the covered commodities, 
                                           
353 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 72. 
354 Panel report, EC-Sardines, para. 7.45.  
355 AB report, EC-Sardines, para. 183.  
356 AB report, EC-Sardines, para. 184-5.  
357 Panel report, US-Clove cigarettes, para. 7.27.  
358 Panel report, US-COOL, para. 7.202.  
359 Panel report, US-COOL, para. 7.204. AB report, EC-Sardines, paras. 183-186 (original reference).  
209 
the labeling requirement under the COOL measure “[was] also applied to and thus 
enforceable against ‘[a]ny person engaged in the business of supplying a covered commodity 
to a retailer”.360  In conclusion, the Panel found that the COOL measure applied to an 
identifiable product or group of products, namely “(i) beef and pork, either as muscle cuts or 
in ground form; and (ii) livestock (i.e. cattle and hogs), which were] the input products 
necessary to develop the beef and pork products explicitly covered by the COOL measure.”361 
  In US-Tuna II, the Panel found that the US measure was specifically related to two types of 
goods, namely, tuna and tuna products.  It observed that the US measure was regulating 
“‘tuna products’ containing ‘tuna’ that can be labeled as dolphin-safe”. 362   After the 
observation, it concluded that the US dolphin-safe labeling provisions applied to an 
“identifiable” product or group of products, that is, “tuna products” as defined in the 
measure.363  
 
5.3.3 The criterion “lays down product characteristics” 
 
The second criterion that the AB interpreted from the definition of technical regulations in 
EC-Asbestos was that the document “must lay down one or more characteristics of the 
product”.364  The AB interpreted the phrase “lay down” as “set forth, stipulate or provide”.365  
It observed that the ordinary meaning of the word “characteristic” could be inferred from its 
synonyms such as “any objectively definable ‘features’, ‘qualities’, ‘attributes’ or other 
‘distinguishing mark’ of a product”.366  It further noted that “[s]uch ‘characteristics’ might 
relate, inter alia, to a product’s composition, size, shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile 
strength, flammability, conductivity, density, or viscosity”(emphasis in original 
reference)”.367  It also confirmed that the definition of a “technical regulation” in Annex 1.1 
to the TBT Agreement lists examples of “product characteristics”, “terminology, symbols, 
                                           
360 Panel report, US-COOL, para. 7.205.  
361 Panel report, US-COOL, para. 7.207.  
362 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.60. 
363 Panel report, US-Tuna, para. 7.62. 
364 AB report, EC-Asbestos, paras. 66-70.  
365 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 67.  
366 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 67.   
367 AB report, EC-Asbestos, para. 67.  
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packaging, marking or labeling requirements”. 368   Then, the AB explained that these 
examples indicated that “product characteristics” included, “not only features and qualities 
intrinsic to the product itself, but also related “characteristics”, such as the means of 
identification, the presentation and the appearance of a product”.369  
Based on the interpretation, the AB observed the EC measure imposed a prohibition on 
asbestos fibres, as such and this prohibition on these fibres “[did] not, in itself, prescribe or 
impose any “characteristics” on asbestos fire, but simply [banned] them in their natural 
state.”370  However, the AB further noted that the regulation of asbestos could only be 
achieved through the regulation of “products that contain asbestos fibres” and, therefore, “[a]n 
integral and essential aspect of the measure [was] the regulation of “products containing 
asbestos fibres” and thus, “although formulated negatively”, the measure was effectively 
prescribing or imposing certain objective “characteristics” on all products.371  Accordingly, 
the AB, based on “the measure as an integrated whole”, concluded that the measure laid down 
“characteristics” for all products that might contain asbestos.372 
The Panel in EC-Sardines noted the “comprehensive definition of “characteristics” of a 
product provided by the AB in EC-Asbestos, and found that the EC regulation was laying 
down certain product characteristics, “both intrinsic and related, that preserved sardines must 
possess in order for them to be “marketed as preserved sardines and under the trade 
description referred” to a certain provision of the EC Regulation.373  It observed that various 
provisions of the EC Regulation provided product characteristics that affected “composition, 
size, shape, colour and texture of preserved sardines”.374 Also, the Panel considered the 
requirement to use exclusively sardina philchardus was “a product characteristic as it 
objectively define[d] features and qualities of preserved sardines for the purpose of their 
‘market[ing] as preserved sardines and under the trade description’” under the measure.375  
Finally, it concluded that the measure at issue “in effect [laid] down product characteristics in 
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a negative form”.376 
In EC-Sardines, it was appealed that the EC Regulation was regulation “naming” of a 
product, which was different from “labeling” requirement as explicitly stipulated in the 
definition of a technical regulation.377  However, the AB found it was not necessary to 
distinguish between “naming” and labeling because it was “irrelevant” to the second criterion.  
The AB viewed that the requirement to prepare a product of “preserved sardines” exclusively 
from fish of the species sardina philchardus was “a product characteristic “intrinsic to” 
preserved sardines.378  Furthermore, the AB, recalling that it had explained a “means of 
identification” as a product characteristic in EC-Asbestos, noted that a “name” played an 
important role as a “means of identification”.379   
In US-Clove cigarette, the Panel noted that the US measure laid down “product 
characteristics” in the negative form because it prohibited “cigarettes from containing certain 
constitutes or additives with a ‘characterizing flavor’”.380  It affirmed that the flavor of 
cigarette was “not only a “feature”… but a feature that was “intrinsic to the product itself”. 381  
In US-COOL, the Panel recalled that, in EC-Asbestos, the AB had found that labeling was 
a product characteristic and that, in EC-Trademarks and GI(Australia), the Panel had found 
that “an explicit requirement to indicate country of origin on the label of the product [was] 
indeed a labeling requirement for the purpose of the definition of “technical regulation”.  
Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the country of origin labeling which was the essence of 
the COOL measure addressed product characteristic, fulfilling the second criterion.  
In US-Tuna II, the Panel found that there was no disagreement between the disputing 
parties that the US measures was labeling requirements which were applied to a product, 
namely tuna products.  Determining that the US measures was labeling requirements, the 
Panel concluded that the measure at issue was one of the subject-matter listed in the second 
sentence of Annex 1.1.382  The Panel found it unnecessary to consider whether the measure 
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additionally falls within the scope of the first sentence.383   
 
5.3.4 The criterion “mandatory compliance” 
 
The third element to determine a “technical regulation” is related to the question whether 
compliance with the product characteristics laid down in the document is mandatory.384  In 
EC-Asbestos, the AB explained that a “technical regulation” must “regulate the 
“characteristics” of products in a binding or compulsory fashion” and that, with respect to 
products, it must have “the effect of prescribing or imposing one or more 
“characteristics””.385  In applying the criterion, the AB observed that “all products must be 
asbestos free; any products containing asbestos are prohibited” and that “compliance with the 
prohibition against products containing asbestos [was] mandatory and [was], indeed, 
enforceable through criminal sanctions”.386  
In EC-Sardines, both Panel and the AB noted that a certain provision of the EC Regulation 
provided explicitly that it would “be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States”, which clearly indicated that the compliance with the EC measure was 
mandatory.387   
In US-Clove Cigarette, the Panel also considered the language of the relevant US 
provisions which provided that a cigarette should not contain any artificial or natural flavor 
except for tobacco or menthol, the effect of the law that prohibited the manufacture and sale 
of cigarettes with certain characterizing flavours, and the enforcement mechanism which 
addressed and punished non-compliance.388  
In US-COOL, the panel examined separately whether the COOL measure and the Vilsack 
letter were mandatory.  With respect to the COOL measure, the Panel noted the languages 
“shall” and “mandatory COOL” in the relevant provisions, the requirement for “‘any person 
engaged in the business of supplying a covered commodity to a retailer’ to provide country of 
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origin information to retailer”, and enforcement mechanism which imposed a fine and a 
sanction in case of a violation.389  The Panel concluded that the compliance with the COOL 
measure was mandatory.   
Although the disputants did not contest that compliance with the COOL measure was 
mandatory, they diverged in views regarding the so called the Vilsack letter in the dispute. 
Canada, one of the complainants, contested that “an instrument which [was] non-binding in 
the domestic legal system of a WTO Member may nevertheless be “mandatory” under the 
TBT Agreement” and particularly noted “an effective form of compliance with the Vilsack 
letter” by showing that there was a certain amount of the shift away from labels B and C 
towards an increased use of Label A.390  In line with Canada’s claim, Mexico argued that, in 
spite of the use of the word “voluntary” and regardless of the issuing authority, the Vilsack 
letter made “possible restrictive modification to the COOL measure” and contained a kind of 
“threats” taken seriously by US industry.391   
In its refute, the US submitted that the Vilsack letter was not mandatory since it did not 
contain binding obligations, it used the word “voluntary”, and it did not regulate the 
characteristics of products in a binding or compulsory fashion.392  
The Panel stated that, “[o]n its face, the Vilsack letter is clearly not mandatory”.393 Then, 
it confirmed that the nature of compliance was “not a merely formalistic question” and agreed 
with the complainants that this matter should not be decided “purely on the basis of the 
language in the Vilsack letter, in particular the use of the word “voluntary”, which would 
allow Members to escape the coverage of large portions of the TBT Agreement.394  Warning 
against a formalistic approach, the Panel mentioned that the question therefore remained 
“whether compliance with the Vilsack letter [might] be considered de facto mandatory, 
namely, whether, in the words of the Appellate Body “with respect to products”, the Vilsack 
letter “ha[d] the effect of prescribing or imposing one or more ‘characteristics’ – ‘features’, 
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‘qualities’, ‘attributes’, or other ‘distinguishing mark’”.395  After examining testimonies and 
evidence submitted by the complaints, the Panel concluded that mandatory compliance with 
the Vilsack letter was insufficiently demonstrated and it was also insufficiently proved that 
the Vilsack letter would “regulate the ‘characteristics’ of products in a binding or compulsory 
fashion, let alone had “the effect of prescribing or imposing one or more ‘characteristics’ – 
‘features’, ‘qualities’, ‘attributes’, other ‘distinguishing mark’” for the products at issue.396  
The concept of mandatory compliance was rigorously dealt in US-Tuna II, analysis of 
which is found in the following Section 5.4.  
 
 
5.4 Determination of “Mandatory Compliance” in US-Tuna II  
 
  The distinction between technical regulations and standards is critical for the operation of 
the WTO TBT Agreement.  It is so because the distinction will subsequently determine an 
applicable set of rules and have different legal consequences.  To be specific, determination 
of a certain measure as a ‘technical regulation’ would result in unconditionally applying 
Article 2 or 3 of the TBT Agreement without exceptions while determination of a certain 
technical specification as a ‘standard’ would bring about a conditional application of the 
disciplines laid out in the Code of Good Practice in Annex 4 of the Agreement.  The 
expression “conditional” is used because only those standards bodies which have previously 
accepted the Code would be subject to the application except for national standards bodies.  
There have been few dispute cases in which the issue of distinction between ‘technical 
regulation’ and ‘standard’ has been one of the central dispute issues.  A majority of the 
measures challenged under the TBT Agreement was not disputed hard in this legal 
characterization issue, and they relatively easily found to be ‘technical regulation’. 
However, this does not mean that the issue of legal characterization and distinction 
between ‘technical regulation’ and ‘standard’ is less important than other legal issues mainly 
discussed so far.  Recently, the crucial concept of “mandatory” compliance and its 
                                           
395 Panel report, US-COOL, para. 7.176. 
396 Panel report, US-COOL, para. 7.192. 
215 
subsequent implication for distinguishing ‘technical regulations’ and ‘standards’ under the 
TBT regime went through a daunting challenge in the US-Tuna II case and the conclusions of 
the DSB drew a huge attention.  For the first time, the dispute settlement of the US-Tuna II 
case unveils significantly divided views among the WTO Members and fundamentally 
diverging legal interpretations even between the experts in panel with respect to interpretation 
of the TBT Agreement.  In addition, the case suggested various ideas and approaches taken 
by the third party participants in clarifying the concept of “mandatory” compliance.  All the 
opinions and conclusions found in the case show that the dividing line between ‘standard’ and 
‘technical regulation’ is blurred and legal criteria applied for the distinction are ambiguous 
and lacks any consensus among the Members and relevant experts.  In this section, this legal 
issue show in US-Tuna II is thoroughly examined, and different views and arguments are 
analyzed.  
 
5.4.1 Arguments of the disputants 
 
5.4.1.1 Mexico’s interpretation of “mandatory” compliance 
 
Mexico claimed that the US measure in dispute was a “technical regulation” within the 
meaning of the TBT Agreement.  It explained that the US statutory and regulatory 
provisions that established the dolphin-safe labelling scheme constituted the “document” and 
the “document” met the three criteria in the definition of “technical regulation” in Annex 
1.1.397  
First, it alleged that the US labelling scheme was applied to “tuna product” as defined by 
the US Section 1385I(5), which was ‘an identifiable product or group of products.398  Second, 
it considered that the US measures regulated the conditions under which a tuna product could 
be labeled as “dolphin-safe” and this requirement was a ‘product characteristic’.399   
Last, Mexico argued that the compliance of the US measure was mandatory.  It noted that 
the US measure prohibited mentioning of the term “dolphin-safe” or any analogous term of 
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symbol on the label of any tuna product offered for sale in the US market if the product 
contained tuna harvested in a method inconsistent with the requirement of the US labelling 
scheme.400  It emphasized that it was also prevented from using a “dolphin-safe” label even 
when a relevant international standard was met.401  Based on the reasoning, Mexico claimed 
that the US measure was a mandatory technical regulation.  
Moreover, Mexico went further to argue that “even if the US labelling scheme [were] not 
to be considered a priori mandatory, it [was] de facto mandatory because the market 
conditions in the US [were] such that it [was] impossible to effectively market and sell tuna 
products without a dolphin-safe designation.”402  
Mexico tried to show altered conditions of competition by the US measure and its adverse 
impact on Mexican tuna products.  In its first written submission, it said, “[f]undamentally, 
the US [was] trying to force “choices” on the Mexican industry through its labelling measure. 
That should not be permissible under the TBT Agreement”.403   In its second written 
submission, it noted the effect of the US measure, stating, “[t]he US measures [had] the effect 
of excluding Mexican tuna products from the major distribution channels”.404  Moreover, it 
provided some statistical evidence for relative shrinking share of the US shrimp imports from 
Mexico compared to those of other countries.405  These adverse impacts were used by 
Mexico to support that the US measure had de facto mandatory nature.  
Mexico described the labelling scheme as imposing requirements “in negative form”.  It 
explained that it was not possible to label tuna products in more than one standard and, 
therefore, dolphin-safe tuna products offered for sale in the US must not possess certain 
characteristics except for the designated one.  As a consequence, Mexico continued to argue 
that the US measure was mandatory not because a label was de jure required for market sales 
but because of the “fact that the US measures [restricted] retailers, consumers and producers 
to a single choice for labeling tuna products as dolphin-safe.”406  
In making its case, Mexico tried to identify the disputed circumstances with those in EC-
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Sardines case.  It viewed that the US measure basically covered two different types of tuna 
based on the fishing method and allowed only the product which contained tuna caught in 
accordance with the US scheme just like the EC measure, in EC-Sardines, provided that only 
products prepared from a certain species, i.e. Sardina pilchardus, could be marked with the 
indication of “preserved sardines”.407  In both cases, Mexico explained, the products at issue, 
i.e. tuna and sardines products, respectively, could be sold or marketed without the 
designation of “dolphin-safe” and “sardines” although market opportunities were limited.408 
Mexico refuted the US argument, particularly charging that the US was taking a narrow 
approach toward the concept of “mandatory compliance”.  In Mexico’s view, the US 
considered that, in order to be technical regulation, a measure must require a product to be 
labeled in a certain way in order to be marketed or sold.  Mexico agreed that this was one 
example of a technical regulation but not the only example.  
 
5.4.1.2 US’ interpretation of “mandatory” compliance 
 
The US argued that its measure was not a technical regulation within the meaning of 
Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement.  It claimed that its provisions did not specify the product 
characteristics that tuna product must meet in order to be sold on the US market.409  Also, it 
argued that its provisions were not mandatory because they constituted a voluntary labelling 
measures.410  It noted that it was perfectly legal to sell tuna products in the US market that 
were not dolphin-safe and that did not bear the dolphin-safe label. 411   It repeatedly 
emphasized that the labelling was not required in order that the tuna product could be sold and 
that marketers were free to choose whether to participate in the US labelling scheme and 
regardless of their choice could continue to sell their products.412  
The US refuted the Mexico’s claim that the US measure was a technical regulation.  With 
respect to Mexico’s argument that a criteria for determining the “mandatoriness” was related 
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to whether the label was the only label that may be used in the market, the US stated that there 
was no legal basis in the TBT Agreement.413  In addition, the US charged that Mexico’s 
interpretation was incorrect because Mexico conflated the meaning of the term “labelling 
requirement” with the phrase “with which compliance is mandatory”.414   
Moreover, the US rejected Mexico’s alternative argument that the US measure was de 
facto mandatory because a labelling requirement could not be de facto mandatory simply 
based on private actors’ preference of products labeled in a certain way.  The US further 
asserted that some form of government action must make it compulsory or obligatory in order 
to render measure mandatory; however, in its view, Mexico identified no government action 
that made compliance with the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions mandatory.415  The US 
perceived that Mexico had equated the US measures as “pressure” amounted to a requirement 
and that US measure had created consumers’ preference for dolphin-safe tuna products, which 
it argued to be having no legal basis and ignoring the history leading up to the enactment of 
the US provisions.416  
 
5.4.2 The Panel’s decision 
 
  In Panel’ view, compliance is “mandatory” if the document has “the effect of regulating in 
a legally binding or compulsory fashion the characteristics at issue, and if it thus prescribes or 
imposes in a binding or compulsory fashion that certain product must or must not possess 
certain characteristics, terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labels or that it must or 
must not be produced by using certain processes and production methods. By contrast, 
compliance with the characteristics or other features laid out in the document would not be 
“mandatory” if compliance with them was discretionary or “voluntary””.417  Then, Panel 
considered the two aspects of “mandatory” as submitted by Mexico, i.e., de jure mandatory 
and de facto mandatory compliance.  Panel viewed that compliance would be de jure 
“mandatory” if “the mandatory character of the provisions would be discernible from an 
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examination of the terms or structure the measures themselves”.418   
The Panel’s such view on the de jure and de facto concept was based on its reference to the 
previous ruling by the AB in other disputes.  It took note of the AB’s decisions in defining 
export subsidies ‘in law or in fact’ in Canada-Aircraft and Canada-Autos.  Although the 
AB’s rulings which the Panel had cited were related to legal issues of the Subsidy Agreement, 
the Panel found them relevant since they essentially determined “the inherent differences 
between a de jure and a de facto analysis”.419  Accordingly, it cited the following passages 
from Canada-Aircraft:  
 
“Article 3.1(a) prohibits any subsidy that is contingent upon export performance, 
whether that subsidy is contingent ‘in law or in fact’. The Uruguay Round 
negotiators have, through the prohibition against export subsidies that are 
contingent in fact upon export performance, sought to prevent circumvention of 
the prohibition against subsidies contingent in law upon export performance. In 
our view, the legal standard expressed by the ‘contingent’ is the same for both de 
jure or de facto contingent. De jure export contingency is demonstrated on the 
basis of the words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal 
instrument.”(italics in the original, underlined added by Panel in US-Tuna II)420 
 
In line with the above citation, the Panel found another similar reference from the AB’s 
consideration regarding export subsidies ‘in law or in fact’ in Canada-Autos.  It reads as 
follows: 
 
“We start with what have held previously. In our view, a subsidy is contingent 
‘in law’ upon export performance when the existence of that condition can be 
demonstrated on the basis of the very words of relevant legislation, regulation or 
other legal instrument constituting the measure. The simplest, and hence, perhaps, 
the uncommon, case is one in which the condition of exportation is set out 
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expressly, in so many words, on the face of the law, regulation or other legal 
instrument. We believe, however, that a subsidy is also properly held to be de 
jure export contingent where the condition to export is clearly, though implicitly, 
in the instrument comprising the measure. Thus, for a subsidy to be de jure 
export contingent, the underlying legal instrument does not always have to 
provide expressis verbis that the subsidy is available only upon fulfillment of the 
condition of export performance. Such conditionality can also be derived by 
necessary implication from the words actually used in the measure.”421  
 
In line with the implication of the precedent rulings, the Panel decided to determine 
whether the US measure at issue in the US-Tuna II dispute de jure establishes labelling 
requirements for tuna products by examining “the terms of the US dolphin-safe provisions 
themselves”.422   
Before beginning its analysis, the Panel tried to make a clear distinction between a 
labelling “requirement” and “mandatory” compliance with a requirement.  It explained that a 
labelling “requirement” referred to the conditions or criteria to be fulfilled in order to comply 
with a document while the notion of “mandatory” compliance with a requirement meant a 
condition which had been made compulsory by law.  Then, the Panel suggested that the 
questions in the relevant dispute involved both: (i) the question whether the document laid 
down certain conditions for the use of a label, or prescribes a certain content for a given label, 
and (ii) the question whether the document at issue regulated in a binding fashion these 
conditions or content.423 
  Then, the Panel proceeded to examine the US measures at dispute.  It noted that the 
provisions of the US labelling system “regulated” the use of the term “dolphin-safe” as well 
as the use of other related terms on labels for tuna products offered for sale on the US market.  
They regulated dolphin-safe labelling requirements “in a biding or compulsory fashion” 
because they prescribed, in a binding and legally enforceable instrument, the manner in which 
a dolphin-safe label could be obtained in the US, and disallowed any other use of a dolphin-
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safe designation.  Also, the manner they prescribed and imposed the conditions under which 
a product might be labeled dolphin-safe was “in a negative form” in that no tuna product may 
be labeled dolphin-safe or otherwise refer to dolphins, porpoises or marine mammals if it did 
not meet the conditions set out in the measure and thus imposed a prohibition on the offering 
for sale in the US of tuna products bearing a label and not meeting the requirement.424  
The Panel considered that the situation at dispute was very similar to those in EC-Sardines 
and EC-Trademarks and GI(Australia).  The Panel explained the situation of the dispute at 
hand as that, in order to be marketed as dolphin-safe tuna, tuna product must have been 
prepared exclusively from fish caught in the specific conditions under the US provisions; 
otherwise, tuna products not complying with the specific conditions in the US regulation 
“were prohibited from being identified and marketed under an appellation including the term 
“dolphin-safe” or other related designations”.425  Noting the similarities in EC-Sardines, the 
Panel restated the relevant passages made by the AB that preserved products made of the 
species not specified in the relevant EC Regulation “were prohibited from being identified 
and marketed under an appellation including the term ‘sardines’” and that to be marketed as 
“preserved sardines”, product must be prepared exclusively from fish of the species 
designated by the EC Regulation.  In this way, the Panel considered the AB’s conclusion in 
that case that the compliance with the EC Regulation was “mandatory” and, overall, a 
“technical regulation”.426  
The Panel also equated the situation at dispute with those in EC-Trademarks and 
GI(Australia) in that, in the latter case, the indications of PDO, PGI or equivalent national 
indications were regulated in a negative form.  In other words, in this case, products with a 
geographical indication identical to a Community protective name that do not satisfy the 
labelling requirement were prohibited from using other indications.427  
The Panel thus concluded from the precedent decisions by the AB that “the mere fact that 
it [was] legally permissible to place the product on the market without using the designation 
that [was] regulated by the measures at issue [did] not compel the conclusion that these 
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measures [were] not “mandatory” within the meaning of Annex 1.1”.  Then, the Panel went 
further to find that “[s]imilarly, in the present case, the legal consequence of the measures for 
tuna products not meeting the requirements of the regulation [was] that they [may have been] 
labeled dolphin-safe.  This implies that such products [were] prohibited from being 
identified and marketed under this appellation.”428 
Finally, the Panel summarized several aspects of the US measure, which together led to its 
final conclusion that the US measure at issue was mandatory and, thus, a technical regulation.  
First, it considered important the component of legal enforceability and binding character.  
Particularly, it noted that the measures were issued by the government and included legal 
sanctions.  Second, it noted that the measure prescribed certain requirements, regulated the 
use of a certain term and, at the same time, prohibited the use of other terms in cases where 
specific conditions were not met.  In the Panel’s view, the measures left no discretion to 
resort to any other standards to inform consumers about the dolphin-safe character, thereby 
effectively regulating the “dolphin-safe” status in a binding and exclusive manner.  Based on 
the findings, the Panel concluded that the measures at issue established labelling requirements, 
compliance with which was mandatory.  
In this way, the Panel examined the US measure only based on the concept of de jure 
“mandatory” compliance and finally concluded with the determination that the US measure 
was mandatory and a technical regulation.  Although it had noted the argument by Mexico to 
interpret the “mandatory” concept to incorporate both de jure and de facto mandatoriness, the 
Panel based its analysis exclusively on the de jure “mandatory” concept  
In its examination, the Panel conceptually distinguished the situation of the dispute from 
another situation in which various standards may coexist in relation with the same issue, with 
different but related claims.  Thus, the Panel found that the US label was de jure mandatory 
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5.4.3 A dissenting opinion of the Panel 
 
The Panel’s final determination that the measure at issue was mandatory to comply and, 
therefore, constituted a technical regulation was not based on a consensus by all members of 
the Panel.  One panel interpreted the concept of “mandatory” compliance differently from 
the majority’s opinion.  
The dissenting panel interpreted the concept of “mandatory” compliance as incorporating 
both de jure and de facto “mandatory” compliance and further suggested how to examine 
each of them with what legal components.  According to the de jure “mandatory” concept 
the dissenting panel had defined and explained, the US measure would be considered not 
“mandatory” or, instead, “voluntary”.  According to the de facto “mandatory” concept 
suggested by the panel, Mexico had failed to establish the case successfully because it did not 
deal with one of the components constituting the de facto concept, namely, the fact that a 
limited market access was the result of some form of government actions.  As a result, the 
dissenting panel held the view that the compliance with the US measure in itself was not 
definitely de jure mandatory.  At the same time, however, it concluded that the measure was 
not de facto mandatory, either, only because the complainant had not sufficiently 
substantiated its argument.   
Before proceeding to examine the “mandatory” character of the measure, the dissenting 
panel tried to make a distinction between labelling requirement and compulsory labelling 
scheme.  The panel emphasized the ordinary meaning of the term “labelling requirement” 
and stated that labelling requirements were “requirements that must be fulfilled in order to be 
allowed to use a certain label. Any labeling scheme foresees such requirements – in fact, if 
such requirement would not exist and if a certain label could be used independent of whether 
specific requirements [were] fulfilled, the label would become meaningless.”429  Therefore, 
the panel stated that the criteria under labelling scheme must be required or made obligatory 
and such a mandatory character in implementing labelling scheme generally kept labelling 
schemes not falling useless.   
On the other hand, in the view of the dissenting panel, labelling schemes were compulsory 
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when the use of a certain label was compulsory to access the market, or they were voluntary 
when products could be marketed with or without the label. 430   However, “labelling 
requirements” must be fulfilled even within a voluntary labelling scheme.  In other words, 
under the circumstances where producers might freely decide whether to use a certain label or 
not, if a producer chose to use a label, then he/she must fulfill the criteria set out under the 
labelling scheme.  
  The panel suggested that his/her interpretation would be confirmed by the definitions in 
Annex 1.1 and Annex 1.2.  The panel noted that both paragraphs referred to labelling 
requirements, indicating that labelling requirements could be either technical regulations or 
standards and the criteria for distinguishing technical regulations and standards were related 
to the fact whether compliance was mandatory or not.  Then, according the panel, to give 
any meaning and make provisions effective, “the requirement that compliance [was] 
mandatory [could not] relate to the obligation to meet certain requirements to be allowed to 
use the label”.431  Instead, the panel explained, the question whether a labelling scheme was 
compulsory or voluntary was related to the question whether products must use a label to be 
marketed or products was allowed to be marketed with or without the label.  
  According to the panel’s interpretation of mandatory compliance of a measures, the US 
dolphin-safe labeling scheme was not de jure mandatory measure.  The reason was that 
neither the use of the “dolphin-safe” label nor the use of the specific fishing techniques and 
locations that conditioned access to the label was compulsory in a sense that tuna products 
could be marketed with or without them.  In addition, the US prohibited use of alternative 
labels and the use of a label in violation of the labelling requirement was subject to 
enforcement measure, which the panel considered as “a typical situation common to both 
voluntary and mandatory labelling schemes” in order to prevent any misleading or false 
declarations.432  This legally binding character or legal enforceability of the measures alone 
was not sufficient to modify the essentially voluntary nature of the US labeling scheme to 
mandatory one.433  The panel continued to explain, “[r]ather, the notion of ‘mandatory 
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compliance’ [was] related more fundamentally to the fact that the measure at issue [prescribed] 
or [imposed] compliance with specific requirements to allow a product to be marketed, 
without allowing discretion to depart from them”.434  
Then, the panel addressed Mexico’s claim that “technical regulations” could encompass 
not only de jure mandatory compliance but also de facto mandatory compliance. 435  
Accordingly, the panel examined whether the ordinary meaning of the language in the 
definitions of the TBT Agreements allowed or excluded the possibility of de facto mandatory 
technical regulation, which the panel turned down.  Specifically, the panel elaborated, 
“[w]hat [was] required [was] that compliance with the characteristics laid down in the 
document be mandatory … This [did] not exclude that voluntary and non-mandatory labelling 
requirements [might] become mandatory as a result of ‘some other government action’ or 
more generally, some other action attributable to the Member concerned”.436  Also, the panel 
noted that many other WTO provisions had been applied with both de jure and de facto 
coverage and, in order for the compliance of a measure to be de facto mandatory, two factors 
should be examined: “the text of the provision in question” and “the potential consequences 
of excluding the possibility of applying that norm” of the de facto concept.437  
Thus, the panel suggested a two-tier test to determine a de facto mandatory compliance: (i) 
the impossibility of marketing a product without fulfilling a requirement, or affixing the 
“dolphin-safe” label in the dispute; and (ii) such impossibility must arise from facts 
sufficiently connected to the measures or to another government action, - the US dolphin-safe 
provisions in the case.438  Then, the panel analyzed the situation at dispute and concluded 
that non-labelled products were sold in the US market and Mexico was claiming impossibility 
of “effective” marking rather than impossibility of marketing at all, which did not provide 
sufficient basis for altering the voluntary or “not mandatory” nature of that standards, within 
determination that compliance was mandatory.  The panel explained that fulfillment of this 
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first factor would not substantiate the determination of a de facto “mandatory” compliance.439  
Second, it further examined whether the limited market access by non-labelled products was 
the result of the application of the US measure at issue or of some government action by the 
US.  With respect to this second issue, the panel also concluded that Mexico had failed to 
demonstrate the effect of the measure or some government action on the limited market 
access.440  
In conclusion, the panel in a separate opinion suggested that the compliance of US measure 
at dispute was not de jure mandatory since it sets out no obligation to label (or not to label) 
tuna as “dolphin-safe”.  Also, the panel found that it was not de facto mandatory for tuna 
products to comply with the US labeling scheme because Mexico had failed to successfully 
demonstrate that it was impossible to market tuna products in the US without the label and 
that such impossibility was resulted from the US provisions or another government action. 
  
5.4.4 The Appellate Body’s decision 
 
The US did not accept the way the Panel had reviewed the measure at dispute to determine 
that it was a ‘technical regulation’ within the meaning of the TBT Agreement.  On appeal, 
the US mainly alleged that the Panel incorrectly applied the phrase “with which compliance is 
mandatory”.  
  However, the AB basically agreed with the panel’s final determination that compliance 
with the US dolphin-safe labelling scheme was mandatory and, therefore, the measure was a 
technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement.  
The AB took a textual approach to interpret definitions of technical regulations and 
standards in Annex 1.1 and Annex 1.2.  Then, it highlighted that both definitions contained 
the identical sentence of “may include or deal exclusively deal with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method”, and that terminology, symbols, packaging, marking and labelling 
requirements may be subject-matter of either technical regulations or standards.  Thus, these 
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common features of both technical regulations and standards could not, by themselves, 
determine legal characterization of a measure under the TBT Agreement.  For example, both 
technical regulations or standards could contain labelling requirements, i.e., conditions that 
must be met in order to use a label and those conditions could be “compulsory” or “binding” 
and “enforceable”, which cannot, therefore, “be dispositive of the proper characterization of 
the measure under the TBT Agreement”.441  
The AB considered that there were additional features that determined technical 
regulations or standards.  It suggested that those relevant features of a measure might include 
“whether the measure [consisted] of a law or a regulation enacted by a WTO Member, 
whether it [prescribed or prohibited] particular conduct, whether it set[]out specific 
requirements that [constituted] the sole means of addressing a particular matter and the nature 
of the matter addressed by the measure”.442  
  Applying the criteria, the AB examined whether the US measure at issue constituted a 
technical regulation.  In assessment, the AB noted that the measure at issue consisted of a 
law enacted by the US Congress and regulations set out in the US Code of Federal 
Regulations.443  Also, the labelling scheme not only set out conditions for eligibility for the 
label but also prohibited any reference to dolphin, porpoise, or marine mammals on the 
label.444  Consequently, the US measure established “a single and legally mandated set of 
requirement for making any statement with respect to the broad subject of “dolphin-safety” of 
tuna products”.445  Last, the AB considered important the fact that the US measure “thus 
[covered] the entire field of what “dolphin-safe” [meant] in relation to tuna products in the 
US”.446  It repeatedly noted this last feature of the measure, stating that “while it [was] 
possible to sell tuna products without a “dolphin-safe” label in the US, any “producer, 
importer, exporter, distributor or seller” of tuna products must comply with the measure at 
issue in order to make any “dolphin-safe” claim”.447 
Furthermore, the AB rejected the US claim that the measure [was] mandatory only if there 
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[was] a requirement to use the label in order to place the product for sale on the market.448  
The reasons for the AB’s ruling were primarily based on the legal text of the Annex 1.1 to the 
TBT Agreement.  It particularly noted that the text did not use the words “market” or 
“territory” nor described “mandatory” labelling requirement only as a requirement to use a 
particular label to market a product.   
Moreover, the AB found that its rejection to the US claim was also confirmed by the 
situation and its rulings in EC-Sardines.  In that case, the AB noted that, it was possible to 
sell in the EC market products made of other specifies than “sardines” designated by the EC 
Regulation, as long as they were not marketed under the appellation “preserved sardines”.  
In the AB’s view, it was legally permissible to sell a product on the market without using a 
particular label or indication and such a fact was not determinative when examining whether a 
measure was a “technical regulation”.449  Thus, when non-labelled products were allowed to 
be marketed, that fact alone could determine that the label was not mandatory or voluntary, 
rendering the measure a standard.  It seems that the AB had strongly rejected the market-
access based approach for determining “mandatory” character of the compliance with a 
disputed measure.  
 
5.4.5 Summary of approaches to apply the element of “mandatory” 
compliance 
 
The examination of different approaches to interpret “mandatory” compliance so far is 
summarized in <Table 17>.  The disputants tried to make arguments based on the concept de 
jure and de facto “mandatory” compliance and the Panel also reviewed based on this 
approach.  Mexico claimed that the compliance was de jure and de facto mandatory while 
the US refuted that the compliance was not mandatory because it was not de facto mandatory. 
The majority Panel ruled that the compliance was de jure mandatory and, therefore, the US 
labelling measure at issue was a mandatory ‘technical regulation’.  In contrast, the dissenting 
member of the Panel considered that the compliance was not de jure mandatory but it was not 
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sure whether it was de facto mandatory either due to lack of relevant evidence.  The AB, 
however, did not apply this de jure or de facto mandatory approach but, instead, came up with 
the four criteria.  
 
Table 17. Summary of the disputants’ claims and the Panel/Appellate Body’s rulings 
 Technical Regulations Standards 
Mexico 
- Compliance is de jure mandatory.  
- Compliance is de facto mandatory 
because it is impossible to effectively 
market without the label; it alters 
competition condition and causes 
adverse impact.  




-- - Compliance is not mandatory because 
non-labelled products may be marketed.  
- Compliance is not de facto mandatory 
simply based on private actors’ preference; 
some form of government action must 
make it compulsory or obligatory.  
Panel 
- Compliance is de jure mandatory 
because mandatory character is 
discernible from the terms or structure 
of the measures themselves.  
 
- legally enforceable and binding 
- regulating in a legally binding or 
compulsory fashion; prescribing or 
imposing in a binding or compulsory 
fashion that products must or must not 
possess certain characteristics; 
prohibiting sale of labelled products not 
meeting the requirement.  
- providing exclusive means, leaving no 






-- - Compliance is not de jure mandatory 
because non-labelled products may be 
marketed.  
- It was not successfully established to 
determine de facto mandatory compliance; 
two components to demonstrate: 1) 
impossibility to market without the label 
2) such impossibility arise from the 





Examination under four criteria: 
1) whether it was enacted by law; 
2) whether it prescribes, prohibits, 
regulates certain product characteristics; 
3) whether it provides only and 
exclusive means to express certain 
product characteristics; 
4) examination of the nature of the 
matter addressed by the measure. 
- no expressive application of de jure or 
de facto concept  
- expressive objection to depend only on 





5.5 Divergent Approaches to Interpret the Concept of “Mandatory 
Compliance” 
 
In US-Tuna II, disputants and third parties have suggested many different ways to interpret 
and apply the concept of “mandatory” compliance with a view to establish a dividing line 
between technical regulations and standards and to make the legal scope of standard 
meaningful and appropriate.  For example, Mexico tried to find the binding character of the 
measure not only in the provisions of the relevant US law and regulations but also in the US 
market place, i.e., preference of consumers, distributors, and importers.  In contrast, US 
argued that the non-binding character of the measure was evinced by the fact that the label 
was not a market-entry condition and non-labelled tuna products were legally allowed in the 
market.  
One of the most noteworthy approaches is related to the notion of “de facto” and “de jure” 
mandatory compliance, based on which both disputing parties have made their arguments and 
the majority as well as a dissenting panels have examined the measure at issue.  However, 
the AB did not expressly or directly address this newly suggested approach and, instead, came 
up with some detail criteria to examine when determining mandatory/voluntary compliance.   
In this dispute, the Panel and the AB particularly took note of the ways or means in which 
231 
the US measure was implemented and enforced.  The US labelling scheme did not allow any 
other analogous indication on the label and thus provided “only and exclusive” means to 
express the dolphin-safe characteristic of tuna products.  This ‘exclusivity” element seems to 
have been a decisive criteria for the Panel and the AB in making the conclusion that the US 
measure was a technical regulation.  
Accordingly, this section studies and analyzes what each of the criteria is meant to be 
based on the explanation of the disputing parties, the Panel and the AB as well as some views 
suggested by the third parties of the dispute.  Irrespective of their legal effect, those ideas 
may serve valuable foundations for developing the concept of “mandatory” compliance and 
thereby establishing a legal boundary between technical regulations and standards.  
 
5.5.1 An approach based on “market sales condition” criterion 
 
Arguing against the Mexico’s assertion that the US labelling scheme was a technical 
regulation, the US claimed that the US provisions at issue constituted a voluntary labelling 
measure because it was “perfectly legal to sell tuna products in the US that are not dolphin-
safe and that do not bear the dolphin-safe label”.450  The US noted that “[m]arketers of tuna 
products [were] free to choose whether to participate in the US labelling scheme and 
regardless of that choice [continued] to sell their products in the US. Compliance with the US 
dolphin-safe labelling provisions [was], thus, not mandatory within the meaning of Annex 1 
of the TBT Agreement.”451   
It can be inferred from this statements that the US interprets the term “mandatory” 
compliance primarily based the role of standards as a market sales condition.  The US asked 
whether the measure required a product certain conditions or characteristics to conform before 
it is sold in market.  Accordingly, if a product can be marketed without a label or without 
fulfilling any other product characteristics provided in a specific document, then such an 
technical specification will be considered “voluntary” standard.  On the other hand, if sale of 
a certain product is prohibited in market unless it affixes the label or fulfills certain 
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characteristics required by an authority, then such a market sale condition will amount to a 
‘technical regulation’, the compliance with which is “mandatory”.  
In response, Mexico generally disagreed with the US and challenged this approach for 
being “too narrow”.  Mexico stated that the “market sale condition” approach may suggest 
one example of the analysis but not the only one.452  
However, the idea of applying the “market sale condition” seems to have been strongly 
supported by the panel’ separate opinion.  The dissenting panel basically considered this 
factor as a main criterion for determining “mandatory” character of the measure and examined 
whether the labelling schemed provided a “market sales condition” or not.  The panel 
examined it in two ways: provisions themselves, i.e. de jure mandatory character, and actual 
effect of the measure on the product’s market access, i.e. de facto mandatory character.  
 In examining the de jure mandatory character, the panel reviews the measure in order to 
determine whether it imposes a general requirement to label or not to label tuna products as 
“dolphin-safe”.  It describes voluntary character of the measure, contrasting it with the 
binding character of conditions set out within the labelling scheme.  It states, “[i]t remains a 
voluntary and discretionary decision of operators on the market to fulfil or not fulfil the 
conditions that give access to the label, and whether to make any claim in relation to the 
dolphin-safe status of the tuna contained in the product.  If an operator wishes to make such 
claim, however, it must abide with the conditions laid down in the DPCIA and other related 
measures.”453  Thus, the panel concludes that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions do not 
establish de jure mandatory labelling requirements.454  
Then, it proceeds to examine the measure based on the concept of de facto mandatory 
compliance.  In order words, the panel considered whether, despite the absence of a de jure 
requirement, tuna products are nonetheless “compelled” to carry that label as a result of some 
other action attributable to the US.455  It suggests the meaning of “de facto mandatory” to be 
as the following: that the US labelling scheme “may be considered de facto mandatory in 
order to market tuna products in the US, if doing otherwise becomes impossible, not because 
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it would contradict a mandatory provision in the measures, but because it would be prevented 
by a factual situation that is sufficiently connected to the actions of the US.”  Then, it 
elaborates that, in his view, the de facto mandatory concept is comprised of two factors: 
impossibility of marking without the label and such impossibility is sufficiently caused by the 
US provisions at dispute or other government actions.   
However, the AB clearly declined the approach.  It first noted the US contention that 
compliance with a labelling requirement is “mandatory” only “if there is also a requirement to 
use the label in order to place the product for sale on the market” and that the compliance with 
the US measures is not mandatory because producers have the option of not using the label 
but nevertheless are able to sell the product on the market.  Then, the AB emphasizes that 
there is no textual basis for interpreting the “mandatory” concept in such a way.  Particularly, 
it highlights the fact that the text of the Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement does not use the 
words “market” or “territory” and does not indicate that a labelling requirement is mandatory 
only if there is a requirement to use a particular label in order to place a product for sale on 
the market.456  Thus, the AB states,  
 
“[t]o us, the mere fact that there is no requirement to use a particular label in 
order to place a product for sale on the market does not preclude a finding that 
a measure constitutes a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1.1.  
Instead, in the context of the present case, we attach significance to the fact that, 
while it is possible to sell tuna products without a “dolphin-safe” label in the 
US, any “producer, importer, exporter, distributor or seller” of tuna products 
must comply with the measure at issue in order to make any “dolphin-safe” 
claim.”457 
 
In addition, it took note that the AB characterized the EC measure at issue in EC-Sardines 
as a “technical regulation”.  The measure at issue in EC-Sardines was a regulation setting 
out a number of prescriptions for the sale of “preserved sardines”, including the requirement 
that they contain only one named species of sardines, to the exclusion of others.  Under the 
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facts of the case, it was possible to sell other species of sardines on the EC market, provided 
that such sardines were not sold under the appellation “preserved sardines”.  The AB stated 
that the fact that the EC regulation was determined to be a “technical regulation” was 
supportive of its view that the mere fact that it is legally permissible to sell a product on the 
market without using a particular label is not determinative when examining whether a 
measures is a “technical regulation”.458  
 
5.5.2 An approach based on “de jure” and “de facto” criteria 
  
Concerning the meaning of “mandatory” compliance, both disputing parties as well as the 
Panel including the dissenting panel all use the terms “de jure” and “de facto” and try to 
incorporate those concepts in explaining their respective arguments and findings.  They all 
seem to assume that the concept of mandatory compliance is comprised with both de jure 
compulsory situation and de facto compulsory situation.   
Mexico claimed that it has been made compulsory by law to use only the dolphin-safe label 
designated by the US provisions; and, alternatively, the US measures, in fact, restricted 
retailers, consumers and producers to a single choice for labelling tuna products as dolphin-
safe.  The US does not directly reject the Mexico’s approach of considering both de jure and 
de facto mandatory compliance of the measure.  However, the US warns against determining 
de facto mandatory character solely based on private actors’ preference; its position is that 
some form of government action is also required to make a measure de facto obligatory.   
The differing opinion by one of the Panel members also examines the binding character of 
the US measure from the perspective of both concepts.  First, it interprets the notion of 
“mandatory” compliance as impossibility of marketing the product without the label at issue.  
Then, it incorporates two fundamental sources of the resulting impossibility to market: (1) 
direct prohibition by law and regulations and (2) indirect prohibition by influence of some 
government actions.  The former constitutes de jure cause and the latter constitutes de facto 
cause.  It further explains method of analysis and components of each concept.  With 
respect to de jure concept, it considered whether the requirement to label a tuna product 
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before being offered for sale in market was directly imposed by the measure itself, for 
instance, by relevant regulations or by the market preference, i.e., preferences of producers or 
consumer.  Even if the impossibility of marketing tuna products is not cause by relevant law 
or regulations, such impossibility could be indirectly caused by some other government 
actions.  
The majority opinion of the Panel seems to endorse the de jure/ de facto approach.  It 
notes the two alternative arguments submitted by Mexico and then decides to consider those 
“two aspects in turn, without prejudice, at this stage of our analysis, to the question of 
whether de facto “mandatory” compliance is covered by Annex 1.1.”459  Then, the Panel 
stated that the de jure compulsory character could be determined from the examination of the 
terms or structure of the measures themselves.   
Accordingly, the Panel examined various aspects of the measure itself, whether the 
relevant provisions of the measure at issue regulate or prescribe certain product characteristics, 
whether they do so in a binding and exclusive manner, whether they imply no possibility or 
alternative means except in compliance with the criteria set out in the measures, and whether 
the measures prescribe in a positive form or in a negative form.   
After reviewing all these relevant questions, the Panel finally concludes that the measure at 
issue establishes de jure mandatory labeling requirements.  Then, the Panel considers it 
unnecessary to further its examination to find de facto obligatory character of the measure at 
issue.  Thus, the Panel terminates its analysis without further explaining how it defines de 
facto mandatory concept and what components it should consider in an actual review.  
Therefore, unlike disputing parties’ assertions and one panel’s separate opinion, the Panel 
rigorously focused on the measure itself and considered various aspects of it when it applied 
de jure approach and finally determined the compulsory character of the measure only within 
the meaning of de jure concept. 
The AB’s approach seems to be significantly different from all the others’.  Although the 
disputing parties and the Panel members tried to apply de jure and de facto approach to 
determine whether compliance with the measure at issue was mandatory within the meaning 
of Annex 1.1, only the AB did not expressly mention such concepts.  Instead, the AB 
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suggested four main criteria to examine, all of which seem to be quite strictly related to the 
measure itself.   
The AB’s examination criteria are almost identical with the set of components the majority 
Panel has considered with the de jure approach.  They were questions of whether the 
measure consists of a law or a regulation enacted by a WTO Member, whether it prescribes or 
prohibits particular conduct, whether it sets out specific requirements that constitute the sole 
means of addressing a particular matter, and the nature of the matter addressed by the 
measure.460   It can be inferred from those specific components that the AB’s review 
approach is closer to a de jure approach than to a de facto approach.  
 
5.5.3 An approach based on “exclusivity” criterion 
 
One most critical criterion that led both the Panel and the AB finally to conclude that the 
US labelling scheme was a technical regulation was the fact that the measure provided 
“exclusive means” of asserting a dolphin-safe status for tuna products.  The Panel took note 
that the US measure left “no discretion to resort to any other standard” to inform consumers 
about the dolphin-safe characteristic of the product.461  In specific, the Panel found that the 
US labelling provisions set out “certain requirements that must be complied with in order to 
make any claim relating to the manner in which the tuna contained in tuna product was caught, 
in relation to dolphins.”462  
The AB also examined this criterion, i.e., whether the US measure sets out specific 
requirements that constitute the sole means of addressing a particular matter, and considered 
the result of this analysis very importantly.  The AB found that the US measure is composed 
of legislative and regulatory acts of the US government and the measure establishes “a single 
and legally mandated definition of a “dolphin-safe” tuna product and disallows the use of 
other labels on tuna product that do not satisfy the definition.  The AB, then, paid specially 
attention to the “ways” or the “manner” in which the measure applied the conditions to allow 
the use of the term “dolphin-safe”.  Then, it found that the US measure prescribed “in a 
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broad and exhaustive manner” that apply for making any assertion as to “dolphin-safety” and 
that, as a consequence, the US measure “covered the entire field of what “dolphin-safety” 
means in relation to tuna products.”  
In sum, it can be inferred that the “mandatory” character of a certain measure is also 
constituted by its manner of application.  If the measure imposes or prescribes what 
conditions a product must possess or not to possess “in an exclusive way” or allows only one 
way but disallows all the other ways, thus covering the entire field of the matter, then such 
compliance condition would be considered “mandatory”.   
Also, this “exclusivity” approach seems to be determinative even in the context where it is 
possible to sell tuna products without a designated label or a product characteristic.  The 
exclusivity approach examines whether the product must comply with the measure in order to 
use the label or make any relevant claim that it has acquired the product characteristic.   
 
 
5.6 Chapter Summary and Partial Conclusion  
 
Chapter 5 analyzed the current interpretation and application of the definitions of ‘standard’ 
and ‘technical regulation’.  It finds that the definition of ‘standard’ is quite limitedly applied 
in disputes to date, being interpreted only in the context of “a relevant international standard” 
as provided in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.  There has been no dispute in which 
‘standard’ was interpreted solely for the sake of determining ‘standard’ itself. Also, 
interpretations of “international standard” were found to be inconsistent in disputes.  In a 
dispute, ‘standard’ as a part of “international standard” was reviewed based on the definition 
of the TBT Agreement but, in another dispute, the phrase “international standard” was 
examined based on the definition in the ISO/ECE Guide.  
In addition, the vague concept of “voluntary/mandatory” compliance was one of the most 
critical legal issues in recent US-Tuna II dispute.  Views and arguments were sharply 
divided regarding its interpretation. Therefore, Chapter 5 analyzes the current interpretation 
and application of the definitions of ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’.   
First, it finds that the definition of ‘standard’ is quite limitedly applied in disputes to date, 
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being interpreted only in the context of “a relevant international standard” as provided in 
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.  There has been no dispute in which ‘standard’ was 
interpreted solely for the sake of determining a ‘standard’ itself. Also, interpretations of 
“international standard” were found to be inconsistent in disputes.  Sometimes, ‘standard’ 
was reviewed as a legal element of “international standard” based on the definition of the 
TBT Agreement but, in other times, the phrase “international standard” was examined 
exclusively based on the definition in the ISO/ECE Guide.  
The second part of the chapter examines the legal interpretations and the consequent 
determination of a ‘technical regulation’, which is basically composed of reviews on three 
legal elements, “identifiable product or group of products”, “lays down product characteristics” 
and “mandatory compliance”.  In particular, the concept of “mandatory compliance” as 
interpreted in this context is very important since the criterion also affects the concept and 
regulatory scope of ‘standard’.  The concept has rarely been a core legal issue in disputes.  
However, the disputants in a recent case had substantially different views from each other 
surrounding the meaning of “mandatory/voluntary compliance” and even the adjudicating 
bodies like panels and the AB submitted significantly diverging opinions.  The analysis 
shows that the AB considered the “exclusivity” criterion most important for determining the 
“mandatory/voluntary compliance” concept.  The chapter additionally analyzes the major 
approaches found in disputes, i.e. “market sales condition” approach, “de jure/de facto” 
approach and “exclusivity” approach, and finds that the adjudicating bodies have overly relied 












6.1 Revisiting the Legal Characterization Review of ‘Standard’ 
 
After all, international trade has long been affected by national technical regulations and 
standards and is increasingly so in recent years as the global society becomes more aware of 
and concerned about problems of consumer safety, health risks or environmental hazards.  
The WTO calls these global trade problems caused by standards and standardization as 
‘technical barriers’ and grasps them through three different sources, i.e. ‘technical regulation’, 
‘standard’ and ‘conformity assessment procedure’.  The distinction between the first two and 
‘conformity assessment procedure’ seems to be straightforward.  The former two are 
substantive standards while the latter is procedural standards.  The distinction between the 
two substantive standards, however, does not appear to be clear-cut by their concepts and in 
practice since their definitions are not sufficiently specific.   
Even before the issue of legal ambiguity and the challenge of distinguishing the concepts of 
the two, there exists a question of how to perceive the category of ‘technical regulation’ and 
the category of ‘standard in the first place.  Should they be treated as sub-categories of one 
large category such as technical specification or standards in general term? Or should they be 
treated as two separate categories, one being a part of government regulation and the other 
being a part of general consensus or practice? Or should one of them be understood to 
encompass the other, ‘technical regulation’ being a special type of ‘standard’?   
One way to address these conceptual questions of defining the external boundaries of 
‘technical regulation’ and ‘standard’ as well as the relation between the two is to consider 
their historical development, particularly their first inception and early discussions.  
Implication from this historical context will help understand the current architecture of the 
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TBT Agreement - the architecture which has been established to deal with trade-restrictive 
standards -and the current definition of the two causes of technical barriers from a 
developmental perspective.  
In the current TBT Agreement, Annex 1 entitled “Terms and Their Definitions for the 
Purpose of This Agreement” provides for definitions of 8 terms and concepts for the purpose 
of the Agreement.  Besides these Agreement-specific terms and concepts, definitions of all 
other terms will have the same meaning as given in the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC Guide 
2:1991.  Among the 8 concepts specifically defined in the Annex, the term ‘technical 
regulation’ and the term ‘standard’ are included.  This means that the Agreement will 
establish its own definitions and concepts of ‘technical regulation’ and ‘standard’ for its own 
purpose, regardless of what their corresponding meanings are in the ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991.  
The definition of ‘standard’ has some similar legal elements with the definition of 
‘standard’.  The first identical element is document; both of the definitions contain the word 
document and they are basically documents.  The second common element is that they are 
documents which lay down or provide such subject matters as product characteristics or 
processes and production methods.  The third common feature is the fact that both talk about 
the compliance obligation, whether it is a mandatory type or not-mandatory type.  Overall, 
both definitions is based on a very similar sentence structure, “document” which “lays down 
/provides” subject matters like “product characteristics” or “processes and production 
methods”, and compliance obligation with the document may be either “mandatory” or “not 
mandatory”.  
Nevertheless, the definition of ‘standard’ is also composed of some different elements from 
that of ‘technical regulation’.  For instance, the document of ‘standard’ needs approval by a 
recognized body, it is applicable to rules or guidelines as well as products and PPMs, and the 
purpose of ‘standard’ should be for common and repeated use.  
Then, were they originally different and separate categories that created technical barriers 
to trade?  If this is true, an examination of the Agreement’s development history will reveal 
that their definitions were different in the beginning but have developed to be similar to each 
other throughout negotiations.  Or, were they two different subsets of a kind?  If this is true, 
a historical review of the Agreement will show that their definitions were initially almost 
identical to each other but have evolved to be different in some other aspects.  
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The following section considers these hypotheses.  It first analyzes the developmental 
process of the concept ‘standard’ by comparing its textual definition with its corresponding 
definition of ‘technical regulation’.  Then, it suggests a more proper approach to 
understanding the concept ‘standard’ and its implications for the current review process of 
legal characterization in dispute. 
 
6.1.1 Implications from the conceptual development of ‘standard’ 
 
6.1.1.1 Implications from the analysis of “standard” in the 1973 Draft Standards 
Code 
 
The 1973 Draft Code, the earliest available proposed draft, uses the term “standard” and 
divides the concept into two categories, “mandatory standard” and “voluntary standard”.  As 
the terminologies imply, “mandatory standard” corresponds to the current ‘technical 
regulation’ and “voluntary standard” to the current ‘standard’.  Terminologies themselves 
probably represent quite a simple structure.  There is “standard”, one source of technical 
barriers to trade, and all “standards” are categorized into two groups by their compliance 
obligation, namely, “mandatory standard” group on one hand and “voluntary standard” group 
on the other.  
Then, Annex 1 to the 1973 Draft Code defines the three terms, “standards”, “mandatory 
standards” and “voluntary standards”.  This means that all the common legal elements of 
“mandatory standards” and “voluntary standard” are described in the definition of “standards” 
while their distinctive features and legal elements are stipulated in each respective definition 
of “mandatory standards” and “voluntary standard”.  A close examination of the “voluntary 
standard” definition reveals that one primary determinative element between “mandatory 
standards” and “voluntary standards” is their “legal obligation to comply”.   
However, further examination of other definitions and the regulatory structure of the Draft 
Code show that characteristics of standards bodies also play equally critical role in delineating 
the entire coverage of “standards” as well as distinguishing the scope of “voluntary standards” 
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from that of “mandatory standards”.  The “mandatory standards” definition provides that the 
mandatory obligation to comply be “by virtue of an action of an authority endowed with the 
necessary legal power”.  This probably means that the determinative “legal obligation to 
comply” should be given by “an action of an authority endowed with the necessary legal 
power”.  Then, which is such an authority?  The regulatory structure of the Draft Code 
seems to give the answer.  The titles of Article 2 and Article 3 imply that “mandatory 
standards” prepared, adopted or used by central government bodies, local government bodies 
and other regulatory bodies are only within the scope of the subject matter “mandatory 
standards”.  The title of Article 4 and the definition of “voluntary standards body” indicates 
that the scope of “voluntary standards” is limited to “non-government organization which 
prepares them for public use”.  Overall, a substantial discrepancy exists between the 
conceptually broad coverage set out in the definition of “standard” and the resulting 
regulatory scope based on relevant definitions and Articles as shown in Figure 4.  
Nevertheless, the concept of “voluntary standards” and the concept of “mandatory standards” 
were tied up together under the concept of “standards”, sharing all aspects and features 
together except for the legal element of “legal obligation to comply” conferred only by 
government standards bodies.  Therefore, it can be inferred that the Draft Code considers the 
category of “mandatory standards” a partial form of government regulations and the category 
of “voluntary standards” a partial form of private standards.  The distinction and the 
meaning of “legal obligation to comply” of the Draft Code is, thus, unambiguous, despite the 
fact that the regulatory scope of “standard” under the regime is quite limited.  
 
6.1.1.2 Implications from the analysis of “standard” in the Standards Code 
 
After the Tokyo Round negotiation, the so-called Standards Code was adopted and had 
been effective until the adoption of the current WTO TBT Agreement.  The Standards Code 
uses the term “technical specification” instead of “standards” as used in the 1973 Draft Code 
and divides the concept into two categories, “technical regulation” and “standard” instead of 
roughly corresponding respective terms of “mandatory standards” and “voluntary standards” 
as used in the early Draft Code.  The changes in terminology were largely due to influence 
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by the contemporary development of terminologies and their normative definitions by the 
ISO/ECE Guide.  Besides, the relations between these three concepts are pretty much the 
same as those represented in the 1973 Draft Code.  Annex 1 to the Standards Code, likewise, 
provides definitions of these three respective terms.  Under the regime of the Standards Code, 
there is “technical specification” as one source of technical barriers to trade, which the 
Standards Code intends to address, and it is again categorized into two groups of “technical 
regulation” and “standard” depending on their compliance obligation.   
Similarly with the 1973 Draft Code, an analysis of their definitions leads to a conclusion 
that a primary determinative legal element between the category of “technical regulation” and 
the category of “standard” is still a mandatory character of its compliance.  Both definitions 
correspondingly state that compliance with “technical regulation” is mandatory whereas 
compliance with “standards” is not mandatory.   
However, unlike the 1973 Draft Code regime, the adjective “legal” is no longer used in the 
definition of “standard”.  Nor does the definition of “technical regulation” contain the phrase 
“by virtue of an action by an authority endowed with the necessary legal power” any longer.  
However, it is noted that the regulatory structure of the Standards Code continues to limit the 
scope of “technical regulations” to works of government bodies and regulatory bodies.  It is 
additionally noted that the term “non-governmental body” has been newly adopted and is 
defined as “[a] body other than a central government body or a local government body, 
including a non-governmental body which has legal power to enforce a technical regulation”.  
In other words, from this definition of the new term, it can be clearly inferred that 
governmental or regulatory bodies should be endowed with “legal power to enforce technical 
regulations” and that the ambiguous phrase of just “mandatory” obligation to comply perhaps 
is perceived by the “legal power” of their government and regulatory bodies.  
The entire regulatory coverage of “technical specification” has now expanded from the 
regulatory scope of the previously corresponding concept “standards” of the 1973 Draft Code. 
Specifically speaking, the regulatory structure of the Standards Code perhaps indicates that 
the scope of “standards” is no longer delimited in terms of their non-governmental standards 
bodies because Article 2 and Article 3 are now intended to be partially applied to standards 
prepared, adopted and used by central and local government bodies and regulatory bodies in 
addition to Article 4 which continues to govern standards by non-government bodies.   
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Source: Author’s analysis based on the implications from Chapter 4 
 
 
In sum, in the Tokyo Round Standards Code, the meaning of “mandatory compliance” 
becomes more ambiguous due to the omission of the word “legal” in relevant definitions but 
is still hinted by some requirements to their standards bodies to possess legally enforceable 
power.  Furthermore, the regulatory coverage of the term “technical specification” has 
expanded since the bodies of “standards” now encompass a broader range, which includes 
                                           
463 For the purpose of this thesis, only the substantive subject matters of the TBT Agreement are considered.  
The category of conformity assessment procedure, procedural subject matter is not considered.  
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non-government bodies to central and local government bodies, to regulatory bodies.464  
<Figure 14> shows the development of outer boundaries embracing the entire scope of the 
TBT Agreement and the inner distinction between the two exclusive sub-categories.  The 
historical development of the TBT Agreement shows the concept of “standards” and the 
concept of “technical regulations” have thus evolved together throughout the negotiating 
history, but that evolution was within a larger boundary of some general concept such as 
“standards” in the 1973 Draft Code or “technical specifications” in the Standards Code.  In 
other words, the TBT Agreement has consistently established a broad boundary that probably 
encompasses the largest extent of scope, and then has defined the two specific categories.  It 
was only after the Uruguay Round that this entire scope has become blurred.  The TBT 
Agreement uses the word “document” to define both technical regulations and standards but 
does no long provide any definition of “document” for the purpose of the TBT Agreement.  
 
6.1.2 Legal evidence from the analysis of ‘standard’ in the WTO TBT 
Agreement  
 
The conceptual development of the large category in negotiation history shows that the 
elements of the outer boundary have remained unchanged and almost identical with the 
corresponding term in the ECE/ISO definitions.  As explained in Chapter 4 of this thesis, in 
the 1973 Draft Code, the definition of “standards” was “any specification which lays down 
some or all of the properties of a product in terms of quality, purity, nutritional values, 
performance, dimensions, or other characteristics.”465  In the ECE/ISO definitions, the 
corresponding term “technical specification” was defined as “[a] document which lays down 
characterization of a product or a service such as levels of quality, performance, safety, 
                                           
464 See <Table 11> of this thesis.  Roughly, the two definitions are compared in the following: the definition 
of “voluntary standards body” in the 1973 Draft Codes says, “[t]his term means any non-governmental 
organization which prepares voluntary standards for public use…” while the definition of “standardizing 
body” in the Standards Code provides, “[a] governmental or non-governmental body, one of whose 
recognized activities is in the field of standardization.” 
465 Supra note 134.  
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dimensions.” 466   In the Tokyo Round Standards Code, the definition of “technical 
specification” was “a specification contained in a document which lays down characteristics 
of a product such as levels of quality, performance, safety or dimensions.”   All the 
definitions identically state in the second sentence, “it may include… terminology, symbols, 
testing and test methods, packaging, marking or labeling requirements”.  Also, the 
GATT/WTO TBT Agreements has excluded services and codes of practice from the very 
beginning.  
In general, the outer boundary is delineated based on a set of elements such as 
“specification”, “which lays down characteristics (or properties) of a product”, “such as 
quality, performance, safety or dimensions”, inclusion of additional subject matters like 
terminologies and labeling requirements and exclusion of services.   
This outer boundary had been a common scope for both ‘technical regulations’ and 
‘standards’ until the adoption of the WTO TBT Agreement.  However, during the Uruguay 
Round, any corresponding term to “technical specification” in the Standards Code was 
deleted and each definition of technical regulation and standard in the WTO TBT Agreement 
commonly uses the term “document” without defining what it means.  Thus, the outer 
boundary has become less clear under the WTO TBT Agreement regime than under the 
previous regimes.  
In US-Tuna II, the Appellate Body noted the term “document” in the definition of 
“technical regulation” and looked it up in the Oxford English Dictionary.  It explained that 
the word “document” is defined quite broadly as “something written, inscribed, etc., which 
furnishes evidence or information upon any subject” and concluded that it covers “a broad 
range of instruments or apply to a variety of measures” which, then, is narrowed by other 
elements in the definition such as “lays down product characteristics”, and “mandatory 
compliance”.467  Despite its wide acceptance, the textual approach taken by the Panel seems 
to have reached a quite limited interpretative result.  As defined in the dictionary, “document” 
itself indicates some form, not the substance.   
The development of the outer scope and the conceptual development of the terms 
“technical regulation” and “standard” studied in the previous Chapter of this thesis, however, 
                                           
466 Supra note 194. 
467 Appellate Body report, US-Tuna II, para. 185.  
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implies more clearly the context and probably the intention of the early drafters for having 
those concepts in the TBT Agreement.   
As mentioned earlier, the outer boundary had been determined, before the WTO TBT 
Agreement, by major elements like “specification”, “which lays down characteristics (or 
properties) of a product”, “such as quality, performance, safety or dimensions”, “including 
terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, packaging, marking or labeling requirements”.  
In the WTO TBT Agreement, these elements are all represent in the definition of “technical 
regulations” while no corresponding term to “technical specification” as defined in the Tokyo 
Round Standards Code is represent.   
This implies that the outer scope is now delineated through some elements of the “technical 
regulation” definition, rather than through the definition of any separate general term like 
“technical specification”.  This further implies that, just like in any other Draft Code or the 
Tokyo Round Standards Code, these elements found in the definition of “technical regulations” 
should also be applied to the concept “standards” and should be commonly shared for the 
scope of “standards”.  
 
6.1.3 A suggestion on a two-stage review process for the legal 
characterization of a ‘standard’ 
 
The findings that the category of “standards” and the category of “technical regulations” 
are in parallel with and exclusive to each other within a larger outer boundary logically lead to 
the conclusion that determination of a “technical regulation” inevitably accompanies 
determination of “not a standard” and vice versa.  Since a “technical regulation” and a 
“standard” are defined separately, there are, in theory, two ways to make one conclusion.  
For example, in order to find out whether a specific document is a technical regulation or not, 
one may examine the definition of “technical regulation” and determine a “technical 
regulation” following a positive finding of mandatory compliance; or one may examine the 
definition of “standard” and determine a “technical regulation” following a negative finding 
of mandatory compliance.  In principle, both ways should produce an identical determination.  
This is because, as explained in the previous two sections, the categories of “technical 
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regulations” and “standards” share a common outer boundary and differ only in the binding 
character of compliance.  
  The review criteria which have been generally established in jurisprudence are based on the 
definition of “technical regulations”.  In a majority of disputes, the parties disputed over 
Article 2 of the TBT Agreement and determination of a “technical regulation” has been 
considered a “threshold” issue.  Based on the definition of “technical regulation, panels and 
the AB have established as a general rule that there are three elements to consider, namely, (1) 
whether the disputed measure applies to an “identifiable product”; (2) whether the disputed 
measure “lays down product characteristics”; and (3) whether compliance with the disputed 
measure is mandatory.  Only in case where all these three elements are satisfied, a “technical 
regulation” can be determined as shown in the flow chart in Figure 15.  
 




Source: Author’s analysis based on the panels’ and the AB’s interpretations in disputes 
 
 
However, this legal characterization review process applied in actual dispute cases is not 
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consistently applied.  For example, the Panel in US-COOL examined “mandatory 
compliance” criterion first, “identifiable product” criterion second, and then “lays down 
product characteristics” criterion last, the order of which is quite departing from what is 
commonly applied.  Especially, it is noted that the Panel examined in accordance with the 
following order: (a) whether compliance with the COOL measure and the Vilsack letter is 
mandatory468; (b) whether the COOL measure applies to an identifiable product or groups of 
products469; and (c) whether the COOL measure lays down one or more characteristics of the 
product470.   Therefore, the Panel examined the legal element of “mandatory compliance” 
first and then considered the other two elements, which is quite an opposite order to the 
review steps in other disputes.  
Another relevant example is the AB’s review process in US-Tuna II.  In response to an 
appeal concerning the “mandatory” character of the compliance with the measure at issue, the 
AB preceded an examination, the content of which is somewhat mixed up or overlapping with 
the analysis of the “product characteristic” criterion.  To be specific, the AB’s review was in 
the order of (a) interpretation of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement and (b) whether the 
measure at issue constitutes a technical regulation.471  In the process, the AB did not 
particularly address the legal element of “mandatory compliance” but it went through the 
other two criteria and two additional criteria in order to determine “mandatoriness” in each of 
the criteria, which seem quite unorganized and unclear.  
The three criteria are all drawn out from the definition of ‘technical regulation’ but they 
originate from different definitions in the previous drafts and each of them has its own 
purpose and implication.  Specifically, the criterion “identifiable product” probably has a 
function of testing whether the measure at issue is concerning product, not service or service 
characteristics.  The criterion “lays down product characteristics” examines whether the 
measure is a kind of the Agreement’s general subject matter standards or technical 
specifications.  These two criteria ask whether a measure at dispute and the matter addressed 
by the measure are subject to the application of the TBT Agreement in general.  Then, the 
                                           
468 Panel report, US-COOL, paras. 7.149-7.197. 
469 Panel report, US-COOL, paras. 7,198-7.208.  
470 Panel report, US-COOL, paras. 7.209-7.217.  
471 Appellate Body report, US-Tuna II, paras. 190-199.  
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third criterion “mandatory compliance” plays important roles in distinguishing ‘technical 
regulation’ and ‘standard’ and subsequently determining which rules and procedures to apply.  
 




Source: Author’s analysis based on the implications from Chapter 5 
 
 
Therefore, a conceptually more appropriate review procedure of legal characterization 
should be composed of two large stages.  The first stage must seek the objective of 
determining whether a document or a measure at issue falls within the entire scope of the TBT 
Agreement.  Therefore, in this stage, the first two criteria – the criterion “identifiable product” 
and the criterion “lays down product characteristics” – should be tested.  Then, in the second 
stage, the question of which source of technical barriers to trade is at hand should be 
considered through an analysis of the criterion “mandatory compliance”.  The purpose of the 
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second stage is to distinguish between ‘technical regulation’ and ‘standard’ and to 
subsequently decide upon which set of provisions is applicable.  <Figure 16> summarizes 
the suggested two-stage model of legal characterization procedure.  
The suggested two-stage model is more desirable for a dispute situation in which one party 
argues that the measure at issue is a “technical regulation” and the other party claims that it is 
a “standard”.  Such a dispute case would be quite distinctive from a dispute in which both 
parties do not disagree over the legal characterization of a measure at hand but the 
adjudicating body must proceed to consider this threshold legal issue.  In the former case, a 
determination of a ‘technical regulation’ inevitably implies a determination of a non-‘standard’ 
and a determination of a non-‘technical regulation’ will necessitate a subsequent text to 
determine a ‘standard’.  In the latter case, on the contrary, a determination of a ‘technical 
regulation’ or ‘standard’ will affirm the application of the TBT Agreement and a 
determination of non-‘technical regulation’ or non-‘standard’ will automatically nullify the 
applicability of the Agreement.  
In fact, one of the legal issues in US-Tuna II was surrounding this threshold issue.  As 
explained above in Chapter 5.4, Mexico, the complainant, claimed that the US dolphin-safe 
labeling scheme was a mandatory “technical regulation” within the meaning of the TBT 
Agreement while the US, the defendant, argued that the US measure was a voluntary 
“standard”.  In the case, the Panel and the AB applied the first model with three criteria 
drawn from the definition of “technical regulation”: (1) identifiable product; (2) lays down 
product characteristics; and (3) mandatory compliance.  In such a dispute, if the adjudicating 
body had concluded that the measure at issue was not a mandatory ‘technical regulation’, then 
the examination does not stop there and this does not imply that the TBT Agreement is not 
applicable.  Instead, such a determination in turn would imply that the Agreement is still 
applicable but a different set of provisions is now applied.  In other words, ‘standard’ rules 
and procedures are applied rather than ‘technical regulation’ rules and procedures.  
 
 
6.2 Revisiting the Concept of “Mandatory” Compliance 
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6.2.1 General applicability of the four criteria for the concept of 
“mandatory/voluntary” compliance 
 
The binding character of their compliance is one critical element that distinguishes 
‘standards’ from ‘technical regulation’.  If compliance is voluntary, such specifications will 
be treated as “standards” for the purpose of the TBT Agreement.  If compliance is 
mandatory, such specifications will be considered as “technical regulations”.  However, the 
concept of “mandatory compliance” is not based on concrete legal definitions and thus fairly 
ambiguous in its application.   
A few disputes involved the threshold issue of legal characterization and rigorously 
reviewed the concept of “mandatory compliance”.  In US-COOL, the Panel tested whether 
the so-called Vilsack letter, allegedly one constituent of the US labeling system, was not 
mandatory to comply, thereby not constituting a technical regulation.472   
In US-Tuna II, the legal issue of interpreting the concept “mandatory/voluntary compliance” 
was one of the core issues of the dispute.  As illustrated in Chapter 5.4 and Chapter 5.5 
which analyzed the divergent opinions over the issue, the disputants, third parties, panels and 
the AB all had different views from each other, and the panel reached no consensus among 
themselves.  The Panel’s determination of a “technical regulation” was appealed by the 
US473 and, accordingly, the AB analyzed the compliance character of the US dolphin-safe 
labeling scheme based on the following four criteria: “(1) whether the measure consists of a 
law or a regulation enacted by a WTO Member; (2) whether it prescribes or prohibits 
particular conduct; (3) whether it sets out specific requirements that constitute the sole means 
of addressing a particular matter, and (4) the nature of the matter addressed by the 
measure”.474  These four criteria that the AB introduced to determine the “mandatoriness” 
are summarized in <Table 18>. 
 
                                           
472 Panel report, US-COOL, paras. 7.163-7.197. 
473 AB report, US-Tuna II, paras. 11-18.  
474 AB report, US-Tuna II, para. 188.  
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Table 18. Analytical criteria and a summary of their limitation to be generally 
applied to determine mandatoriness and voluntariness 
Analytical criteria Mandatoriness Voluntariness 
Criterion 1. 
Whether it was enacted by 
law 
Mandatory TRs are enacted 
by law. 
Voluntary standards are “not” 
enacted by law. (X) 
Criterion 2. 
Whether it prescribes, 
prohibits, regulates certain 
product characteristics 
Mandatory TRs prescribe, 
prohibit or regulate certain 
product characteristics. 
Voluntary standards do “not” 
prescribe, prohibit or regulate 
certain product characteristics. 
(X) 
Criterion 3.  
Whether it provides “only 
and exclusive means” to 
express certain product 
characteristics 
Mandatory TRs provide 
“only and exclusive means” 
to express certain product 
characteristics. 
Voluntary standards provide or 
allows “multiple or inclusive 
means” to express certain 
product characteristics. (?) 
Criterion 4.  
Nature of the matter 
addressed by the measure  
Not sufficiently clear (?) Not sufficiently clear (?) 
Source: Author’s analysis  
 
 
In US-Tuna II, the legal issue of characterizing the measure and, thereby, determining the 
applicability of Article 2 of the TBT Agreement was based on two claims: on the one hand, 
the complainant argued that the US measure at dispute was a “technical regulation” within the 
meaning of the TBT Agreement and, on the other hand, the responding US claimed that the 
measure in question was not a “technical regulation” but a “standard” defined in the 
Agreement.  Therefore, the result of the Panel and the AB’s examination must involve either 
of a finding that the measure in question is a “technical regulation” but not a “standard”, or of 
a finding that the measure is not a “technical regulation” but a “standard”.  In other words, 
the criteria the Panel and the AB applies must be, in principle, determinative for 
distinguishing a “technical regulation” from a “standard” and vice versa.  
In general, it is true that case-by-case approach is employed by the WTO adjudicating body 
when reviewing a dispute and, therefore, finding and ruling cannot be generalized and applied 
to other cases with equal weight.  Notwithstanding this general rule of dispute examination, 
the AB’s four criteria for analyzing the mandatory compliance obligation may provide a good 
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starting point for addressing the unclear concept of mandatory/voluntary compliance and 
finding a determinative element for defining the concept.   
However, a tested hypothesis in this analysis is that if positive findings to the four criteria 
serve determinative evidence for characterizing a measure as a ‘technical regulation’, then 
negative findings to them would logically lead to determination of a “voluntary” ‘standard’ if 
and only if at least one of the four criteria is a sufficient condition.  In this section, this 
hypothesis is tested.  The result of the analyses on each of the criteria generally lead to a 
conclusion that the criteria do not provide any determinative element to distinguish voluntary 
compliance from mandatory compliance.  More precisely, the set of criteria falls short of 
providing a general rule to follow in legally characterizing a “technical regulation” from a 
“standard” or vice versa under the TBT Agreement regime.  Instead, the analyses suggest 
that the criteria in fact have some limitations and inappropriate review process to be used as a 
general rule for the threshold analysis of legal characterization.  
 
6.2.1.1 A criterion to be based on “enactment by law”   
 
The first criterion applied by the AB in US-Tuna II to determine a “technical regulation” 
and its characteristics of “mandatory compliance” was the question whether the measure at 
issue was enacted by law.  In its review, the AB first considered whether the measure at 
issue “consists of a law enacted by the US Congress and regulations pertaining to the use of 
the “dolphin-safe” label set out in the United States Code of Federal Regulations”.475  
Subsequently, the AB affirmed that the measure was based on “legislative or regulatory acts 
of the US federal authorities.” 
This criterion of testing whether a certain specification is based on the government 
authority’s legal enactment or implementing regulation can be a necessary condition for 
determining a “technical regulation”, but cannot be a sufficient condition.  This is supported 
by reasons from two perspectives.  One perspective involves the current definition of the 
term “technical regulation” in the WTO TBT Agreement considered in the context of its legal 
development in the GATT/WTO negotiating history.  The other perspective is related to the 
                                           
475 AB report, US-Tuna II, para. 191.  
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realities and practices in major countries.  
First, as discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis, the legal definition of “technical regulation” 
has developed in a direction that removes conditions for its standardizing body.  The 
requirement that the mandatory compliance be made by some legal enactment and legal 
enforcement by government or regulatory bodies appears in the earliest available draft codes 
but neither in the Tokyo Round Standards Code nor in the WTO TBT Agreement.  The 
following several passages elaborate on the change in the negotiating history.  
In the very early discussion to identify the problems of standards – i.e. standards in a 
general sense – , the negotiators noted that the role of government differed significantly in the 
field of standardization from country to country and both government bodies and private 
organizations were involved in the field of standardization.476  This led to the regulatory 
structure in the 1973 Draft Code for to incorporate three levels of standards bodies, namely, 
central, local, and non-government bodies.477   
Nevertheless, it was additionally noted that “the area of voluntary standards were largely 
confined to industrial products. Safety and health regulations were usually compulsory”. 478  
Accordingly, the 1973 Draft Code defined the category of “mandatory standards”, which was 
later replaced by “technical regulations”, not only in terms of binding character of its 
compliance but also in terms of some characteristics of the standards body.  In specific, it 
conditioned the compliance with mandatory standards be made compulsory “by virtue of an 
action by an authority endowed with the necessary legal power”.479  Consequently, only 
government bodies and regulatory bodies which were basically defined as bodies with legal 
power to enforce a mandatory standard were assumed to be able to prepared, adopt and use 
and, thus, were subject to the disciplines for “mandatory standards”.  In contrast, the 1973 
Draft Code defines “voluntary standards” partly in terms of their voluntary standards body 
which is, in turn, defined as “any non-governmental organization” including some “national 
standards bodies”.  Thus, at this stage, the legal enactment and legal power to enforce on the 
part of the standards body were important elements for understanding the concept of 
                                           
476 MTN/3B/3, para. 6.  
477 See Chapter IV, Section 1.3.1.  
478 Supra note 454.   
479 COM.IND/W/108, 1973 Draft Code, Annex 1.2. 
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compulsory compliance.  
However, such a description for the concept of mandatory compliance was removed during 
the Tokyo Round negotiation and the definition of “technical regulation” does not contain any 
description or condition to the requirement of compulsory compliance.  The factor regarding 
standards body became less certain in definitions of “technical regulations”.  Nevertheless, 
the regulatory structure and the definition of “non-government body” still indirectly referred 
to some characteristics of standards body and thus described ‘technical regulation’ in terms of 
their bodies although the link became weaker than before.480 
Finally, in the WTO TBT Agreement, the respective definitions of technical regulations 
and standards do not contain any reference to the standards body and the regulatory structure 
no longer limit the scope of them in respect of their bodies.  Thus, the factor of standards 
body became legally little relevant in determining the criterion “mandatory compliance”.  
Second, in practice, national ‘standards’ are also based on general law and subject to legal 
enforcement just like national ‘technical regulation’.  In general, the entitlement of “national” 
in national standards is supported by its basis on legal enactment or a general law.  For 
example, “Korean Industrial Standards” or KS are allegedly to be voluntary national 
standards and they are prepared, adopted and applied by the Korea Agency for Technology 
and Standards, a government body under the auspice of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy, based on the Industrial Standardization Act.481  Furthermore, any deceptive use or 
any misuse of the KS marking is closely monitored and responded under the general national 
market surveillance scheme.  Therefore, the fact that a standard is based on law and subject 
to enforcement mechanism does not necessarily imply that the compliance with such standard 
is mandatory.  Ample evidence shows that national standards are based on law but they are 
still considered to be voluntary.  
 
6.2.1.2 A criterion to “prescribe, prohibit, or regulate certain product characteristics” 
 
The second criterion considered by the AB in US-Tuna II was related to the compulsory 
manner of the measure at issue.  The AB tried to reaffirm a compulsory compliance manner 
                                           
480 For more elaborated discussion, see Section 6.1.1.2 of this thesis.  
481 Korea Agency for Technology and Standards, <http://www.kats.go.kr/en_kats/standard/KAEU03_1.asp> 
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by looking at the fact that the measure regulated, prescribed, and prohibited certain product 
characteristics.  For example, the AB found that the US measure conditioned eligibility for a 
“dolphin-safe” label based on certain documentary evidence, prohibited any reference to 
dolphins, porpoises, or marine mammals on the label and regulated by establishing “a single 
and legally mandated set of requirements making any statement with respect to the broad 
subject “dolphin-safety” of tuna product in the United States”.482 
It is noted, however, that almost an identical examination had already been conducted 
when the AB was considering the second main legal criteria “lays down product 
characteristics”.483  As examined and suggested in Section 6.1, the first and second main 
criteria “identifiable product” and “lays down product characteristics” are separate from the 
criterion “mandatory compliance”.  
Therefore, this criterion of considering whether a measure regulates, prescribes, or 
prohibits certain product characteristics in a compulsory manner is duplicative with the 
previous step for examining whether the measure “lays down product characteristics” 
regardless of its binding manner.  The AB mentioned that this criterion was to review the 
measure’s compulsory manner and this differently intended goal of the review may have 
entailed different content from the previous examination of the element “lays down product 
characteristics”.  However, the AB’s analysis does not contain any such distinctive feature.  
Consequently, this criterion provides no crucial standard for distinguishing technical 
regulations from standards in respect of their compliance manner.  
Meanwhile, it may be questioned whether it is necessary to apply the same legal element of 
“lays down product characteristics” to determine a “standard”.  As discussed in Section 6.1, 
the definition of “standard” also contains this element; it defines a “standard” as “document… 
which provides… characteristics for products…”.  Consequently, panels and the AB would 
also have to consider whether a document “provides”, “prescribes” or “prohibits”, a certain 
product characteristic in very much the same way as in the examination procedure for 
determining a technical regulation.  Then, it is not sufficiently clear how to carry out an 
                                           
482 AB report, US-Tuna II, para. 193.  
483 In general, panels and the AB examine whether the disputed measure defines, or prescribes in the positive 
form or prohibits in the negative form a certain characteristics.  Likewise in US-Tuna II, the Panel had 
already found that the US scheme defined the conditions that must be met if a product was to bear a “dolphin-
safe” label, and in so doing, it conveyed criteria to be fulfilled, thereby laying down “labeling requirements”. 
258 
examination under the second criterion applied by the AB.    
 
6.2.1.3 A criterion of “only and exclusive means”  
 
The third criterion that the AB considered was a question of whether the measure at issue 
provided a single and exclusive means of indicating the subject product characteristics. The 
AB found that the measure at issue, in effect, established a single definition of “dolphin-safe” 
and covered the entire field of what “dolphin-safe” means in relation to tuna products in the 
US and finally concluded that the compliance with the US labelling scheme was compulsory.  
However, this criterion serves only a case-specific condition and cannot be generally applied 
to definitively affirm “mandatory compliance” because of the following reasons.   
First, the AB explanation was that the compliance with the US labeling scheme was 
mandatory because it set out a single way or only one way to claim dolphin safety on tuna 
products.  Then, if a measure requires only one way to use a product characteristic, does this 
single method per se constitute the mandatoriness?  It may not.  In other words, there can 
also be a government scheme under which multiple ways use a certain product characteristic 
are suggested but compliance with the scheme be nevertheless compulsory.  The concept of 
mandatory compliance cannot be determined by the number of choices allowed to conform to 
a certain product characteristic.  
Second, the AB described that the US labeling scheme provided an exclusive way to make 
any claim on dolphin-safety, thus making this measure effectively prohibiting other 
alternatives, and emphasized that this particular characteristic of the scheme produces 
mandatory character of the compliance.  To simply put, the AB considered existence of 
alternatives as an important factor for concluding that the disputed measure was “mandatory”.  
However, this approach seems to be inappropriate since the inherent characteristic of 
compliance and existence of alternatives are two different things.  A measure can be 
compulsory, prohibiting or allowing other alternatives; a measure can also be voluntary, 
prohibiting or allowing other alternatives.  If a measure provides for one method and 
prohibits all the other methods, then the measure can be perceived as an only available way.  
However, this fact alone does not transform the measure’s inherent type of compliance 
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obligation. 
Another concern about this approach is that it is based on too flexible and thus too vague 
concept of exclusivity.  Even under the same measure, exclusivity can exist or not exist, and 
such an existence virtually depends on the situation faced by the counterpart.  For instance, 
if a government adopts a standard which prohibits use of all the other alternatives to indicate a 
certain product characteristic but allows only one designated way, then, if the AB’s approach 
is applied, it would logically lead to a conclusion that such a measure is based on mandatory 
compliance and is, thus, a ‘technical regulation’ for the purpose of the TBT Agreement.   
Now, suppose that this government signs a mutual recognition agreement with other 
governments, consequently allowing other alternatives designated in the mutual recognition 
agreement, would this new situation modify the previous determination of a ‘technical 
regulation’ into a finding of non-exclusive ‘standard’?  Since the mutual recognition 
arrangement in principle permits the exporters’ conformity with their domestic technical 
regulations in the importer’s domestic market, the previously exclusive ‘technical regulation’ 
would now be perceived as non-exclusive ‘standards’.  
Then, there comes another problem in the simulated case above.  Producers and suppliers 
of non-parties to the mutual recognition agreement will continuously perceive the importing 
country’s domestic measure exclusive to them.  In other words, exporters in non-parties to 
the mutual recognition agreement will realize that, unlike the products of the exporters in the 
parties, their products are still restricted and importer’s measures are exclusive and mandatory 
to them, even if their products are domestically certified and even if the arrangement partially 
allows some other alternatives under the mutual recognition scheme.   
On the other hand, what would be a legal characterization of the measure if the US scheme 
in US-Tuna II allowed the labeling requirement established by a relevant international 
standard organization such as AIDCP?  If the international standards were allowed in the US 
market along with the designated labeling standard in dispute, would this render the US 
measure non-exclusive and, thus, a ‘standard’? 
All these conceptual problems are created because the criterion “only and exclusive means” 
does not deal with some factors inherent to a measure itself.  The exclusivity or inclusivity is 
determined by the existence of other options, not some factors inherent to the measure itself. 
Moreover, a measure which excludes all other means can also be operated on a voluntary 
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basis.  Likewise, a measure which allows other alternatives can still be legally compulsory, 
making such an inclusive measure a mandatory ‘technical regulation’.  Therefore, it may be 
more appropriate to determine the mandatory/voluntary compliance character based on the 
measure’s inherent feature, rather than by the measure’s exogenous factors such as the 
existence of some alternatives.  
   
6.2.1.4 A criterion to consider “nature of the matter addressed” and a suggestion to 
consider specificity of the matter 
 
The last criterion is consideration on the “nature of the matter addressed by the measure”.  
The AB mentioned this criteria as one of the four relevant factors to consider regarding the 
mandatoriness analysis but did not sufficiently explain in specific terms, so the criteria 
remains legally ambiguous.  
One aspect of the nature of the matter can be considered highly relevant to the legal 
element of mandatoriness.  This feature can be labeled as specificity of the matter.  In US-
Tuna II, for example, the matter addressed by the measure was a labeling scheme which 
specifically regulated the fishing method of tuna in specifically designated ocean for the 
purpose of protecting a species, namely, dolphin.  In other words, the regulatory purpose, 
regulated methods, and regulated product were all so narrowly and specifically designated in 
the measure.   
Due to the high specificity in the nature and architecture of the US measure, the resulting 
binding force turned out to be fairly high.  This implies that the more specific the purpose of 
a measure is, and/or the more specific the way regulated by a measure is, and/or the more 
specific the product subject to a measure is, the stronger influence the measure will have on 
producers and suppliers to comply.  Therefore, a purpose of protecting dolphins rather than 
marine mammals in general, a regulatory structure of requiring to equip certain device and to 
use it in certain marine area rather than general requirements to follow, and/or a specific 
product like tuna product rather than fish products in general must have necessarily 
accompanied strong and direct influence on restraining the producers’ choice.  
Therefore, the specificity of the measure can be a useful criterion to consider, and a finding 
of high specificity in a measure at dispute would likely lead to a finding of mandatoriness and 
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vice versa.  Nevertheless, this cannot be an absolute and determinative criterion for 
mandatoriness.  It should be noted that the feature of specificity can be one possible 
component for the “nature of the matter” criterion.  
 
 
6.2.2 Reconsidering the concept of “mandatory” based on the market-
entry condition criterion 
 
The adjudicating body of the WTO dispute settlement system seems to disagree with the 
idea of adopting a market-entry condition criterion in making a determination of “mandatory 
compliance”.  In US-Tuna II dispute, the US argued that the compliance with its labeling 
scheme was not mandatory because non-labelled products may be marketed.  Also, one of 
the Panel who had a separate opinion from the majority stated that the compliance with the 
US measure was not de jure mandatory because non-labelled products may be marketed.  
Although the dissenting panel member could not precede its examination since the 
complaining party Mexico did not successfully establish factual arguments that supported its 
position.  Nevertheless, the dissenting panel seems to have supported an introduction of the 
interpretative approach based on de facto mandatory compliance.  The panel, however, 
mentioned that there are two components to demonstrate before establishing a de facto 
mandatory concept.  The two components were impossibility to market without the label and 
the fact that such impossibility arose from the measure or another government action.  In 
short, the dissenting panel required the de facto mandatoriness to be based on market entry 
denial and a causal link between the denial and some government action. 
Although the defending party US tried to argue that the measure was not mandatory since it 
was not market-entry condition, the AB explicitly disagreed with this US argument.  The, 
AB noted that definition of “technical regulation” does not contain any word like “market” or 
“territory” nor does it indicate that a labeling requirement is “mandatory” only if there is a 
requirement to use a particular label in order to place a product for sale on the market.  Thus, 
the AB objected to adopting a market-entry perspective, stating,  
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“ [t]o us, the mere fact that there is no requirement to use a particular label 
in order to place a product for sale on the market does not preclude a 
finding that a measure constitutes a “technical regulation” within the 
meaning of Annex 1.1.  Instead, in the context of the present case, we 
attach significance to the fact that, while it is possible to sell tuna products 
without a “dolphin-safe” label in the United States, any “producer, importer, 
exporter, distributor or seller” of tuna products must comply with the 
measure at issue in order to make any “dolphin-safe” claim.”484 
 
The AB’s expressive rejection to a market-entry condition approach can cause some 
additional confusion in the operation of the WTO TBT regime.  First of all, it is widely 
understood that the term mandatory or voluntary in general context indicates that use of a 
certain standard can either be legally required or not legally required for a product before it is 
put on market sale.  Accordingly, international, regional or domestic standardizing bodies 
publicly announce that their standards are mandatory or voluntary and the WTO members 
notify to the WTO secretariat of their mandatory technical regulations based on their self-
judgment on the mandatoriness.  However, the problem is that, as shown in US-Tuna II, the 
AB explicitly opposed the idea of considering whether a standard is a market-entry pre-
requisite or not in finding mandatoriness but did not provide any determinative element for 
judging mandatory or voluntary concept within the meaning of the TBT Agreement.  The 
AB’s strict textualist approach and insufficient consideration of the context such as wide 
acceptance of the market-entry condition approach inevitably results in this legal obscurity 
and practical confusion.  
 
 
6.3 Revisiting ‘Standard’ in the TBT Regime 
 
In line with the implications and partial conclusions of the analyses in the previous 
Chapters of this thesis, this Chapter finally revisits the concept of ‘standards’ and attempts to 
                                           
484 AB report, US-Tuna II, para. 196.  
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suggest an appropriate way to understand and apply the concept in practice.  In conclusion, 
there are basically two arguments and suggestions.  First, it may be desirable to carry out the 
legal characterization of a measure in accordance with a suggested two-stage review process.  
Currently, the one-stage-three-criteria review process is introduced and applied when a 
measure at issue is reviewed in disputes.  However, this process is based on the definition of 
‘technical regulations’ only and seems to an incomplete approach because it consequently 
neglects the definition of ‘standards’ and the conceptual existence of a larger outer boundary 
which combines the two.  Furthermore, this process is not even consistently applied in actual 
dispute settlements, which urgently calls for an established order and review process.   
Second, it further argues that the recent approach to interpreting “mandatory/voluntary 
compliance” concept in US-Tuna II does not sufficiently provide a generally applicable set of 
criteria for future disputes.  The majority of the criteria are redundant or only providing 
necessary conditions, rather than sufficient conditions.  Moreover, this Chapter noted that 
some of the interpretative approaches were excessively relied on textual interpretation, 
thereby rejecting some of the practical approaches suggested by the disputants and the Panel.  
  Finally, it emphasizes that the concept of “mandatory/voluntary compliance” should be 
extensively applied so that part of the legally voluntary but virtually mandatory ‘standards’ 









‘Standard’ has been one of the most important subject matters of the GATT/WTO TBT 
regime.  From the very inception of the proposed TBT Agreement right after the Kennedy 
Round, ‘standard’ has been considered as one of the major causes for technical barriers, along 
with ‘technical regulation’.  ‘Standard’ and ‘technical regulation’ differ from each other 
basically in terms of their standardizing bodies, trade effects, and standardization purposes, 
and, therefore, the regulatory distinction between them in the TBT Agreement seems to be 
natural and essential.  However, despite the importance of the distinction, the TBT 
Agreement only puts a vague and indefinite dividing line between them.  This dividing line 
contains vague boundaries, overlaps and some loopholes in practice, creating a large loophole 
in the system. 
This thesis addressed this important issue surrounding the regulatory scope of the TBT 
Agreement, particularly in respect of the meaning, regulatory scope and legal status of 
‘standards’ in the TBT regime.  The concept of ‘standard’ in the current TBT Agreement is 
too generally defined, and the extent of its coverage remains tremendously obscure.  As a 
result, there are several fundamental legal issues related to the clarification and delineation of 
this concept.  Some of them, for example, include such questions as whether the concept 
covers non-product-related process and production methods, whether the concept is primarily 
determined by its standardizing bodies, or whether the concept includes legally voluntary but 
virtually mandatory standards.     
There are quite a few major academic researches, dealing with the operation of the TBT 
Agreement, not to mention this specific fundamental legal issue of clarifying the concept of 
‘standard’.  On this background, this thesis adopts the evolutionary aspect of the concept as 
one important source of reference for grasping its meaning and scope.  Fortunately, there are 
a handful dispute cases in which this issue has been briefly touched upon, albeit the WTO 
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adjudicating body fell short of establishing a general principle for the issue.  Accordingly, 
this thesis takes into account all relevant arguments and approaches suggested during the 
disputes and consider them as valuable sources for establishing the foundation of the concept.  
Notably, ‘standard’ has long been perceived by the TBT Agreement as one important cause 
for technical barriers and, thus, the past draft and final TBT codes treated it as equivalently as 
‘technical regulation’.  In the process of its conceptual development, the regulatory scope of 
‘standard’ has expanded through negotiations, and the concept has gradually detached from 
the factor of existence/non-existence of legal basis and the factor of who the standards body 
are.  
In spite of the evolutionary expansion in terms of its concept and scope, the distinction 
between ‘standard’ and ‘technical regulation’ has evolved to be more ambiguous as the legal 
element of “mandatory/voluntary compliance” became less specific with fewer contextual 
references.  Particularly, the ambiguity originates from the discrepancy between legal 
perception and actual practice.  In other words, “voluntary” ‘standards’ can be broadly 
interpreted as covering legally-voluntary- but-virtually-mandatory standards, or can be 
narrowly interpreted as encompassing only legally-and-virtually voluntary standards.  
Within the spectrum of these two extreme approaches, the WTO Members and the 
adjudicating bodies have tried to find out the proper position in actual disputes, setting out a 
broad foundation for the clarification of the concept ‘standards’. 
The ambiguous distinction between ‘standards’ and ‘technical regulations’, in itself, creates 
a serious loophole in the operation of the TBT Agreement.  Unlike the GATT Standards 
Code which treated “standards” almost equivalently as “technical regulations” except for a 
few transparency obligations, the current TBT regime’s treatment of ‘standards’ is apparently 
dissimilar with the regime’s treatment of ‘technical regulations’ in terms of the strictness of 
the implementation obligation and the degree of specificity in rules and procedures.  In other 
words, the multilateral trading system’s treatment of ‘standards’ has been revised to be more 
general and less direct, which potentially causes increasing uncertainty for the interpretation 
of the definition.  
In fact, the vague concept of “voluntary/mandatory” compliance was one of the most 
critical legal issues in recent US-Tuna II dispute.  The thorough analysis of the dispute case 
concludes with the two results.  First, the definition of ‘standard’ is quite limitedly applied in 
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disputes to date, being interpreted only in the context of “a relevant international standard” as 
provided in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.  There has been no dispute in which 
‘standard’ was interpreted solely for the sake of determining a ‘standard’ itself. Also, 
interpretations of “international standard” were found to be inconsistent.  Sometimes, 
‘standard’ was reviewed as a legal element of “international standard” based on the definition 
of the TBT Agreement but, in other times, the phrase “international standard” was examined 
exclusively based on the definition in the ISO/ECE Guide.  
Second, the legal interpretations and the consequent determination of a ‘technical 
regulation’, which is basically composed of reviews on three legal elements, “identifiable 
product or group of products”, “lays down product characteristics” and “mandatory 
compliance”.  In particular, the concept of “mandatory compliance” as interpreted in this 
context is very important since the criterion also affects the concept and regulatory scope of 
‘standard’.  The concept has rarely been a core legal issue in disputes.  However, the 
disputants in a recent case had substantially different views from each other surrounding the 
meaning of “mandatory/voluntary compliance” and even the adjudicating bodies like panels 
and the AB submitted significantly diverging opinions.  The analysis shows that the AB 
considered the “exclusivity” criterion most important for determining the 
“mandatory/voluntary compliance” concept.  The chapter additionally analyzes the major 
approaches found in disputes, i.e. “market sales condition” approach, “de jure/de facto” 
approach and “exclusivity” approach, and finds that the adjudicating bodies have overly relied 
on a strict textualist approach in interpreting the concept “mandatory compliance”.  
  Finally, the thesis revisits the concept of ‘standards’.  Major findings include that the 
legal characterization of a ‘standard’ or a ‘technical regulation’ should be based on a two-
stage review process and that the recently adopted criteria in US-Tuna II dispute fall short of 
providing generally applicable criteria for reviewing and interpreting the term ‘standards’.  
In addition, this thesis concludes with a suggestion that a concept like “specificity” can be 
adopted to partly constitute the legal element of “mandatory/voluntary compliance”.  It also 
concludes with an emphasis that the practically effective domain of the TBT Agreement can 
be extended if the concept of “mandatory” compliance is flexibly interpreted, rather than 
narrowly interpreted, introducing some ‘standards’ into the scope of ‘technical regulations’. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this thesis will necessitate further studies.  Since the analysis 
267 
of this thesis is primarily focused on the development of the concept ‘standard’ itself, it 
probably needs to extend its scope and discuss the development of rules for ‘standard’ in 
order to have a more complete picture of the concept ‘standard’ defined and treated within the 
operative context of the TBT Agreement.  Furthermore, the legal analysis will essentially 
require more dispute cases and relevant discussions, admitting the current state that the 
development of jurisprudence is only at an early stage and it needs more attention and inputs 
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WTO 무역기술장벽 협정의 ‘표준’에 관한 법적 연구 
 
 
오늘날 생산과 소비에 대한 표준의 역할이 중요해지고 표준으로 인해 발생하는 
비관세 무역장벽 문제가 심화되고 있는 가운데, GATT/WTO 다자무역체제는 이와 
같은 국제 통상과 관련된 표준 문제를 규율하기 위하여 무역기술장벽(TBT)협정을 
도입하고 이를 바탕으로 한 제도를 운영하고 있으나, 협정 목적상 ‘표준’에 관
한 정의와 적용 범위가 분명하게 확립되지 못하여, 제도 운영의 불확실성과 제도
적 한계를 겪고 있다. 이에 따라 본 논문은 WTO TBT협정의 규율대상 중 하나인 
‘표준’의 법적 개념을 연구하였다. 본 논문의 기본 목적은, WTO TBT협정 목적
상 ‘표준’이라는 개념의 법적 의미를 재조명하고, 궁극적으로 동 협정이 무역
장벽으로서의 표준 문제를 보다 효과적으로 규율 할 수 있도록 ‘표준’의 법적 
지위와 적용 범위를 확립하기 위한 학술적 근거를 제시하는 것이다.    
이를 위하여 본 논문은 우선, 표준의 일반적 의미와 WTO협정 전반에서 나타난 
표준에 관한 개념을 연구하였다. 그 결과, 표준에 관한 정의가 일반적으로 통일
되어 있지 않았으며 WTO협정들 사이에서도 “표준”이라는 개념이 일관되게 사용
되지 않고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 또한, ‘표준’개념을 정의하고 ‘표준’에 의
한 통상 문제를 규율하는 것이 목적인 TBT협정에서 조차도 동 개념이 충분히 구
체적으로 규정되지 않아, ‘표준’개념의 법적 모호성과 TBT협정 이행상의 혼란
이 초래되고 있음을 주목하였다. 
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따라서 본 논문은 현행 TBT제도에서 의미하는 ‘표준’개념을 보다 구체적으로 
연구할 필요성을 주목하였다. 특히‘기술규정’과 대칭 하면서도 구별되는 ‘표
준’의 법적 의미, 적용 범위 및 제도적 지위를 비교 분석함으로써 TBT협정에서
의‘표준’개념을 명료화하고자 하였다. 기본적으로 TBT제도상 TBT협정의 규율대
상이 기술규정, 표준 및 적합성평가절차로 나뉘고, ‘표준’은‘기술규정’과 개
념적으로 매우 유사하지만 “강제적/자발적 이행”이라는 법적 요소에 의해 결정
적으로 구분되고 있다. 이러한 구분이 갖는 법적 결과는 매우 중요함을 알 수 있
는데, ‘표준’과 ‘기술규정’에 적용되는 규정들을 각각 비교 분석해 보면, 
TBT협정은 ‘기술규정’보다 ‘표준’에 대해 완화된 법적 의무와 절차를 규정하
고 있으며, 중앙정부기관을 통하여 간접적으로, 그리고 부속서의 모범관행규약에 
대한 사전 수락을 요건으로 한 조건부로 부과되고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 이처럼
‘표준’과 ‘기술규정’의 구분에서 비롯되는 중대한 법적 결과에도 불구하고, 
“강제적/자발적 이행”이라는 법적 요소에 대한 구체적인 규정과 설명이 없어, 
‘표준’개념의 모호성은 한층 더 심화되고 있다.   
TBT협정상 ‘표준’개념과 “강제적/자발적 이행”개념을 명료화하고 바람직한 
해석 방향을 제시하기 위하여, 본 논문은 기본적으로 다음의 두 가지 연구를 바
탕으로 하는 분석 방법을 채택하고 있다. 그 하나는, TBT협정에 관한 다자협상 
과정에서 제시되고 논의되었던 ‘표준’이라는 용어와 그 개념의 발달 과정에 대
한 연구하는 것이다. 구체적으로, 해당 연구는 케네디라운드 협상 직후 TBT협정 
도입에 관한 초기 논의 당시의 ‘표준’개념에서부터 시작하여, 동경라운드 협상 
초안들의 ‘표준’개념, GATT 표준협정에서 채택된 ‘표준’개념, 그리고 우루과
이라운드 협상을 거치면서 일부 변화한 ‘표준’개념들을 발달사적 측면에서 순
차적으로 연구함으로써, 현행 TBT협정상‘표준’개념의 근본적인 도입 배경을 고
찰하고 개념 발달의 흐름 속에서 주목해야 할 중요한 법적 요소와 해석 방향을 
제시하고 있다.   
다른 하나의 접근방법은, 최근 TBT분쟁에서 나타난 ‘표준’및 “강제적/자발
적 이행”에 관한 WTO 분쟁해결기구의 해석 입장과 검토 기준들에 관해 연구하는 
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것이다. 특히 ‘표준’과 ‘기술규정’을 구분하는“강제적/자발적 이행”이라는 
법적 요소에 대해 최근 분쟁에서 논의되고 채택되었던 해석 논리와 접근 방법들
을 분석함으로써, ‘표준’의 의미와 범위를 ‘기술규정’과의 관계 속에서 규명
하고자 하였다.  이 과정에서 분쟁해결을 위하여 최종적으로 채택된 법적 논리 
뿐만 아니라 분쟁당사국들과 WTO회원국들이 제시한 다양한 접근 방법들을 분류하
고 검토함으로써, 향후 나아갈 방향을 제도의 실용성 측면에서 고려하고 있다.  
상기 연구 결과 다음과 같은 몇 가지 중요한 결론들을 도출할 수 있었다. 우선, 
GATT/WTO 다자협상을 통하여 발전해 온 ‘표준’개념의 변천 과정을 연구한 결과, 
기본적으로 ‘표준’이라는 의미를 나타내기 위하여 사용되었던 용어, 그 정의, 
적용 범위가 상당한 변화를 거쳐서 오늘에 이르렀음을 알 수 있었다. 구체적으로 
기술하면, 주요한 발달 특징으로 첫째, 이행이 법적으로 자발적이어야 한다는 
‘표준’에 관한 명시적인 법적 요건이 협상 과정을 통하여 점차 모호해졌으며 
둘째, 과거에는‘표준’개념에 대해 표준을 준비, 도입, 적용하는 기관에 관한 
요건을 중요하게 규정하였으나 표준기관의 범위가 점차 중앙정부 기관, 지방정부 
기관 및 非정부 기관을 모두 포함하는 매우 포괄적으로 발전함에 따라 제도적으
로 무의미한 요소가 되었다. 셋째, 과거 GATT시절 TBT협정은‘표준’과 ‘기술규
정’을 ‘기술요건’등과 같은 상위개념에 속하는 대등한 개념으로 간주하였고, 
협정 의무에 있어서도 큰 차별을 두지 않았으나, 우루과이라운드 협상을 통하여 
‘표준’의 정의가 개정되고 모범관행규약이 도입된 결과, 현행 제도는 ‘표준’
과 ‘기술규정’을 각각의 독립적인 의미와 범위를 갖는 개념으로 규정하고 있다.  
또한, 최근 TBT 분쟁에서 나타난 ‘표준’개념의 해석과 적용을 연구한 결과 
첫째, 현재까지의 분쟁에서는 ‘표준’에 관한 법적 해석과 적용이 협정 제2.4조
의 “관련 국제표준에 기초하여”에 관한 검토 맥락에서만 제한적으로 이루어졌
으면 그 검토 기준 또한 일관적이지 않았다는 결론을 도출할 수 있었다. 둘째, 
US-Tuna II 사건을 분석한 결과 ‘기술규정’인지 ‘표준’인지를 판단하기 위한 
법적 검토가 ‘기술규정’의 정의를 바탕으로만 이루어지고 ‘표준’의 정의는 
고려되지 않았는 바, 이러한 검토방법이 바람직한 것인지에 대한 의문을 제기하
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였다.   셋째, “강제적/자발적 이행”을 검토하는 과정에서 여러 가지 접근방법
들이 제시되고 논의되었으나 상소기구는 “유일하고 배타적인 방법을 제공하였는
지”의 기준을 가장 중요하게 고려하는 한편, “사실상(de facto)/법률상(de 
jure) 강제적이었는지”의 기준과 “시장 판매를 위한 사전적 요건인지”의 기준
을 지나친 명문해석을 바탕으로 명시적으로 배제하였다는 연구 결과를 얻을 수 
있었다. 
이와 같은 연구 결과와 시사점들을 바탕으로 본 논문은, 현행 TBT제도상‘표준’
의 의미를 재조명하고 향후 바람직한 해석 방향을 위하여 고려되어야 할 사항들
을 제시하였다. 그 주요 내용으로 첫째, ‘표준’과 ‘기술규정’이 정의상 다소
의 차이가 있음에도 불구하고 궁극적으로는 하나의 상위개념에 속하는 개념으로 
이해되어야 할 것이고, 그렇다면 현재 적용되고 있는 1단계의 검토방법보다는, 
우선‘표준’과 ‘기술규정’을 공통으로 결정하는 법적 요소들을 검토하고, 다
음으로 둘을 구분하는 “강제적/자발적 이행”이라는 법적 요소들을 검토하는 2
단계 검토방법이 보다 바람직한 접근 방법임을 제시하고 있다. 둘째, 최근 분쟁
에서 적용되었던 “강제적/자발적 이행”에 관한 법적 검토기준들이 ‘표준’또
는 ‘기술규정’을 결정하는 보편적인 검토기준으로 활용될 수 있는지를 검토한 
결과, 대부분이 중복적이거나 필수조건들이라는 한계를 지니는 것으로 분석되었
다. 셋째, “강제적/자발적 이행”개념이 통상적으로 “시장판매를 위한 사전적 
요건인지”의 기준을 바탕으로 널리 이해되고 있는 반면, 최근 분쟁에서는 상소
기구가 이러한 해석 방법을 명시적으로 배제함으로써 ‘표준’개념에 관한 실질
적인 혼란을 가중시키는 결과를 초래한 것으로 분석된다. 또한 상소기구가 “강
제적/자발적 이행”개념의 모호성을 해결하지 않은 채 사안별 접근방법을 최종적
으로 채택함으로써, 결과적으로 TBT제도의 ‘표준’개념은 여전히 불확실하게 남
아 있으며, 실제 적용에 있어 오히려 혼동이 가중될 수 있음을 주목하였다. 
이처럼, 본 연구는 TBT협정의 ‘표준’개념에 대한 법 원칙이 아직 충분히 확
립되지 않은 초기단계에서 수행되었다는 방법론적인 제약에도 불구하고, 제도발
달과 함께 진화해 온‘표준’개념의 변천 과정과 분쟁과정에서 나타난‘표준’에 
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대한 다양한 접근 방법들을 포괄적이고 거시적인 차원에서 연구하여 향후 해석 
방향을 제시하였다는 점에서 학문적 의의를 지닌다. 이와 같이 TBT제도 발달의 
큰 흐름을 파악하고 그 배경 속에서 ‘표준’개념을 재조명함으로써, 동 개념에 
대한 보다 유연한 해석이 가능하고 궁극적으로는 TBT협정 운용을 활성화시킬 수 
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